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Although a relevant share of firms is created out of unemployment and current active labor
market policies in Europe often subsidize unemployed individuals to start their own businesses,
little is known about the role of unemployment insurance (UI) generosity for self-employment. By
using Spanish administrative data including so far inaccessible information on self-employment,
we exploit a reform-driven exogenous cut in UI benefits to identify its causal effect on general
employment and decompose it into the effects on self-employment and re-employment. Exploiting
a discontinuity in the UI benefit schedule which changed as a result of the 2012 Spanish labor
market reform, we estimate the causal reform effects on the extensive margin of (self-)employment
and on unemployment duration. We find heterogeneous effects on the extensive margin: while
the job-finding rate increases, the startup rate decreases. Over different time horizons, the
negative effect on self-employment (35-50%) outweighs the positive effect on employment (5-33%).
Therefore, omitting self-employment as a counterfactual outcome might lead to overestimate
general employment effects. Our UI benefit duration elasticity estimates indicate that reduced
UI benefits extend unemployment duration for individuals transitioning into self-employment but
shorten unemployment for individuals finding re-employment. These results might be relevant
for the (optimal) design of UI systems.
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1 Introduction
Reducing unemployment is a common public policy goal which becomes especially important during
a period of economic crisis. For this reason, Unemployment Insurance (UI) policies aim to provide
a social safety net while limiting moral hazard in order to promote re-employment and to reduce
unemployment duration. In this context, most studies analyze how the generosity of UI systems in
terms of Potential Benefit Duration (PBD) or UI benefit levels affects re-employment outcomes (e.g.
Solon, 1985; Katz & Meyer, 1990; Card & Levine, 2000; Kolsrud, Landais, Nilsson, & Spinnewijn,
2018 and Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) for a critical literature review). However, little is
known about the relationship between UI generosity and self-employment1. The channel from
unemployment to self-employment is economically relevant, particularly in Spain where more than a
quarter of all new firms is started out of unemployment each year.2 Given the potential of successful
startups to create additional employment or to boost innovation, and because self-employment is a
common trajectory for individuals to exit unemployment, current active labor market policies in
Europe often subsidize unemployed individuals to start their own businesses.3 Thus, it is important
to conduct research on understanding the role of UI benefits in the transition from unemployment
to self-employment. More knowledge about this channel would also complete the picture of how
the design of UI benefits affects all relevant post-unemployment outcomes – not only employment –
and may lead to more efficient unemployment policies.
Our paper aims to shed light on this issue by analyzing the heterogeneous effects of UI benefit
level changes on self-employment and employment in Spain. By exploiting reform-driven exogenous
variation in UI benefit levels, we are the first to estimate the causal effects of a cut in UI benefits
(holding PBD fixed) on the probability of exiting from unemployment into self-employment or
employment, i.e. the union of both exit states, and decompose the overall effect into distinct
causal effects on the self-employment probability (startup rate) and the employment probability
(job-finding rate). We investigate the causal effects on the extensive margin and on the quality of
post-unemployment labor market states, and compute unemployment duration elasticities for each
potential exit state. Since most other studies investigate increases in UI generosity, our focus on
analyzing a reduction in UI benefit levels is also novel within this field of research.
From a theoretical point of view, it is ex-ante unclear whether there is a differential effect of a change
in UI benefit levels on self-employment as compared to employment. According to standard search
theory, a cut in UI benefit levels will lower the reservation wage, and thus the opportunity costs
1Regarding the labor market status self-employment, the term founder refers to the person starting a firm which
covers both firms with and without employees. The term entrepreneur is used to focus on a founder who continues to
run a firm after having started it. The term startup refers to the act of starting a firm and is a synonym for new firm.
2Self-employment accounts for 10-15% of the labor force in the member countries of the Organization of Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD). Spain’s self-employment rate is among the highest in the European Union
(EU) - it varied between 16.4% and 17.9% during the 2010s (OECD, 2018). We find that between 2005 and 2018,
30-50% of founders have been unemployed before starting their firms in Spain. In Germany, about one quarter of
startups emerged out of unemployment between 2005 and 2015 (Camarero Garcia & Murmann, 2020).
3In Spain, such policies have been used to address the high (youth) unemployment rates after the economic crisis
of 2007/2008. For instance, in 2013 the Spanish government launched the Strategy of Entrepreneurship and Youth
Employment 2013-2016. This program aimed at promoting self-employment among the unemployed youth through
reductions in social security contributions (González Menéndez & Cueto, 2015). Garcia-Cabo and Madera (2019)
provide a good overview of self-employment options in rigid labor markets like Spain.
1
of searching will decline which should increase search intensity. Consequently, the probability of
exiting unemployment will increase and the actual unemployment duration will decrease (Mortensen,
1977; Schmieder, von Wachter, & Bender, 2016). In other words, the job-finding rate is expected to
rise in response to a cut in UI benefit levels (see, e.g. Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020)
for evidence from Spain). However, a cut in UI benefits may also alter an individual’s decision
to become self-employed. If searching for business opportunities works exactly the same way as
searching for regular employment, standard search theory would also predict an increase in the
startup rate. Nevertheless, a different scenario is also possible: by taking general equilibrium effects
into account, as the reservation wage for employment decreases and labor becomes cheaper, the
number of job vacancies will increase. In this instance, we would again expect a higher job-finding
rate, but also a relative decrease in the startup rate to occur, as more job vacancies do not affect
the latter and only increase re-employment options. Taking both scenarios from standard search
theory into account, the effect of a cut in UI benefits on the startup rate is ambiguous.
In the entrepreneurial choice model, individuals compare their expected returns from employment
and self-employment, and choose the labor market status with a larger expected net income (Lucas,
1978; Kihlstrom & Laffont, 1979; Evans & Jovanovic, 1989). The basic versions of this model focus
on the effect of personal characteristics4 on the entrepreneurial choice problem. Alba-Ramirez
(1994) expands the model with regard to unemployment.5 The model argues that due to the
cut in benefits, actual UI duration decreases for similar reasons as in the standard search model.
Hence, shorter unemployment duration implies less negative unemployment duration dependence
(e.g. less human capital depreciation or stigma effects as illustrated by Jarosch and Pilossoph
(2019)), and thus, relatively better employment prospects compared to a setting without a cut in
UI benefits. Consequently, the expected employment income remains relatively higher, suggesting
that the job-finding rate should increase. With regard to the expected self-employment income,
shorter actual UI benefit duration, however, implies a shorter period of learning regarding market
opportunities, which might lower the expected quality of business ideas and thus potential returns
from self-employment. According to this model, a cut in UI benefits could therefore negatively
affect entrepreneurial success, which would consequently lead to worse self-employment prospects.
Thus, the entrepreneurial choice model predicts rather a decrease in the startup rate, while the
job-finding rate is expected to increase.
Both theories predict a positive effect on the job-finding rate, but also ambiguous effects on the
startup rate. In this study, we provide empirical clarification. We are aware that we cannot fully
identify the right model because there is within-model ambiguity, and our results might be partially
in line with both theories. Nevertheless, we provide new evidence on which future models can base
themselves.
4These characteristics include entrepreneurial skills (Lucas, 1978; Evans & Jovanovic, 1989), risk preferences
(Kihlstrom & Laffont, 1979), and capital constraints (Evans & Jovanovic, 1989).
5Alba-Ramirez (1994) estimates the determinants of the self-employment probability in a sample of previously
employed workers and UI recipients. Given the individual was a former UI recipient, the author finds that the
probability for self-employment significantly increases with longer UI spell duration. Unfortunately, his estimates
may suffer from selection bias as individuals who remain recipients of UI benefits are not taken into account.
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We focus on the Spanish UI system and use comprehensive administrative data from the Continuous
Working Life Sample - Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL). We extract the MCVL’s
information on self-employment which is mostly inaccessible when it comes to similar data of other
countries. In our descriptive analysis, we validate the new information on self-employment against
official data. Our main analysis exploits a Spanish labor market reform in 2012 which led to a
sharp change in UI benefits: with the reform, the net replacement rate for the time after 180 days
of benefit receipt decreased by 10 percentage points (from a replacement rate of 60% to one of
50%). Only individuals entitled to more than 180 days of UI benefits receipt can be affected by
this reform. This quasi-experimental set-up allows us to exploit exogenous variation in UI benefit
levels, in order to estimate the causal effect of a cut in UI benefits on (self-)employment. We use
a sample of UI recipients who were displaced from regular employment and apply a Regression
Discontinuity Design (RDD), which relies on the running variable being the time interval between
the UI entry date and the sharp reform cutoff date, to estimate our causal effects.
First, we estimate the causal effect of UI benefits on the probability of exiting from unemployment
into self-employment or employment, i.e. the union of both exit states. We then decompose the
overall effect into distinct causal effects on the startup rate and the job-finding rate. When estimating
the effect on self-employment, we consider unemployment and employment as counterfactual
outcomes (vice versa for the effect on employment) and, thus, take all possible labor market states6
into account. Second, we estimate the causal reform effect on the unemployment spell duration for
individuals who become self-employed and those who get re-employed and calculate distinct UI
benefit level duration elasticities. Third, we analyze the causal relationship between UI benefits
and the quality of post-unemployment labor market states to infer potential welfare implications.
Our findings show that in response to the cut in UI benefit levels the self-employment probability
declines within the first 180 days of unemployment (short term). This negative effect gets stronger if
the considered time frame is increased up to 360 or 720 days (medium and long term, respectively).
On the contrary, the probability of finding a job is positively affected in the short term whilst
attenuating in the medium and long term. The effect on the union of both exit states is slightly
positive on a short-term basis but attenuates towards zero in the medium and long term, suggesting
that the positive effect on employment and the negative effect on self-employment cancel out each
other. These results clearly show a behavioral response of treated individuals. They increase
their search intensity to find employment before UI benefits drop after 180 days, which explains
the (decrease) increase in the short-term (self-)employment probability. In terms of effect size
our results show notable differences to a study conducted by Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas
(2020)7: from the overall analysis, their RDD estimates point towards a local average treatment
effect on the job-finding rate of 26%, while our estimates are placed in a range between 17% and
19%. Additionally, we find that the negative effect on self-employment (35-50%) is consistently
6We distinguish between unemployment, employment and self-employment. The unemployment state includes
spells with benefit receipt but also spells unregistered (out of labor force) with social security authorities.
7Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020) exploit the same Spanish labor market reform in 2012. They find that
the benefit reduction shortens the mean expected unemployment duration by 14% and increases the job-finding rate
by 26% compared to workers unaffected by the reform, using a RDD. Different to Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas
(2020), we take all possible unemployment exit states into account and consider also long-term effects.
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stronger than the positive effect on employment (5-33%) over different time horizons. Although
Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020) use the same dataset with access to information on
self-employment, they exclude self-employed individuals from their sample. Our findings show that
through the exclusion of individuals who transition from unemployment to self-employment, the
estimated reform effect on the job-finding rate could potentially be upward biased, especially in the
very short term (within the first 90 days of unemployment). This suggests that the exclusion of
data on self-employment is not an innocuous sample selection criterion. Together with the presence
of heterogeneity, the reform’s general employment effect (on both self-employment and employment)
could be substantially overestimated if self-employed workers are excluded from the sample.
We find that UI benefit levels affect the actual unemployment duration of unemployed individuals
no matter whether they become re-employed or self-employed, but in opposing directions. We
estimate a positive UI benefit duration elasticity of approximately 0.6-0.9 for those who become
re-employed. Our estimate is higher compared to findings in other studies which usually estimate
this elasticity based on reforms that extend UI generosity instead of reducing it, suggesting the
existence of asymmetric effects depending on the direction of changes in UI generosity. Interestingly,
we find a negative UI benefit duration elasticity for those transitioning from unemployment to self-
employment (between -0.2 and -1.5). This finding could be explained through liquidity constraints,
imposed by the cut in UI benefits which impact potential founders more so than individuals who
search for regular jobs, due to the fact that those who decide to set up a business may need
more time to collect necessary funding. Moreover, our estimated reform effect is stronger for
self-employment than re-employment, i.e. the cut in UI benefit levels increases actual UI duration
more for those transitioning to self-employment than it decreases UI duration for those transitioning
to employment (joint elasticity is therefore 0.3-0.6). Nevertheless, we are cautious in interpreting
our elasticity results, which are only barely statistically significant with respect to self-employment
but mostly significant with regard to re-employment.
Finally, our analysis concludes that there is mixed evidence of the reform’s effect on the quality
of post-unemployment labor market states. The cut in UI benefits did not significantly affect the
quality of post-unemployment startups or jobs. While re-employment wages appear to stagnate,
our findings suggest that our proxy for self-employment income increases in response to the reform.
Altogether, UI benefits affect the extensive margin of transitions into (self-)employment but not so
much the quality of post-unemployment labor market states.
Our study relates to three strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the entrepreneurship
literature (e.g. Evans & Leighton, 1989; Levine & Rubinstein, 2017) by providing evidence on the
role of UI benefits for entrepreneurship in terms of the extensive margin and composition effects.
Hombert, Schoar, Sraer, and Thesmar (2020) exploit a French reform in 2002 which lowered the
downside risk of establishing a business and find that more self-employment is created when more
social security is provided. We complement this finding by analyzing the causal effect of providing
less security (less UI benefits) on self-employment. Second, our research adds to the optimal
unemployment insurance literature which analyzes the optimal level of benefits and PBD (e.g.
Schmieder, von Wachter, & Bender, 2012; Schmieder et al., 2016; Schmieder & von Wachter, 2016;
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Kolsrud et al., 2018). So far, the focus has been on investigating effects on actual unemployment
duration and subsequent employment outcomes. The effects of PBD extensions are disputed.
For instance, Nekoei and Weber (2017) argue that longer PBD can either induce delay in job
acceptance and thus simply subsidize leisure (disincentive effect), or improve job opportunities
through promoting a longer search that results in job matches of higher quality. While Nekoei
and Weber (2017) find that the latter positive effect is dominant in Austria, Schmieder et al.
(2016) report negative effects of unemployment duration on re-employment wages in Germany.
The literature agrees upon the disincentive effect with regard to UI benefit levels, i.e. an increase
in benefit levels leads to an increase in actual unemployment duration and to a decrease in the
job-finding rate (e.g., Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas, 2020; Meyer & Mok, 2014; Lalive, Van
Ours, & Zweimüller, 2006). However, to the best of our knowledge, self-employment is usually
ignored when these effects are estimated due to a lack of good data. Our study is the first to
investigate the effect of UI benefits on both the job-finding and the startup rate. We show that
the path from unemployment into self-employment is important and should be considered for the
optimal design of UI systems. Third, we contribute to the literature on (un)intended consequences
of economic crisis politics considering UI generosity changes which has mostly focused on the US
(e.g., Farber, Rothstein, & Valletta, 2015; Card, Johnston, Leung, Mas, & Pei, 2015). As a matter
of fact, the labor market reform that we analyze was one of the policies to deal with the aftermath
of the Great Recession and was supposed to reduce unemployment under the pressure of fiscal
consolidation. Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020) and Doris, O’Neill, and Sweetman (2020)
find that a non-standard response of cutting UI benefits in a crisis period increases the job-finding
rate and reduces actual unemployment duration. We complement their findings by also estimating
the effect on self-employment.
During the 2010s and also this present day, in light of the economic crisis that follows the COVID-19
pandemic, many European countries suffer from high unemployment rates which policymakers
often aim to mitigate by easing the transition into self-employment.8 This demonstrates why our
research questions are highly relevant. Moreover, our research enables us to learn about the bias
created in studies which ignore self-employment in their analysis and solely focus on employment.
We believe that Spain is an interesting country to learn from because it allows us to investigate a
policy (in times of crisis) with good internal validity and high data quality. Thus, we can contribute
to the big picture of how UI generosity affects (self-)employment outcomes, which may be relevant
for countries with similar economic conditions.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our data and provides a descriptive analysis
of the Spanish labor market and all labor market flows over time (2005-2018). Section 3 explains
the institutional background of social security in Spain and the labor market reform on which our
identification strategy relies. Section 4 explains our estimation methodology and its underlying
assumptions. Section 5 presents our results. Finally, Section 6 discusses our results and concludes.
8Laffineur, Barbosa, Fayolle, and Nziali (2017) find that such active labor market policies have a positive impact on
the rate of necessity-driven entrepreneurship but no significant effect on the rate of opportunity-driven entrepreneurship.
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2 Data and Descriptive Analysis
In this section, we describe our dataset and demonstrate its representativeness by illustrating to
which extent we can match relevant labor market stocks and flows with official statistics. In this
context, we provide a descriptive analysis of the Spanish labor market, with a particular focus
on the transitions between unemployment, self-employment, and employment over time (during
the time period 2005-2018). Thus, this section illustrates the relevance of our research questions,
establishes important facts for future research and provides insights into how the data can be used.
2.1 MCVL Data
For our analysis we use Spain’s Continuous Working Life Sample - Muestra Continua de Vidas Lab-
orales (MCVL). It contains administrative information on individual socio-economic characteristics
and longitudinal information on labor market statuses and job characteristics for a four percent
non-stratified random sample of Spain’s population. The MCVL takes into account individuals
who were registered with the social security at any point between 2005 and 2018, but it also
entails reliable employment histories retrospectively since the 1980s. MCVL data was released in
14 waves, the first occurring in 2005 and the most recent in 2018. As the anonymized identifiers
are maintained, all MCVL editions can be combined. This allows a representative dataset to be
created in which, as opposed to survey data, there is no problem concerning sample attrition.
MCVL data identifies five different labor market spells: 1) employment; 2) self-employment; 3) UI
benefits receipt; 4) UA benefits receipt; and 5) inactivity. The retrospective nature of the data
enables an individual’s different labor market spells over an entire labor market history to be
tracked. Starting from the point when the individual joined a social security scheme for the first
time, the labor market trajectory can be tracked up until 2018. Naturally, the forthcoming spells
after 2018 are right-censored with the exception of individuals who passed away beforehand. The
spells 1) - 4) imply that the individuals are actively registered with the social security authorities,
whereas individuals in spell 5) are unregistered. In addition to the labor market trajectories, MCVL
data also contains job characteristics. For each employment spell, it provides information on sector,
occupation, skill level required for this job, contract type (temporary vs. permanent, part-time vs.
full-time), contribution basis, reason for dismissal, firm ownership (private vs. public), and the
firm’s location. As individual spell entry/exit dates can be observed, (self-)employment experience
can be calculated as well.9 The socio-economic characteristics entail an individual’s age, sex, date of
birth/death, country of birth, nationality, and formal education. From the province of residence, we
can infer where each UI recipient is currently registered. Appendix E.1 provides more information
on the MCVL data.
Restrictions. For the construction of the quarterly dataset which we use to obtain the relevant
descriptive statistics, we limit our sample to individuals of working age, i.e. 18 years or older, who
are included in the social security files from 2005 to 2018. However, some additional restrictions are
9Following the definition of De La Roca and Puga (2017), we compute experience as accumulated time spent in
employment, starting from the first job in an individual’s life.
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necessary in order to carry out the RDD estimations. Details on the RDD sample are explained in
Section 4.1. Additionally, we give an overview of our variables and data construction in Appendix E.
Procedures to replicate our datasets and results can be gathered from our data documentations.
2.2 Other Data
While processing the MCVL data, the nominal contribution basis was deflated using the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) with 2015 as a base year. Furthermore, some other macroeconomic indicators
of interest for the data description and the analysis have been obtained from official sources.
For instance, the local unemployment rate at the province level is used as a control variable in
our regressions. Similarly, the annual unemployment rate and labor market data, such as the
self-employment rate or labor force participation, have been extracted and used to generate the
descriptive statistics shown in Section 2.3. Our indicators are drawn from the Selected indicators for
Spain of the OECD (2018)10 and the INE (2018)11. Official statistics on the number of beneficiaries
and benefit levels have been extracted from Spain’s Ministry of Labor (2020)12.
2.3 Descriptives - Matching Labor Market Flows
This section documents how the main labor market states evolve in the period 2005-2018 in Spain,
thereby confirming our accuracy in constructing the dataset by showing that we are able to match
key labor market facts as provided by official bodies such as OECD or the Spanish National
Statistics Institution (Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE)). For clarity purposes, the terms
Self-Employment (SE), Employment (E), Unemployment (U), and Out of Labor Force (OL) are
abbreviated in our graphs.
Labor Force. The composition of the labor force is plotted in Figure A.1. The largest section of
the labor force consists of employed workers. In 2005, their share was 78% of the labor force which
subsequently declined due to the financial crisis from 2008 onwards until a share of approximately
60% was reached. This drop of 18 percentage points (p.p.) was absorbed by the unemployed
individuals’ share which increased after the crisis by an equivalent amount. The share of self-
employed individuals remains roughly constant at 18%. A slight increase in the self-employment
share is observable from 2013 onwards. When analyzing the age distribution of the labor force,
Figure A.2 reveals that self-employment is more relevant for the older individuals (age groups over
40) than for younger individuals. The share of self-employed as percentage of the labor force is only
around 10-15% for those younger than 40, whereas it ranges between 20-24% for those in the age
groups above 40. A closer look at Spain’s labor force in the OECD data reveals that a four percent
sample should equal on average 913,000 individuals across the sample period (OECD, 2018).13
10OECD data for Spain can be retrieved from: https://data.oecd.org/spain.htm
11INE data for Spain can be retrieved from: https://www.ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/en/listaoperaciones.html
12Unemployment benefits statistics from Spain’s Ministry of Labor (2020) can be retrieved from: http://www
.mitramiss.gob.es/estadisticas/PRD/welcome.htm
13The Spanish average labor force level from 2005 until 2015 was approximately 22,817,000 individuals per year
(OECD, 2018). Thus, a four percent sample should result in 0.04 · 22,817,000 ≈ 913,000 individuals.
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Evolution of the Spanish Labor Market. In Appendix Figure A.3, Spain’s annual unemploy-
ment rate using MCVL and OECD data is illustrated for the sample period. The unemployment
rates from both sources are based on individuals of working age, including all sectors and all social
security schemes, such that they are comparable. It is important to note that the OECD restricts
the working age population to individuals between 15 and 64 years old, whilst the INE’s Working
Conditions Survey focuses on individuals older than 16 years of age. We restrict our descriptive
sample to individuals who are 18 years or older.14 In spite of these differences, the computed
unemployment rate using MCVL data is very similar to the quarterly unemployment rate reported
by INE (left panel figure) and also matches OECD’s annual unemployment rate (right panel figure).
Concerning the self-employment rate, measured in terms of total employment, Figure A.4 confirms
that our data cleaning process and the construction of our dataset from the MCVL data enable us
to match quarterly statistics from INE (left-hand panel), as well as annual statistics from OECD
data (right-hand panel). Specifically, Figure A.4 shows that self-employment has been slowly rising
until reaching its peak in 2014 at nearly 20% and then declining again.
For completeness, Figure A.5 illustrates part-time and Figure A.6 temporary employment rates in
Spain. Again, we compare our calculated data with both official statistics from Spain (quarterly
INE data in the left-hand panels) and OECD data (annual data in the right-hand panels). While
the part-time rate has continuously increased from 10% in 2005 to 15% by 2018, the temporary
contract rate reflects an U-shape evolution. This is in line with the observation that during an
economic crisis temporary contracts are not renewed, and therefore this group of workers is among
the first to be laid-off (as can be seen from the drop of around 27% to 20% in the temporary
employment contract rate during the crisis). In contrast, when the recovery started (in Spain at
the end of 2013) temporary employment recovered first and surpassed pre-crisis levels in 2017.
Labor Market Flows. Figure 1 shows that the inflow into self-employment is considerably
dominated by flows from unemployment. In other words, a relevant share of founders in Spain
has been previously unemployed, and the inflow from unemployment into self-employment is
important. This inflow from unemployment makes up 30-50% of all new self-employed individuals
every year.15 Moreover, the composition of inflows into self-employment exhibits counter-cyclical
patterns, especially from 2010 onwards. While the share of inflows from previously employed
workers decreases, the share of inflows from previously unemployed individuals increases during
a crisis. Although outflows from unemployment to self-employment might only reflect 5% of the
whole unemployment stock (Figure A.12), there are usually job spillovers, i.e. most founders
have employees. Consequently, the economic significance of our object of interest is a multiple
of the outflow statistics from unemployment to self-employment and is therefore quantitatively
important. Thus, startups can be engines for economic growth. It is worth noting that the role of
14For a summary of the main sample characteristics, on a person basis, see the last two columns in Table B.1.
15In the Appendix, we also show the same figures including the stocks of self-employed. Looking at stocks
of self-employed individuals in our representative sample shows that around 80% of the self-employed remain in
self-employment in the following year (less during the crisis period): Figure A.7 shows the yearly inflows including
the self-employment stock dimension, Figure A.8 shows the same for outflows from self-employment excluding the
self-employment stock dimension. The graphs confirm that new inflows into self-employment are mainly composed
out of new self-employed individuals who were previously unemployed or employed. In particular, the share of new
inflows to self-employment out of unemployment increases until around 2013.
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Notes: These figures illustrate the yearly inflows to self-employment in Spain, in both absolute (left-hand side) and
relative (right-hand side) terms. The sample consists of all individuals who are 18 years of age or older. We distinguish
inflows of individuals from the relevant states: Out of Labor Force (OL), Employment (E), and Unemployment (U).
See Figures A.7 to A.12 for a representation of inflows to and outflows from other statuses.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
self-employment for the inflows into employment (Figure A.9) appears not to change much over
time. This is also true for the outflows from employment to self-employment (Figure A.10), but is
different to the patterns observed when analyzing the outflows from unemployment.
Figure A.12 illustrates that the share of individuals who transition from unemployment to self-
employment remains relatively stable during the years surrounding the reform, even though they
are relatively larger than at the beginning of the sample period. However, the outflows from
unemployment are clearly dominated by employment, especially during the years 2012 and 2013.
Moreover, Figure A.11 shows a similar pattern regarding the inflows into unemployment. The
relative destruction of employment increases until 2013, when the economic recovery changes the
trend. The inflow into unemployment from employment starts to decline thereafter.
Self-Employment Characteristics. Table B.1 compares the main characteristics of employed
versus self-employed individuals. Regarding their socioeconomic features, we observe a gender gap
in the group of self-employed individuals: while 47% of employed individuals are female, only 35%
of self-employed individuals are women. The average age of the self-employed individuals (44 years)
is higher than the average age of employed individuals (37 years). Moreover, the distribution of
education levels differs to a certain extent: for example, the share of highly educated workers is
larger for employed (15%) than for self-employed individuals (13%). This might be due to the fact
that the trade and agricultural sectors are more relevant for self-employment. Moreover, the share
of migrant founders (15%) is smaller than the share of immigrants among employees (26%).
Additionally, Figure A.13 illustrates the composition of self-employment with regard to the sector
in which the business has been started. Our findings indicate that self-employment is important in
the construction sector. The share of founders in that sector increases until 2008, when it begins to
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decrease in favor of other sectors like trade (retail and tourism), education, health, social, auxiliary,
information, communication, insurance, and scientific services.16
Earnings. Figure A.14 compares the evolution of average annual real earnings from tax and social
security data.17 Both move parallel to one another: average earnings increased until 2009 but
declined during the crisis period. They have only started to recover since 2014 but are still below
pre-crisis levels at around 21,000 euros. The evolution of earnings follows the previously described
patterns of the unemployment rate. In this context Bonhomme and Hospido (2017) document that
earnings inequality (between 2004 and 2010) also appears to have evolved in line with the evolution
of unemployment rates using similar social security data. Figure A.16 shows that the distribution
of average monthly earnings is skewed to the left with a large dispersion across top incomes. Thus,
most citizens in Spain earn an income that is below the mean.
3 Institutional Framework and Reform
Spain provides social security protection which covers healthcare, professional care for illnesses or
accidents, and benefits for (temporary) disability, maternity, paternity, death, retirement, and job
loss (SEPE, 2019). In the following section we will only focus on benefits in case of job loss. For
details on the institutional background, we refer to Appendix F.1.
3.1 Unemployment Benefits in Spain
Unemployment Insurance (UI) Benefits. To get UI benefits, an individual must be legally
unemployed, 16-65 years old, must have contributed to social security for at least 360 days within
the last six years, and the reason of unemployment must be involuntary dismissal (SEPE, 2019).
The monthly UI benefit amount is computed from the regulatory base, which is an approximation
of the average labor income over the 180 days preceding the unemployment spell, multiplied by
the replacement rate. For the first 180 days of UI benefit receipt, a replacement rate of 70% is
applied. If the individual is entitled to more than 180 days of UI benefits, another replacement
rate is valid from day 181 onward. This second rate corresponded to 60% in the period before
the reform of July 2012 took place. The reform reduced the second replacement rate to 50% of
the regulatory base. According to the SEPE (2019), the monthly UI benefit amount is subject
to a floor of 80% of the Public Income Index - Indicador Público de Renta de Efectos Múltiples
(IPREM)18 - and a ceiling of 225% of the IPREM. It is increased by one sixth of the monthly
benefit amount conditional on the number of dependent children. Details on the calculation of UI
benefits can be inferred from Table B.2 in the Appendix B. Moreover, the bounds of UI (and of
unemployment assistance) benefit amounts were kept constant between 2010 and 2016, when the
IPREM was frozen. In other words, during the period of our analysis, all relevant social security
16According to the classification of the Bank of Spain (García & Román, 2019), the construction sector decreased
in favor of transport, tourism and retail, but also professional, scientific, administrative, and auxiliary services.
17We compare average monthly and daily real earnings from tax and social security data in Figure A.15.
18The IPREM serves as a reference to calculate social security benefits and is revised on an annual basis. Since
June 25 2004 the IPREM replaced the minimum wage which was previously used to calculate social benefit amounts.
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benefit levels were kept nominally constant in Spain. An overview of the evolution of UI benefit
levels is provided in Figure A.17 in Appendix A.
The duration of entitlement to UI benefits depends on the contribution period. Appendix Table B.3
shows that the Potential Benefit Duration (PBD) starts from a minimum of 120 days given a
contribution period of at least 360 days. It increases gradually by 60 days conditional on the
respective length of the contribution period. The maximum possible PBD is 720 days (SEPE, 2019).
For more details on the Spanish UI system, we refer to Appendix F.2.
Unemployment Assistance (UA) Benefits. Under certain conditions registered job seekers
are eligible for Unemployment Assistance (UA) benefits: the individual must be ineligible for UI
benefits (or exhausted them) and the monthly gross income must be less than 75% of Spain’s
minimum wage. Additional information on the UA system is provided in Appendix F.3. Moreover,
the evolution of the number of UI/UA beneficiaries is shown in Figure A.18.
3.2 Labor Market Reform in 2012
We focus on a Spanish labor market reform which was publicly announced on July 13, 2012.19 On
this day, Spain’s vice president explained that all recipients entitled to more than 180 days of UI
benefits who start their UI spell after July 14 2012 would experience a reduced Replacement Rate
(RR) of 50% after their first 180 days of UI benefits receipt. Thus, this reform decreased UI benefits
by approximately 16.67% in comparison to the previous RR of 60%. This new RR is marked by
the red line in Figure 2. For all UI recipients who entered the UI system before July 15 2012 the
old rate (blue line) remained valid from day 181 of the benefit period onward. As illustrated by the
black line, the RR of 70% for the first 180 days of the UI PBD remained unchanged.











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
UI benefit month
RR for the first 6 months old RR after 6 months new RR after 6 months
Notes: This figure shows the drop in the Replacement Rate (RR) of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits before
and after the reform.
Source: Authors’ illustration of the reform.
19By virtue of the Royal Decree-Law 20/2012, this reform aimed to ensure budgetary stability and competitiveness.
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Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020) note that the reform’s consequences for UI benefits
became quickly known publicly as the new law received broad media attention. Nonetheless, a
displaced worker’s decision to claim benefits should not have been affected by the reform because
for the first 180 days of benefit receipt the RR stayed the same. As the benefit cut kicks in 180
days after the UI spell entry, we can investigate individuals’ responses in job search behavior before
and after the actual drop in the net RR takes place.
According to Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020), strategic lay-offs caused by the new
law have been fairly improbable because the reform had already been implemented two days
after its announcement. They also show that trends of monthly inflows into the UI system were
similar during 2011 and 2012. As we discuss in Section 4.2, our analysis confirms that strategic
manipulation around the reform cutoff date is not an issue, and thus the reform can be exploited as
a quasi-experiment. Since Spain’s unemployment rate reached its zenith of 26.1% in 2013 (OECD,
2018), the implementation of this reform affected a large portion of the Spanish labor force and
was fairly unexpected in times when the economy was unlikely to improve for many months to
come. Consequently, it cannot be argued that its implementation was endogenous to an anticipated
recovery of the economy (Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas, 2020).
Besides the reduction in the RR, the reform also changed labor market rules for part-time workers
and workers older than 52 years of age. Moreover, reforms adopted in 2013 had the goal of promoting
self-employment among young workers. In Appendix F.6.3, we show that these self-employment
reforms do not influence our results. A detailed overview of all reforms is given in Appendix F.6.
4 Empirical Strategy
The aim of this paper is to investigate the heterogeneous treatment effects of (reducing) UI benefit
levels on (self-)employment in Spain. A decrease in UI benefit levels was implemented as part of
Spain’s 2012 labor market reform. The new law lowered the RR after the first 180 days of an
individual’s UI benefit spell by about 16.67% (cf. Section 3.2). Since only the individuals entitled
to more than 180 days of UI benefits who entered their benefit spell after July 14 2012 are affected
by the reform, we can exploit this quasi-experimental set-up to identify causal reform effects using
an RDD. Our estimation sample consists of UI recipients who were displaced from a full-time job.20
We follow each individual until he or she chooses to accept a job, becomes self-employed or until the
end of 2018 in case he or she remains unemployed (or out of the labor force). For individuals who
become self-employed, the counterfactual outcome would be to find a job or to stay unemployed.
For individuals who become employed, the counterfactual would be to become self-employed or to
stay unemployed. Our sample includes the whole set of possible exit states from unemployment.
Thus, we can avoid the potential bias that emerges through ignoring self-employment and only
focusing on employment.
20We exclude individuals who were self-employed right before they received cease-of-activity benefits (analogous to
UI benefits) because their eligibility rules deviate from the UI eligibility criteria of regularly employed individuals
(compare Appendix F.4). This does not, however, necessarily mean that individuals in our sample have no self-
employment experience. It could be the case that they have previously been self-employed at an earlier stage of their
employment history.
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Notes: These figures illustrate the reform effect on the probability of exiting unemployment into self-employment,
employment, or either of them within the first 720 days of the UI spell from the raw data. We apply the IMSE-optimal
number of quantile-spaced bins using a cubic polynomial (linear and quadratic versions are presented in Figure C.1).
Our sample includes individuals who are 25-52 years old, entitled to more than 180 days of UI benefits, and who
entered their UI benefit spell between January 1 2011 and December 31 2013, after having been laid-off from a
full-time employment spell in a private firm (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
In Figure 3 we plot the effect of the UI benefit cut in 2012 on the probability of exiting from
unemployment into (a) self-employment, (b) employment or (c) either of them (the union of both
exit states) within the first 720 days of the unemployment spell from the raw data using a cubic
polynomial. As suggested by Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik (2019), we apply the integrated mean
squared error (IMSE) optimal number of quantile-spaced bins.21 We find evidence of a negative
reform effect on the startup rate and a positive reform effect on the job-finding rate, regardless of
the polynomial order used (compare Figure C.1). It is worth noting that the scale is different for
each exit state because more individuals transition into employment rather than self-employment.
The effect on the union of self-employment and employment appears to be rather small if we use
a quadratic polynomial (in Figure C.1) and vanishes if we use a cubic one. Consequently, using
different functional forms to verify robustness of our results seems highly relevant. Overall, the raw
data imply that the reform effects on (self-)employment may point in different directions.
Our plots only depict the overall effects within the first 720 days of unemployment. The results of
Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020) suggest heterogeneous treatment effects depending on
the length of the actual unemployment spell duration. In their RDD set-up they find that the cut
in UI benefits increases the job-finding rate on average by 26%, but only in the short term before
the actual RR drop takes place (anticipation effect). We expect that the cut in UI benefits may
not only affect employment in a heterogeneous manner, but also self-employment.
4.1 Methodology
Being affected by the reform is a deterministic and discontinuous function of time. Our RDD
approach exploits the sharp treatment discontinuity introduced by the reform. When taking only
individuals entitled to more than 180 days of UI benefits into consideration, those who enter their UI
benefit spell after July 14 2012 are directly affected by the benefit cut (treatment group), whereas
21Bins contain approximately the same number of observations but their length may differ (Cattaneo et al., 2019).
13
those who still entered into UI before that date represent a valid counterfactual (control group). If
nothing changed around the cutoff other than the treatment discontinuity induced by the reform,
this setting allows us to identify the causal reform effect. Thus, identification relies on individuals’
UI entry being a smooth function around the cutoff date which cannot be precisely manipulated.
Estimation sample. We restrict our sample to individuals entitled to more than 180 days22 of
UI benefits who entered their benefit spell between January 1 2011 and December 31 2013 after
being laid-off from a full-time employment spell in a private23 firm. We exclude individuals who
contributed to a social security scheme24 different from the general scheme right before they became
unemployed, as well as disabled persons. Moreover, we restrict our sample to individuals between
the ages of 25 and 52. As the new law from 2012 also changed labor market rules for workers
older than 52 years of age, this seems to be a reasonable maximum age restriction to avoid bias
from other parts of the reform. We exclude individuals not affected by the reform because their
benefits either hit the ceiling or the floor of the UI benefit amount both before and after the RR
drop (see Section 3.1 and Appendix Table B.2 for more details). In line with Fernandez-Navia
(2020) we exclude UI benefit spells for which individuals potentially use the option right.25 In case
of multiple UI entries of the same person within our time period of interest, we keep one random
observation. We drop a handful of individuals who leave the sample (due to death or emigration)
to avoid potential sample selection bias (Fernandez-Navia, 2020).
Appendix Table C.1 shows mean values and standard deviations of pre-displacement characteristics
of individuals in our RDD sample. We distinguish between individuals who exit from unemployment
into self-employment (4,132) and employment (27,630) within the first 720 days of their unemploy-
ment spell. The total sample column additionally includes individuals who stay unemployed or
whose exit states are censored (2,819). Similar to the comparison regarding our descriptive analysis
(Table B.1), the share of women and immigrants is higher for individuals who exit into employment
as compared to those who exit into self-employment. The characteristics of self-employed and
employed workers differ in our RDD sample regarding the presence of children, education, skill level,
earnings, PBD, and other variables. Individuals who exit into self-employment tend to be more
educated and have worked in an occupation with a higher skill level in comparison to those who exit
into employment.26 The self-employed workers earn, on average, only slightly higher monthly real
incomes and are entitled to only slightly more PBD.27 In general, differences between both groups
are less severe as compared to the sample that we used for our descriptive analysis (Table B.1),
which is due to our sample restrictions that make treatment and control groups comparable.
22As the RR drop kicks in after the first 180 days of benefit receipt, individuals entitled to a maximum of 180 days
of UI benefits are not affected by the reform.
23Shortly after the reform’s implementation, we find an increase in dismissals of public firm workers in the data.
We also find evidence of imbalanced covariates if we include public firm workers, which is why we decided to exclude
them from our sample. In fact, austerity policy led to a decline in public sector workers in 2012 (see Appendix F.5).
24In addition to the general scheme, special schemes also exist for sea workers, etc. (see also Appendix F.1).
25If individuals use the option right, we cannot be sure whether they use up their old entitlement based on the rules
from the pre-reform period or entitlements based on the rules valid after the cutoff date (see also Appendix F.2).
26This might be due to the exclusion of individuals who contributed to special social security schemes (i.e. marine
scheme, agricultural scheme, etc.) who are characterized by lower education and skill level. Since these schemes are
particularly important for the self-employed, this group experiences the largest changes.
27This might be due to the exclusion of individuals entitled to no more than 180 days of UI benefits.
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Estimation equation. We employ a non-parametric local polynomial estimation framework
using a triangular kernel function, different polynomials as a sensitivity check, and a bandwidth
that optimizes the mean squared error (MSE) as recommended by Cattaneo et al. (2019). Standard
errors are clustered at UI entry date level to account for potential correlation in unobservable
characteristics (Lee & Card, 2008). Our estimation equation can be illustrated as follows:
Yi =α+β ·1(ti ≥ 0)+ δ(ti)+θXi + εi (1)
We use three different sets of outcome variables, Yi. With our first set of outcome variables we intend
to measure extensive margin effects. In this case, our dependent variable Yi is a binary outcome
which takes the value of one if individual i exits from unemployment into the state of interest
(self-employment, employment or the union of both as shown in Figure 4, where each exit state of
interest is highlighted in blue) within the first 90, 180, 360, and 720 days of being unemployed. It
takes the value zero if the individual remains unemployed or exits into the counterfactual state
(Figure 4, highlighted in gray). This measure can also be interpreted as a cumulative hazard rate
because the probability of exiting from unemployment into the state of interest is accumulated over
time.28 Summary statistics of our extensive margin outcomes are shown in Appendix Table C.2.


















Notes: Alongside UI spells, unemployment also includes UA spells and unregistered spells which essentially means
the individual is unemployed without receiving any kind of benefits (out of labor force).
Source: Authors’ own illustration.
The second set of outcome variables measures the unemployment spell duration in months such
that we can compute duration elasticities. We distinguish between the general Unemployment (UE)
spell duration (including UI, UA, and unemployment spells without benefit receipt) and UI spell
duration (excluding periods without UI benefit receipt). We run unemployment duration regressions
for different subsamples: for individuals who transition from unemployment into self-employment,
employment, and the union of both within the first 360 and 720 days of their unemployment spell.
We then calculate distinct duration elasticities for each of these subsamples, i.e. we divide the
percentage change in UI or UE duration (relative to the pre-reform average duration, as illustrated
28Example: If individual i exits into self-employment within the first 90 days of unemployment, the same individual
also exits within 180, 360, etc. days into self-employment. For this particular individual the self-employment (and
self-employment or employment) outcome variables will always take the value one and the employment outcome
variables will always take the value zero.
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in Table C.17) by the percentage change in the RR due to the reform (approximately 16.67%):
η = % change in UI or UE duration% change in RR (2)
Our third set of outcome variables consists of quality measures regarding the unemployment
exit states to assess the reform’s potential welfare implications. Namely, (self-)employment spell
duration29 (in months), logarithm of the real average social security contribution basis30, a dummy
variable indicating whether the individual earned an income above the median31 before he or she
became unemployed, and eight sector dummy variables32. Regarding the employment quality
measures we additionally include a permanent contract dummy. We take potentially heterogeneous
reform effects on (self-)employment quality into account by restricting our sample to individuals
who transition into a (self-)employment spell within the first 360 and 720 days of unemployment.
Our running variable, ti, is the UI entry date of individual i, normalized to zero at the cutoff date
(July 15 2012). The treatment dummy variable is represented by the indicator function 1(ti ≥ 0)
which equals one if individual i enters the UI benefit spell after July 14 2012 (ti ≥ 0) and zero if
the individual enters before that date (ti < 0). We control for the smooth relationship between the
running variable and Yi using the function δ(.) which allows a different slope before and after the
reform cutoff date. The effect of the running variable on the outcome variable may therefore be
different before the cutoff than after the cutoff date. We use a linear, quadratic, and a cubic spline
to test sensitivity of results. By adding different sets of predetermined covariates, Xij , this enables
us to investigate the sensitivity of our results. If our point estimates change considerably due to
the inclusion of additional covariates, the identification assumption might be violated.
Our predetermined covariates are measured at an individual’s UI spell entry and include socio-
economic, pre-displacement job, and unemployment characteristics. The socio-economic character-
istics refer to a female dummy, age and age squared (in years), educational level dummies (lower,
medium, and higher education), a dummy for the presence of children in the household, and an
immigrant33 dummy. The pre-displacement job characteristics refer to an individual’s employment
29We observe individuals’ spells until the end of 2018. Consequently, individuals who switch into an UI spell by the
end of 2013 can be observed until a maximum of five years. We guarantee that pre- and post-reform period spells
potentially have the same duration maximum by artificially right-censoring exit states’ duration after five years.
30The contribution basis corresponds to the real earnings with regard to individuals who exit into employment.
Unfortunately, we have no information on self-employment income, but we use the contribution basis as best available
proxy. Self-employed individuals must choose a contribution base within existing legal bounds which are legally
determined each year. The minimum and maximum basis from which the self-employed can choose depends on
personal and occupational characteristics. Starting from the legal minimum contribution base, they have to pay a
higher percentage of their income as social security contributions if they choose a higher protection level. We can
only approximately infer the income of self-employed individuals.
31Median monthly real wage from social security data: 1,471.63 euros. We define workers being of high quality
if they received a pre-unemployment monthly real wage above the median. If the probability that individuals who
become (self-)employed are high quality workers increases due to the reform, this may indicate an increase in the
(self-)employment quality.
32Sector 1: Agriculture, extraction, primary manufacturing; Sector 2: Manufacturing and utilities; Sector 3:
Construction; Sector 4: Trade; Sector 5: Transport and storage; Sector 6: Accommodation and food services; Sector
7: Information, communication, finance, insurance, real estate, and scientific services; Sector 8: Education, health,
social, auxiliary, and other services.
33We define an immigrant as a person with a different birth country than that of Spain. Our results are robust to
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experience (in months), self-employment experience dummy, logarithm of real monthly average
earnings, permanent contract dummy, eight sector dummy variables, and occupational skill level
(high, medium, low skilled). Ultimately, unemployment characteristics include the PBD (in months)
and the quarterly unemployment rate of the province the individual lived in during UI entry.
Summary statistics of pre- and post-reform period means are presented in Appendix Table C.3.
The variables’ detailed definitions can be inferred from Appendix E.3.
In the following sections we focus on the estimated treatment effect β̂. As our estimation technique
relies on a local approach, we estimate the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of the cut in UI
levels for workers who switch into an UI spell in the vicinity of the cutoff date. Due to limited space
we only show the main results in the text. More detailed results are presented in Appendix C.
4.2 Identification
As assignment into the treatment group is solely determined by each individual’s UI entry date,
identification of the causal LATE hinges on the assumption that individuals cannot precisely
manipulate this date. In other words, the running variable must be continuous around the cutoff.
Given that the reform was already implemented two days after being announced, it seems plausible
that this assumption holds. Additionally, an individual is only entitled to receive UI benefits if the
reason of dismissal is involuntarily and the employer has to inform the worker about the dismissal
two weeks in advance - facts which limit the possibility of precise manipulation tremendously.
Appendix Figure C.2 shows the histogram of our running variable. It plots the number of UI entrants
at each date, centered around the reform cutoff. In line with the findings of Fernandez-Navia (2020),
our descriptive evidence shows that most UI entrants systematically occur at the beginning of each
month due to administrative reasons. Nonetheless, there is no suspicious peak or drop close to the
cutoff, such that we find no visual evidence for precise manipulation.
Even though logical reasoning and visual inspection speak in favor of our identification assumption,
we also test its validity empirically. As suggested by Cattaneo et al. (2018), a non-parametric local
polynomial approach should be used to estimate the density of the running variable below and
above the cutoff, respectively. According to Cattaneo et al. (2019) this sort of manipulation test has
better power properties than other manipulation tests and does not require pre-binning of the data.
Figure 5a plots the resulting density of the running variable and its 95% confidence intervals.34 On
both sides of the cutoff the confidence intervals clearly overlap, indicating continuity of the running
variable around the cutoff. We estimate a t-statistic of 0.2657 with a p-value of 0.7905 which
confirms the visual impression. Additionally, we run a more typical density test based on McCrary
(2008) to verify continuity around the cutoff.35 We plot the estimated density in Figure 5b using a
bin size of three (results remain robust if different bin sizes are used). According to the estimated
test statistic of -0.0032 with a standard error of 0.0417, the null hypothesis of continuity around
the cutoff cannot be rejected which, again, speaks in favor of our identification assumption.
the inclusion of an immigrant variable defined by a person’s nationality.
34We use the rddensity routine in Stata to run the RD manipulation test (Cattaneo et al., 2018).
35We use the DCdensity routine in Stata to run the McCrary test.
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Figure 5: Continuity of the Running Variable
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Notes: Figure (a) depicts the density of the running variable and its 95% confidence intervals using non-parametric
local polynomial density estimation as suggested by Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2018). We estimate a t-statistic of
0.2657 with a p-value of 0.7905. Figure (b) plots the density of the running variable based on the approach suggested
by McCrary (2008). Using a bin size of three and the default bandwidth calculation (bandwidth = 170) we estimate
a log difference in height of -0.0032 (0.0417) with standard errors in parentheses. According to both tests, the
null hypothesis of a continuous running variable cannot be rejected, which is evidence in favor of our identification
assumption. We use our RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
Validity of our approach is not guaranteed through continuity around the cutoff of the running
variable. We require that nothing else changes except for the treatment assignment (and potentially
our outcome variables). More precisely, it is necessary that any other determinant of our outcome
variables correlated with the running variable is continuous in the vicinity of the cutoff. Thanks to
the RDD we can directly test the balancing assumption of our covariates by estimating equation 1
and putting each of the covariates on the left-hand side.
Appendix C.3 shows the estimated reform effects on the covariates and their corresponding balancing
plots in detail. We estimate a linear and a quadratic version of the running variable and include
the remaining covariates on the right-hand side.36 Regardless of the functional form used, most of
the estimated coefficients are close to zero and insignificant. There are only two exceptions. The
reform effect on the immigrant dummy variable is estimated to be significantly different from zero
at the 5% level in both the linear and the quadratic set up. However, the estimates we present in
the next section remain robust if we exclude immigrants. Hence, this slight imbalance does not
affect our results.37 Another exception is the low-skilled occupation dummy variable which seems
to be significantly positively affected by the reform but only at the 10% significance level in the
quadratic set-up. The remaining 22 covariates are perfectly balanced which may also be inferred
from the balancing plots (Appendix Figures C.3 to C.6). Overall, manipulation and balancing tests
support the validity of our identification assumption.
36The results remain robust if the basic RDD set-up without covariates is used.
37We decided to include immigrants in our main set-up because they make up an important share (16.5%) of
self-employed individuals (Appendix C.1).
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5 Results
5.1 Reform Effects on the Extensive Margin
Our baseline results from local quadratic regressions without covariates are visualized in Figure 6. It
plots the (discontinuous) average exit probabilities before and after the cutoff date. The subfigures
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UI entry centered around the reform date
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UI entry centered around the reform date
Notes: These figures illustrate the estimated quadratic reform effect on different UI exit states without covariates
using MSE-optimal bandwidths as suggested by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). We use the rdrobust
routine in Stata to select the MSE-optimal bandwidth and the rdplot routine to generate the graphs. We use our
RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions). See Figures C.7 to C.8 for
the analogous linear and cubic specifications.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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depict the effects on the average probability of exiting from unemployment into (a) self-employment,
(b) employment, and (c) self-employment or employment. We take potential heterogeneity into
account by plotting the effects within different time periods of the unemployment spells. The first
row corresponds to exit probabilities within the first 90 days of unemployment, the second row to
the exit probabilities within the first 180 days, the third row to those within 360 days, and the
last row to the exit probabilities within 720 days of unemployment duration. Thus, we distinguish
between short-term (90 or 180 days), medium-term (360 days), and long-term effects (720 days).
Moreover, the cumulative unemployment exit probability increases if a longer period of time is
taken into consideration. Therefore, the scale of the y-axis increases if the time horizon is extended.
The figure shows that the reform effect on the startup rate is consistently negative and is rather small
on a short-term basis but it intensifies over time. By contrast, the job-finding rate is consistently
positively affected. The effect is stronger in the short term and decreases over time. The aggregate
effect on the probability of exiting into self-employment or employment is slightly positive in the
short term but vanishes in the medium and long term. Regardless of the exit state considered, the
effect size is very similar if we use a cubic polynomial (see Figure C.8; for the sake of completeness,
linear plots are illustrated in Figure C.7). As almost none of the fitted lines appears to be linear,
the figures suggest a second or higher order relationship between the running and outcome variable.
Therefore, we focus on higher order relationships in the subsequent section.
Overall, we can confirm the visual findings of the raw data when conducting our RDD regression
(compare Section 4.1). We find a negative effect on the self-employment probability and a positive
effect on the employment probability which cancel out each other if the union of both exit states is
taken as an aggregate exit probability. However, the effect intensity varies over time, supporting
our presumption of heterogeneous treatment effects.
Table 1 shows our significantly estimated reform effects on the probability of exiting from unemploy-
ment into self-employment (SE, panel A) in the medium term and on the probability of exiting into
re-employment (E, panel B) in the short term. Panel C refers to the estimated reform effect on the
probability of exiting into self-employment or employment (SE or E) in the short term. Alongside
point estimates and p-values we indicate the estimated average change in the outcome variable due
to the reform relative to its pre-reform average outcome. We also indicate the polynomial of the
running variable, whether covariates are added or not, the selected MSE-optimal bandwidth, and
the effective number of observations used to the left and the right of the cutoff. Appendix Tables
C.4-C.8 contain extensive versions of our results.
Our results show that the lower UI benefits negatively affect the probability of becoming self-
employed within the first 360 days of unemployment. The point estimate is significant at the 5%
level if we use a local quadratic regression without covariates (panel A, first row). The significance
level is only slightly reduced if covariates are added (panel A, second row). The UI benefit cut
decreases the self-employment probability in the medium term, on average, by 3.5 percentage points
(p.p.). Given a pre-reform self-employment mean probability of 9.6% (Table C.2), this corresponds
to a decrease of 36.5%. In the cubic setting the decrease corresponds to 45.8% and is significant at
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Table 1: Reform Effects on the Extensive Margin
Outcome Variable RD Estimate Rel. Change s.e. p-value Polynom. Covs. Bandwidth N Left N Right
(A) SE within 360 days -0.043 -44.8% 0.022 0.028 quadratic 166.751 5,676 5,758
-0.035 -36.5% 0.021 0.060 quadratic X 178.160 5,863 6,171
-0.048 -50% 0.023 0.018 cubic 264.475 9,105 9,125
-0.044 -45.8% 0.023 0.030 cubic X 239.670 7,973 8,172
(B) E within 180 days 0.076 16.6% 0.042 0.033 quadratic 150.063 4,926 5,244
0.080 17.5% 0.041 0.027 quadratic X 150.738 4,813 5,109
0.085 18.6% 0.044 0.025 cubic 235.693 8,071 8,292
0.086 18.8% 0.044 0.024 cubic X 234.536 7,829 8,057
(C) SE or E within 90 days 0.070 20.1% 0.043 0.056 quadratic 160.199 5,252 5,626
0.076 21.8% 0.042 0.039 quadratic X 156.880 5,008 5,296
0.070 20.1% 0.042 0.069 cubic 289.288 10,045 9,718
0.074 21.2% 0.042 0.057 cubic X 284.684 9,427 9,388
Notes: Outcome variables are binary and indicate whether the person transitioned into an (self-)employment spell
within the first 90, 180 or 360 days of unemployment, respectively. The local polynomial estimation results are
calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014) and a triangular kernel. We show
the effective number of observations used to the left (N Left) and to the right (N Right) of the cutoff. Standard
errors are clustered at the UI entry date level. Relative changes are calculated based on the pre-reform average exit
probabilities illustrated in Appendix Table C.2. We use our RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description
of detailed sample restrictions). Detailed results for each outcome are provided in Tables C.6 to C.8.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
the 5% level even when covariates are added. Regardless of the polynomial order, estimates vary
little if we add covariates. Overall, the quadratic and cubic settings of panel A suggest that lower
UI benefits reduce the self-employment probability within 360 days of unemployment by 35-50%.
The more extensive results of the estimated reform effects on the self-employment probability in
Table C.6 reveal that all point estimates are negative and increase over time in absolute terms.
Within the first 90 days of the unemployment spell, the reform effect is small and insignificant
(between -2.2 and -1.9 p.p.). It turns significant at the 10% level with a stronger magnitude
(between -3.6 and -2.2 p.p.) if we consider the 180 days period. This result is evidence of an
anticipation effect. Even if the actual RR drop takes place after 180 days of UI benefit receipt,
individuals adjust their behavior from the start of their UI spells. However, the effects on the
self-employment probability are stronger (between -3.5 and -5.8 p.p. for the quadratic and cubic
polynomials) in the medium and long term. Altogether, our results indicate a negative anticipation
effect on the self-employment probability in the short term and an even stronger negative effect on
the startup rate in the medium and long term.
Conversely, we estimate a consistently positive reform effect on the job-finding rate within the
first 180 days of unemployment, which is significant at the 5% level in all specifications of panel
B. The point estimates indicate an average increase between 7.6 and 8.6 p.p., corresponding to
a relative increase between 17% and 19% in the short term. In contrast to the reform effect on
the self-employment rate, the effect on the job-finding rate is stronger in the short term than in
the medium (7-9%) or long term (5-6%). Appendix Table C.7 shows that these positive effects
decrease and turn insignificant if we follow the unemployment spell over a longer time period. In
Appendix C.6 we check the sensitivity of our estimates to the exclusion of individuals who exit into
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self-employment. We show that the estimated reform effect on the very short-term job-finding rate
(within the first 90 days of unemployment) is slightly upward biased if self-employment is excluded.
From panel C we infer that the stronger positive anticipation effect on employment surpasses the
negative anticipation effect on self-employment, such that the probability of exiting into either of
these states is, on average, positively affected in the short term. We estimate a relative increase in
the probability of exiting into self-employment or employment of about 20-22% due to the reform.
However, this positive effect is only significantly different from zero within the first 90 days of the
unemployment spell. Table C.8 shows that the point estimates are halved and turn insignificant if
we take the first 180 days of unemployment into consideration. We find insignificant zero effects in
the medium and long term. As previously suggested by the raw data in Figure 3, the negative effect
on the startup rate and the positive effect on the job-finding rate cancel out each other over time.
Overall, our results are robust to the inclusion of covariates and different polynomials. We
can confirm heterogeneous treatment effects on the extensive margin. The effect on the self-
employment probability is negative and increases in the medium and long term, whereas the
effect on the employment probability is positive and declines throughout the unemployment spell.
The probability of exiting into self-employment or employment is positively affected but only
within the first 90 days of unemployment. We cannot confirm any medium or long-term effects
if we do not differentiate between self-employment and employment (i.e. general employment).
However, we do find short-term anticipation effects for all exit states. Over different time horizons,
the negative effect on self-employment (35-50%) is consistently stronger than the positive effect
on employment (5-33%). Our findings suggest that the inclusion of data on self-employment is
extremely important to evaluate the reform effect on the probability of exiting unemployment in
general. Under heterogeneous treatment effects it is flawed to assume that the positive effect on the
job-finding rate represents the reform’s general employment effect (on both self-employment and
employment). It is worth noting that we demonstrate these results more elaborately through the
exclusion of self-employment in Appendix C.6. In conclusion, the isolated focus on the job-finding
rate does not tell the full story, as the reform’s negative effect on the startup rate is not considered.
5.1.1 Placebo Tests
As a robustness check, we analyze our extensive margin results using placebo tests. Appendix
Table C.9 shows the results if we use a placebo treatment group of individuals whose RR did not
drop after 180 days of UI receipt because they either hit the ceiling or the floor of the UI benefit
amount (Appendix Table B.2 shows the minimum/maximum of UI benefits). For this placebo
group, we find very few individuals who exit their unemployment spell within 90 or 180 days and
therefore can only investigate the effects on the medium and long-term exit probabilities. Regardless
of the polynomial order or whether we include control variables or not, we find insignificant placebo
reform effects.38 Consequently, exit state probabilities of our placebo group are not affected, which
suggests that our estimated reform effects from Section 5.1 reflect true causal effects and are robust.
38The only exception are a handful of significant effects regarding the probability of exiting into self-employment or
employment within the first 720 days of the unemployment spell.
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Another placebo test we conduct is to artificially change the reform cutoff date to check the
robustness of our results and show that they are indeed driven by the reform cutoff date. We
use a fictive reform cutoff date one year after the actual reform took place (July 15 2013) to test
whether the estimated reform effects are indeed driven by the actual reform and not by other
factors such as seasonal effects. We drop observations before the actual cutoff date (July 15 2012)
to avoid bias from the true reform effect. Results are presented in Appendix Tables C.10-C.12. We
find no evidence of a season driven reform effect, since almost all estimated placebo effects are
insignificant.39 To conclude, placebo tests confirm the robustness of our main results.
5.1.2 Robustness Check - Competing Risks Model
It might be of some concern that our estimation results could potentially be biased, since our local
polynomial regression framework does not take the duration structure of the data itself into account.
A Competing Risks Regression (CRR) takes care of this issue and therefore could be the more
suitable model candidate. In Appendix D we demonstrate that our results do not considerably
change if we use a CRR instead, which is why we prefer the more parsimonious model of Section 4.1.
5.1.3 Subgroup Analysis
Besides significant reform effects on the extensive margin of (self-)employment which vary over time,
different groups of unemployed individuals might also be heterogeneously affected by the reform.
In the following, we conduct a subgroup analysis to investigate which groups are mostly affected.
We divide our sample by age (below vs. above median age), gender, contract type (permanent vs.
temporary), presence of children in the household, immigration status, education (lower, medium,
higher education), and monthly average real earnings (below vs. above logarithm of median wage).40
Appendix Table C.15 shows the estimated reform effects on the self-employment probability in the
medium term (within 360 days of entering unemployment) when results are divided by subgroups.
In general, all point estimates are negative. Reform effects are very similar when it comes to
different contract types. We find that, on average, younger individuals, women, those with children,
and immigrants experience a significantly stronger drop in their medium-term startup rate when
UI benefits decrease. It is not surprising that these vulnerable subgroups are more sensitive
to benefit cuts: young people often face liquidity constraints41 (Alba-Ramirez, 1994) and it is
often more difficult for women to successfully compete with male entrepreneurs (depending on
the sector of activity). Being a woman is also highly correlated with having children which
reduces the probability of becoming self-employed according to our results, perhaps because having
children limits entrepreneurial flexibility and increases risk aversion. Immigrants may not only face
discrimination but may also be less informed on regulations and procedures which are necessary
when it comes to starting up a business. Besides, they may have smaller networks, and therefore
39There are only two exceptions: we find significant placebo reform effects for the short-term probability of exiting
into self-employment and the medium-term probability of exiting into self-employment or employment. However, we
find no significant effects on these outcomes in our actual reform results which is why we take these less seriously.
40We used the following median values: median(age)= 36 and the median ln(real monthly average wage)= 7.3.
41In fact, this is one of the main reasons why Spain introduced the Strategy of Entrepreneurship and Youth
Employment in August 2013. For more details on Spanish reforms, we refer to Appendix F.6.
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face more obstacles compared to locals. According to González Menéndez and Cueto (2015) and
Garcia-Cabo and Madera (2019) business survival rates of younger workers, women, and immigrants
are lower than the ones of an average founder. Awareness of this fact might also reduce the
motivation to become self-employed within this group, especially when a reduction of the planning
period due to higher income pressure arising from a cut in UI benefits might increase the hurdles
in starting a business. Moreover, our findings also show that individuals with a medium or higher
educational degree and those with pre-displacement income above the median wage tend to be
more negatively affected. These potentially relatively smaller subgroups of unemployed individuals
most likely have better chances of finding a job, particularly in a crisis period, which could be the
reason why their self-employment probability is more strongly reduced.
There is also substantial heterogeneity in the reform effects on the short-term job-finding rate (within
180 days of unemployment). Table C.16 shows that younger individuals experience a stronger
positive effect on the job-finding rate, in line with the stronger reduction in their self-employment
probability. As opposed to Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020), we find that individuals
with a pre-displacement temporary contract and those without children tend to be more positively
affected. As this subgroup has fewer duties and a higher flexibility, their chances of finding a
suitable job match might be higher. Additionally, men, locals, those educated at a medium level,
and individuals with higher pre-displacement earnings drive the positive employment effect in the
short term. These subgroups are less subject to prejudices, which may also relatively improve their
job-finding opportunities. Our result that the male job-finding rate is more positively affected by
the reform corresponds to the findings of Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020).
Altogether, we find not only heterogeneity in the timing of reform effects but also with regard to
the socio-economic status and pre-displacement job characteristics of the unemployed individuals
affected by the cut in UI benefits.
5.2 Reform Effects on Unemployment Duration
Next, we analyze how UI benefits affect actual unemployment duration. As described in Section 4.1,
we use actual UI and UE duration in months as outcome variables and estimate a local polynomial
RDD for different subsamples of individuals who transition into self-employment, employment, or
the union of both within the first 360 and 720 days of their unemployment spell. We then calculate
the duration elasticity for each subsample (ηSE , ηE , and ηSE or E) as illustrated in equation 2.
Table 2 summarizes our duration elasticity results using the quadratic RDD estimation approach for
transitions out of unemployment in the medium term (within 360 days of unemployment) and in the
long term (within 720 days of unemployment). Panel A shows results using UI and panel B shows
results using UE as an outcome variable to measure the reform’s effect on actual unemployment
duration. Our findings show that the UI duration elasticity for individuals who transition into
self-employment is always negative and relatively large in absolute terms (between -0.2 and -1.5 in
panel A1). Their UE duration elasticity in panel B1 is slightly smaller in absolute terms, though
statistically not significant. Instead, the UI duration elasticity results for those who transition
into re-employment (panel A2) are statistically significant and take values between 0.6 and 0.9.
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Their UE duration elasticity estimates in panel B2 are slightly smaller yet still positive. Finally,
as expected the duration elasticity estimates regarding the union of both exit states (panels A3
and B3) are in between the elasticities with respect to self-employment (A1/B1) and employment
(A2/B2), yet always positive (0.3-0.6). Results for linear and cubic polynomials are depicted in
Tables C.18 to C.19.
Our duration elasticity results complement the previous probabilities findings by pointing to the
following. A reduction in UI benefit levels appears to reduce the actual UI benefit duration (as well
as UE duration) of those transitioning from unemployment to re-employment. This is in line with
the fact that we find an increase in the job-finding rate in response to the reduction of UI benefits
levels (cf. Section 5.1). With increasing search intensity, unemployed individuals find regular
employment more quickly, thus, their actual UI/UE duration declines (compare e.g. Marinescu
Table 2: UI and UE Duration Elasticities (360 vs. 720 Days) - Quadratic
Outcome Variable Duration RD Est. % change in s.e. p-value Covs. N left N right Max. days
Elast. (η) duration before exit
(A) UI Duration
(A1) Self-Employment -0.066 0.034 1.1 0.615 0.907 633 589 360
-0.200 0.101 3.3 0.616 0.984 X 584 557 360
-1.249 1.047 20.8 1.174 0.375 1080 1049 720
-1.480 1.241 24.7 1.168 0.288 X 1016 1008 720
(A2) Employment 0.752 -0.491 -12.5 0.334 0.071 3451 3670 360
0.772 -0.504 -12.9 0.308 0.052 X 3384 3593 360
0.830 -0.865 -13.8 0.543 0.063 4881 5269 720
0.865 -0.901 -14.4 0.551 0.062 X 5593 5897 720
(A3) Self-Employment 0.584 -0.370 -9.7 0.311 0.127 4070 4230 360
or Employment 0.641 -0.406 -10.7 0.296 0.094 X 3915 4065 360
0.528 -0.536 -8.8 0.551 0.239 5954 6252 720
0.532 -0.541 -8.9 0.559 0.248 X 6759 7064 720
(B) UE Duration
(B1) Self-Employment -0.278 0.154 4.6 0.673 0.975 626 585 360
-0.475 0.264 7.9 0.665 0.817 X 595 567 360
-1.182 1.113 19.7 1.408 0.451 926 879 720
-1.352 1.274 22.5 1.370 0.350 X 915 877 720
(B2) Employment 0.783 -0.534 -13.1 0.349 0.061 3313 3641 360
0.821 -0.559 -13.7 0.317 0.038 X 3181 3511 360
0.566 -0.644 -9.4 0.565 0.169 5474 5603 720
0.584 -0.665 -9.7 0.565 0.163 X 6073 6255 720
(B3) Self-Employment 0.615 -0.409 -10.2 0.329 0.111 4018 4186 360
or Employment 0.668 -0.444 -11.1 0.306 0.077 X 3642 3988 360
0.336 -0.373 -5.6 0.596 0.409 6398 6590 720
0.358 -0.398 -6.0 0.596 0.397 X 6818 7114 720
Notes: This table presents our estimated UI (panel A) and UE (panel B) duration regression results. The local
polynomial estimation results are calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014), a
quadratic specification and a triangular kernel. Standard errors are clustered at the UI entry date level. We use our
RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions) but restricted to individuals
who exit into self-employment, employment, or either of them within the first 360 or 720 days of unemployment.
The duration elasticity, η, is computed from the percentage change in UI or UE duration (relative to the pre-reform
average duration, see Table C.17), divided by the percentage change in the RR due to the reform (approx. 16.67%),
as illustrated in equation 2. Detailed results for linear and cubic polynomials are provided in Tables C.18 to C.19.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
25
& Skandalis, 2019). Thereby, in correspondence with Doris et al. (2020) the elasticity estimates
regarding employment appear to be larger in absolute terms than common elasticity estimates that
are usually based on evaluating more rather than less generosity of the UI system. Our findings
confirm the asymmetric nature of the direction of UI generosity changes for UI duration elasticity
results.
Moreover, our findings are among the first that provide elasticity estimates concerning self-
employment. These estimates show that individuals starting up out of unemployment after
a cut in benefits tend to remain longer unemployed (both in terms of UI and UE duration). Given
our main results revealing that there is a decline in the probability of becoming self-employed, the
results that suggest a negative UI (UE) duration elasticity could be interpreted in two ways. First,
individuals who are not able to find a proper employment option may end up feeling pushed to
become self-employed. As a result, longer actual unemployment duration may hint to a deterioration
of the quality of new startups in response to the cut in benefit levels. In the following section, we
explore this aspect in more detail by focusing on the welfare considerations for those transitioning
into self-employment. Second, those with an opportunity-driven motivation for starting up a
business might be less responsive to a change in unemployment benefits and simply take the reform
as an opportunity to find, for instance, new employees more easily. In this context, our findings
could be also explained through liquidity constraints, imposed by the cut in UI benefits which hit
potential founders more than individuals who search for regular jobs, since those who want to set
up a business might need more time to collect necessary funding.
5.3 Reform Effects on (Self-)Employment Quality
From a policy perspective, it is also relevant to understand whether the quality of (self-)employment
has changed due to the reform alongside our extensive margin results of the previous sections. There-
fore, we investigate whether the UI benefit level cut affects the composition of (self-)employment
and other quality aspects of post-unemployment outcomes. Regarding self-employment, we propose
that an increase in the share of opportunity-driven rather than necessity-driven entrepreneurs
indicates a quality improvement. Opportunity-driven entrepreneurs are most likely better prepared
and consider their business as a destiny rather than a last resort to escape unemployment, as
opposed to necessity-driven entrepreneurs. Consequently, we can expect that if the composition of
self-employment changes, its quality changes as well.
Starting with a descriptive analysis of the effects on self-employment quality, Appendix Figure C.9
shows that the composition of self-employment among different age groups before and after the
reform has changed. Older individuals are less often self-employed than before, whereas the opposite
can be observed with regard to the younger generation. According to Azoulay, Jones, and Miranda
(2020) successful entrepreneurs tend to be middle-aged rather than young. An increasing share of
young entrepreneurs may therefore indicate an increase in necessity-driven entrepreneurship, i.e. a
decrease in startup quality.42
42However, this is only descriptive evidence and could be caused by other reforms in 2013 which particularly
targeted young unemployed individuals to become self-employed. See Appendix F.6.2 and F.6.3 for more details.
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Other descriptive evidence can be inferred from mean comparison tests in Appendix Table C.20.
We compare two quality measures in the post- and pre-reform period to account for changes in self-
employment quality: sector of activity indicators and the real average social security contribution
basis as best available proxy for self-employment income. If self-employed individuals choose a
higher contribution basis, this may be an indicator of opportunity-driven entrepreneurship because
they tend to be in a better economic situation than necessity entrepreneurs. This enables them to
pay higher social security contributions in order to get access to more social insurance. Opportunity-
driven entrepreneurs may successfully work in any sector, particularly in those with higher growth
potential. For instance, an increase in the information and communication (I&C), finance, real
estate, and scientific services sector could be interpreted as an average increase of startups’ quality.
Instead, transitions to activities such as trade could reflect decreases in startup quality because it
may entail simple business models with low growth potential. Increases in accommodation and food
services which are primarily touristic, and seasonal activities, may also indicate a quality decrease
of startups. Table C.20 shows that the real monthly average contribution basis is significantly lower
in the post-reform compared to the pre-reform period. This could reflect an increase in necessity-
driven entrepreneurship due to the reform. Furthermore, there is indeed a significant difference
between the sectors which treated individuals worked in before they became unemployed and the
new sector in which they start their business. We observe that the share of treated individuals
who started a business in the construction sector significantly decreases, while significantly more
individuals started a new business in the trade and high-skilled service sector (I&C, finance, real
estate, and scientific). It is difficult to exactly decompose changes in sectors of new firms into the
share of necessity-/opportunity-driven entrepreneurship. However, the significant increase in the
high-skilled service sector points to more opportunity-driven entrepreneurship, whereas increases in
the trade, accommodation and food service sectors indicate that more individuals are also pushed
into necessity-driven entrepreneurship. Altogether, our descriptive evidence suggests that the
dispersion in the quality of startups increased due to the reform.
So far we only considered correlations. In Table 3 we estimate the potential causal relationship
between the cut in UI benefits and (self-)employment quality using quality proxies as outcome
variables. First, we focus on our findings regarding self-employment quality. We restrict our sample
to individuals who transition from unemployment into self-employment within the first 720 days
of unemployment (4,132 individuals, as illustrated in Appendix C.1).43 According to our results,
the cut in UI benefits reduces the self-employment spell duration, indicating a quality decrease.
However, the reform effect is estimated to be insignificant.44 We find that the reform slightly
increases the social security contribution basis during the self-employment spell, suggesting a quality
increase. Nevertheless, this effect is only significant at the 10% level in a linear specification and
turns insignificant if we use a quadratic or cubic functional form of the running variable. Our point
estimates show that, on average, the reform decreases the probability of being a self-employed
individual for those who earned a monthly income above the median before becoming unemployed.
43As our results are very similar if we restrict the sample even further to individuals who exit into self-employment
within the first 360 days, we refrain from showing them here – also due to space limitations. They are available upon
request.
44Kyyrä and Pesola (2020) also find insignificant effects of UI benefits on duration of the exit employment spell.
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Table 3: Effect on (Self-)Employment Quality - Quadratic
Outcome Variable RD Est. s.e. p-value Bandwidth N Left N Right Covs.
Duration (monthly)
Employment 0.035 1.154 0.990 193.009 5138 5480
0.199 1.227 0.928 198.022 5321 5434 X
Self-Employment -0.893 4.462 0.928 212.747 922 877
-1.518 3.824 0.681 263.851 1079 1069 X
ln(real monthly average contribution basis)
Employment -0.005 0.046 0.880 163.718 4251 4618
-0.005 0.044 0.944 191.233 4925 5267 X
Self-Employment 0.024 0.029 0.374 247.499 1025 1008
0.038 0.028 0.169 249.093 1014 1007 X
Above median wage pre UI receipt
Employment -0.030 0.047 0.580 241.809 6543 6816
-0.019 0.039 0.615 253.983 6666 6894 X
Self-Employment -0.076 0.077 0.412 228.250 978 925
-0.048 0.075 0.412 182.859 752 732 X
Agriculture, extraction, primary manufacturing
Employment 0.036 0.016 0.011 237.905 6436 6743
0.037 0.017 0.021 179.551 4652 5033 X
Self-Employment -0.010 0.028 0.824 189.985 798 763
-0.014 0.027 0.670 188.375 784 749 X
Manufacturing and utilities
Employment -0.030 0.019 0.147 239.718 6493 6775
-0.019 0.016 0.280 268.679 7114 7252 X
Self-Employment -0.034 0.025 0.242 230.725 984 954
-0.035 0.025 0.197 255.110 1028 1026 X
Construction
Employment 0.010 0.030 0.558 182.187 4851 5250
0.004 0.019 0.673 169.365 4426 4593 X
Self-Employment 0.052 0.071 0.458 229.972 981 954
0.045 0.053 0.408 242.699 994 976 X
Trade
Employment -0.005 0.025 0.665 151.897 3917 4280
-0.015 0.021 0.316 147.435 3711 4068 X
Self-Employment 0.090 0.081 0.158 166.067 711 656
0.067 0.072 0.232 152.583 632 597 X
Transport and storage
Employment -0.001 0.013 0.933 205.727 5594 5917
-0.011 0.011 0.219 240.461 6337 6626 X
Self-Employment -0.022 0.042 0.444 184.396 780 744
-0.044 0.037 0.159 146.136 612 581 X
Accommodation and food services
Employment -0.048 0.027 0.073 198.455 5451 5586
-0.005 0.017 0.683 241.878 6366 6640 X
Self-Employment -0.017 0.053 0.673 192.366 810 769
-0.033 0.049 0.385 208.193 890 849 X
I&C, finance, real estate, and scientific services
Employment 0.017 0.021 0.442 210.369 5696 6036
0.010 0.018 0.534 199.280 5342 5451 X
Self-Employment 0.016 0.058 0.722 244.172 1015 999
0.052 0.045 0.240 232.551 971 949 X
Education, health, social, and other services
Employment 0.008 0.030 0.906 209.058 5691 6023
-0.014 0.024 0.485 199.106 5342 5451 X
Self-Employment -0.030 0.060 0.496 211.189 913 871
-0.009 0.048 0.807 230.120 968 940 X
Permanent contract
Employment -0.023 0.042 0.705 182.023 4851 5250
-0.013 0.037 0.825 184.551 4785 5141 X
Notes: In this table, we estimate the causal reform effect on (self-)employment quality. The local polynomial estimation
results are calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014), a quadratic specification
and a triangular kernel. We show the effective number of observations used to the left (N Left) and to the right (N
Right) of the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the UI entry date level. We restrict our RDD estimation sample
(see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions) to individuals who exit into (self-)employment within
the first 720 days of unemployment. Results for individuals who exit into (self-)employment within the first 360 days
of unemployment are provided in Table C.21. Detailed results for the linear and cubic specifications are available
upon request. The median monthly real wage from social security data is EUR 1,471.63.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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While this result could indicate a quality decrease, it is again insignificant in all specifications.
Additionally, we find no clear effects on the choice of post-unemployment sectors in which new
firms are created. Our estimated reform effects are mostly statistically insignificant, except for the
effect on the manufacturing and utilities sector in the linear version. However, if we apply different
functional forms, the reform effect turns insignificant as well. The decrease in standard errors
when covariates are added shows that we can increase precision. In Appendix C.3, we also show
that we have no balancing problem which could cause changes in point estimates. Insignificant
results could also point to a power issue. Nonetheless, the fact that most of the estimates are rather
small and clearly insignificant shows that there are no significant changes in the composition of
self-employment due to the reform. Altogether, we find descriptive evidence but no significant
causal reform effect on the self-employment quality.
Table 4: Reform Effects on Monthly Earnings for (Self-)Employment within 360 Days – Quadratic
Time Horizon RD Estimate s.e. p-value Covs. Bandwidth N left N right
12 months after
Employment 0.031 0.048 0.335 145.690 2861 3219
0.007 0.034 0.632 X 166.876 3338 3528
Self-Employment 0.093 0.067 0.112 238.643 796 779
0.103 0.064 0.076 X 234.423 776 763
18 months after
Employment 0.027 0.045 0.369 150.268 2942 3294
0.014 0.027 0.438 X 179.923 3520 3887
Self-Employment 0.068 0.074 0.304 199.310 712 611
0.076 0.074 0.268 X 189.292 626 587
24 months after
Employment 0.005 0.055 0.714 175.068 3499 3908
-0.015 0.035 0.595 X 263.940 5358 5477
Self-Employment 0.110 0.071 0.097 199.315 702 608
0.127 0.065 0.035 X 181.345 591 567
36 months after
Employment 0.021 0.052 0.497 169.375 3372 3606
-0.009 0.033 0.710 X 254.617 5037 5243
Self-Employment 0.023 0.072 0.737 258.245 844 824
0.026 0.075 0.852 X 201.639 685 627
48 months after
Employment 0.021 0.043 0.419 150.893 2850 3193
-0.022 0.028 0.440 X 257.730 5159 5205
Self-Employment 0.060 0.086 0.426 228.101 755 709
0.085 0.085 0.271 X 170.966 549 526
Notes: In this table, we estimate the causal reform effect on earnings, approximated by the contribution basis in the
case of self-employment for those who transition into (self-)employment within 360 days of entering unemployment.
The dependent variable corresponds to log monthly earnings after different time periods measured in months after
having entered UI. Note that the earnings or contribution basis in Table 3 and Table C.21 correspond to the exit
status, i.e. the first status which an individual has after unemployment; whereas the earnings considered here might
belong to a status which is different from the exit status, as we are able to trace the individuals’ complete labor market
trajectories until 2018. We estimate these effects on sub-samples defined by the individuals’ exit status: Employment
and Self-Employment. The local polynomial estimation results are calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth
suggested by Calonico et al. (2014), a quadratic specification and a triangular kernel. We show the effective number
of observations used to the left (N Left) and to the right (N Right) of the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the
UI entry date level. We restrict our RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample
restrictions) to individuals who exit into (self-)employment within the first 360 days of unemployment. Results for
the linear and cubic specifications are provided in Table C.22 and Table C.23. Detailed results for individuals who
exit within the first 720 days of unemployment are provided upon request.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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A similar picture emerges if we look at our employment quality regressions in Table 3. When
restricting our sample to individuals who exit to regular employment within the first 720 days of
unemployment, our sample size is much larger (27,630 individuals, as illustrated in Appendix C.1).
Nonetheless, most of our point estimates are insignificantly different from zero and an increase in
the job-finding rate is only statistically significant in the primary sector. Thus, we find no evidence
for a significant effect on employment quality. However, the signs of the reform effect resemble the
observed signs of our descriptive analysis.
Finally, similar to Khoury, Brébion, and Briole (2019), we analyze the effect of UI benefits on post-
unemployment re-employment wages and our proxy for self-employment income. Table 4 shows that
treated individuals, who find re-employment within 360 days of unemployment, experience nearly
no wage increases even four years after UI entry. Instead, our estimated effects on self-employment
income are consistently higher, though they also mostly lack statistical significance. To sum up,
our analysis reveals that reducing UI benefits may increase the dispersion of the quality of startups
created out of unemployment and only slightly worsens the quality of re-employment.
6 Conclusion
This paper addresses how UI benefit levels affect both self-employment and employment. We
account for heterogeneity in the timing of these effects and investigate whether our findings are
driven by different subgroups. We also estimate the effect on actual unemployment duration and
analyze potential welfare implications with regard to the quality of post-unemployment exit states.
Finally, we rationalize our findings in the context of related literature in labor and public economics.
While the existing literature has addressed how UI policies affect unemployment duration and
re-employment wages when self-employment is ignored in the analysis, we are the first to consider
self-employment as an alternative post-unemployment outcome. Since active labor market policies,
which incentivize unemployed individuals to start their own businesses, are commonly used policy
measures to fight unemployment, understanding the effects of the design of UI policies on self-
employment is extremely relevant.
To surpass data limitation on the labor market employment histories of founders, we exhausted
Spanish administrative social insurance and labor income tax data to assess all relevant labor
market flows over the business cycle (2005-2018). This has enabled us to conduct a descriptive
analysis of self-employment in Spain in stock/flow dimension. Our findings show that flows from
unemployment to self-employment are important in Spain: 30% of all new firms are created by
founders who were previously unemployed. During the crisis, this share increased by up to 50%.
In our causal analyses, we exploit the Spanish labor market reform in 2012 which led to a sharp
change in UI benefits: with the reform, the net replacement rate for the time after 180 days of
benefit receipt decreased by 10 percentage points (from a replacement rate of 60% to one of 50%).
Only individuals entitled to more than 180 days of UI benefits receipt were affected by this reform.
This quasi-experimental set-up allows us to exploit reform-driven exogenous variation in UI benefit
levels in order to estimate the causal effect of a cut in UI benefits on (self-)employment.
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Our results suggest significant LATEs on the extensive margin of both employment and self-
employment outcomes (Section 5.1). We find negative reform effects on the self-employment
probability, expanding in size throughout the UI spell duration. This reveals heterogeneity in the
effect size over time. Regarding the effects on re-employment, similar heterogeneity over time is
prevalent, but in the opposite direction: reform effects on the job-finding rate are significantly
positive in the short term, although they attenuate and turn rather insignificant in the medium
and long term. In correspondence with Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020), we find that
individuals already adjust their search intensity before the actual cut in UI benefits takes place. In
contrast to Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020), we cannot only confirm an anticipation effect
on the job-finding rate but also on the startup rate. In relative terms, the probability of becoming
self-employed declines by around 35-50%, whereas the probability of becoming re-employed increases
by 16-19%, and thus the first effect (startup rate) dominates the latter (job-finding rate). Moreover,
in terms of effect size, our findings differ from their results: our estimated effects on employment
are smaller than the estimates provided by Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020). Their RDD
results point towards a LATE on the job-finding rate of 26%, while our corresponding estimates are
in a range between 16-19%. Additionally, we show that over different time horizons, the negative
effect on self-employment (35-50%) is consistently stronger than the positive effect on employment
(5-32%). Our findings suggest that the inclusion of data on self-employment is extremely important
in order to evaluate the reform effect on the probability of exiting unemployment in general. Under
heterogeneous treatment effects it should not be assumed that the positive effect on the job-finding
rate represents the general employment effect (on both self-employment and employment), as the
reform’s negative effect on the startup rate is not taken into account (compare also Appendix C.6).
Our subgroup analysis shows that the significant negative effect on the medium-term startup rate is
mainly driven by the more vulnerable subgroups (younger individuals, women, those with children,
and immigrants). Additionally, better qualified individuals with a higher educational attainment
and those with a pre-displacement real income above the median experience stronger decreases
in the startup rate. The latter group is also the main driver of the significant positive effect on
the job-finding rate. Overall, we find not only heterogeneity in the timing of reform effects but
also in relation to the socio-economic status and pre-displacement job characteristics of treated
unemployed individuals.
In line with the findings of Doris et al. (2020) and Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020),
we confirm that the UI benefit level duration elasticity is larger with regard to UI benefit level
cuts rather than increases. We find that the UI duration elasticity is larger in absolute terms
for those who exit into self-employment (between -0.2 and -1.5) compared to those who exit into
employment (0.6-0.9), implying that the joint elasticity into either exit state is in between (0.3-0.6).
Our elasticity results show a clear pattern that complements our findings on the extensive margins.
While we find mixed descriptive evidence for changes in (self-)employment quality due to the
reform, we cannot confirm any causal relationship. The reform neither significantly affected the
post-unemployment exit state quality of newly self-employed individuals, nor the one of re-employed
individuals. Consequently, (self-)employment quality is barely affected by the cut in UI benefits.
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Taking stocks also from the results derived in Camarero Garcia and Murmann (2020), both time
and money are important when it comes to the effect of UI benefits on self-employment. Camarero
Garcia and Murmann (2020) show that a PBD extension prolongs actual unemployment duration
of founders. They find that the UI duration elasticity for those transitioning to self-employment is
positive and larger than common estimates for those who are re-employed suggest. In summary,
PBD changes can affect the quality of startups (Camarero Garcia and Murmann (2020)), whereas
UI benefit levels can affect the extensive margin, i.e. the startup rate, as we show in this paper.
Overall, our results show that reducing UI benefit levels does not push unemployed individuals to
become self-employed, but rather induces search for employment on the extensive margin. The
existing literature offers two different theoretical explanations for this outcome. On the one hand,
our findings are in line with the second hypothesis derived from standard search theory which
suggests that a decrease in benefit levels leads to higher search intensity already at the beginning
of the unemployment spell before the actual RR drop takes place. The reservation wage for
employment decreases and labor becomes cheaper. Taking general equilibrium effects into account,
both the number of job vacancies and labor market tightness increase. Consequently, we expect a
higher job-finding rate. As employment increases, self-employment becomes less likely in relative
terms and this is exactly what we discover in our results in the short term. On the other hand,
we find evidence in favor of the entrepreneurial choice model. It predicts that the shortened UI
duration, which is caused by the decrease in benefits, leads to less negative unemployment duration
dependence (e.g. less human capital depreciation or stigma effects), and thus, better employment
prospects compared with an unchanged UI level. Moreover, as there is less time for learning about
proper business opportunities, it becomes relatively easier to find a job than starting a business
(Alba-Ramirez, 1994). Both the decrease in the startup rate as well as the negative duration
elasticity for the self-employed could be explained through liquidity constraints, imposed by the
cut in UI benefits which hit potential founders stronger than individuals searching for regular jobs.
Liquidity constraints could, on the one hand, prevent affected individuals from establishing a firm
independent of the entrepreneurial ability. On the other hand, individuals who decide to start a
business despite these constraints may need more time to collect sufficient funding which increases
their actual unemployment duration.
As our findings are in line with different theoretical explanations, future research may help to
rationalize our results in a theoretical model which takes the extensive margin effects of UI benefit
levels on both employment and self-employment into account. For instance, an extended search-
matching model including employment and self-employment as matched states alongside unmatched
outcomes could rationalize our empirical findings and contribute to the policy debate.
Finally, in light of the crisis following the COVID-19 pandemic a reallocation shock may destroy
many jobs (Barrero, Bloom, & Davis, 2020), potentially increasing the importance of transitions
from unemployment to self-employment. Therefore, demands for optimizing the design of the UI
system could be better addressed by taking the results of this paper into account, and consequently
considering the role of UI benefits on both sides of the same coin: employment and self-employment.
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CRR Competing Risks Regression.
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LATE Local Average Treatment Effect.
MCVL Continuous Working Life Sample - Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales.
OECD Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development.
OL Out of Labor Force.
PBD Potential Benefit Duration.
RDD Regression Discontinuity Design.
RR Replacement Rate.
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A Appendix: Descriptive Analysis Figures









































Notes: This figure illustrates the composition of the Spanish labor force between 2005 and 2018. It shows the
percentage of individuals of working age (18 years of age or older) distinguishing Unemployment, Employment
and Self-Employment.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Notes: This figure illustrates the distribution of workers across the different employment states, including
Unemployment, Temporary Employment, Permanent Employment and Self-Employment, with respect to
their age group, as a percentage of the Spanish labor force.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Notes: The left-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the unemployment rates in Spain from 2005 to 2018
on a quarterly basis. The right-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the same rates on a yearly basis. Note
that our definition of unemployment includes individuals who receive either UI or UA benefits, as well as
individuals who do not receive any benefits at all, and those who are tagged as receiving cease-of-activity
benefits.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data and official statistics provided by INE
(2018) and OECD (2018).

























































































Notes: The left-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the self-employment rates in Spain from 2005 to 2018
on a quarterly basis. The right-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the same rates on a yearly basis.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data and official statistics provided by INE
(2018) and OECD (2018).
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Notes: The left-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the part-time employment rates in Spain from 2005 to
2018 on a quarterly basis. The right-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the same rates on a yearly basis.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data and official statistics provided by INE
(2018) and OECD (2018).





























































































Notes: The left-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the temporary employment rates in Spain from 2005
to 2018 on a quarterly basis. The right-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the same rates on a yearly
basis.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data and official statistics provided by INE
(2018) and OECD (2018).
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OL E SE U
(b) Yearly Outflows in %
Notes: These figures illustrate the yearly composition of Self-Employment (SE) in Spain providing the share
of each component in percentage of the total stock. The sample is restricted to individuals of working age
(18 years of age or older). We distinguish transitions to SE (inflows), on the left-hand side, and transitions
from self-employment (outflows), on the right-hand side, with respect to the following labor market states:
Out of Labor Force (OL), Employment (E), Unemployment (U), and the corresponding stock of those who
remain in SE. See Figure 1 for the composition of inflows into SE excluding stocks.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.





















































































































(b) Yearly Outflows in %
Notes: These figures illustrate the yearly outflows from Self-Employment (SE) in Spain, in both absolute
(left) and relative (right) terms. The sample is restricted to individuals of working age (18 or older). We
distinguish outflows of individuals from SE to the following labor market states: Out of Labor Force (OL),
Employment (E), and Unemployment (U). This is the other side of the coin: the inflows are shown in the
main text in Figure 1.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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OL E SE U
(b) Yearly Inflows in %
Notes: These figures illustrate the yearly composition of transitions to Employment (E) (inflows) in Spain,
in both absolute (left) and relative (right) terms. The sample is restricted to individuals of working age
(in this case, 18 years of age or older). We consider inflows of individuals into E from the following labor
market states: Out of Labor Force (OL), Self-Employment (SE), and Self-Employment (SE), along with the
corresponding stock of those who remain in E.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.







































































































OL E SE U
(b) Yearly Outflows in %
Notes: These figures illustrate the yearly composition of transitions from Employment (E) (outflows) in
Spain, in both absolute (left) and relative (right) terms. The sample is restricted to individuals of working
age (in this case, 18 years of age or older). We consider outflows of individuals from E into the following
labor market states: Out of Labor Force (OL), Self-Employment (SE), and Unemployment (U), along with
the corresponding stock of those who remain in E.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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OL E SE U
(b) Yearly Inflows in %
Notes: These figures illustrate the yearly composition of transitions to Unemployment (U) (inflows) in Spain,
in both absolute (left) and relative (right) terms. The sample is restricted to individuals of working age (18
years of age or older). We consider inflows of individuals into U from the following labor market states: Out
of Labor Force (OL), Employment (E), and Self-Employment (SE), along with the corresponding stock of
those who remain in U.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.






















































































































OL E SE U
(b) Yearly Outflows in %
Notes: These figures illustrate the yearly composition of transitions from Unemployment (U) (outflows) in
Spain, in both absolute (left) and relative (right) terms. The sample is restricted to individuals of working
age (18 years of age or older). We consider outflows of individuals from U into the following labor market
states: Out of Labor Force (OL), Employment (E), and Self-Employment (SE), along with the corresponding
stock of those who remain in U.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Figure A.13: Sector Distribution of the Self-Employed





















Transport and food services
Accommodation and food services
I&C, finance, insurance, real
estate, and scientific services
Education, health, social,
auxiliary and other services
Notes: This figure illustrates the composition of self-employment in Spain, with respect to the sector variable
in each year. The sample is restricted to individuals who are 25 to 52 years old.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.










































Notes: This figure illustrates the evolution of average annual real earnings in Spain for Employment, according
to the Social Security records and the tax files. The sample is restricted to individuals who are 18 years of
age or older.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Notes: These figures illustrate the evolution of average monthly (left) and daily (right) real earnings in Spain
for Employment, according to the Social Security records and the tax files. The sample is restricted to
individuals who are 18 years of age or older.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Monthly real earnings from tax files (in 2015 Euros)
Notes: This figure illustrates the distribution of monthly real earnings in Spain with a mean value of 1,981.81
euros and a median of 1,564.67 euros, according to the tax files. The sample is restricted to individuals who
are 18 years of age or older.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Notes: This figure illustrates the evolution of yearly average UI benefit levels. The solid line corresponds to
our data set, whilst the dashed line has been obtained from the official statistics published by the Ministry
of Labor. Moreover, our sample is restricted to individuals who are 18 years of age or older.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data; and official statistics by Spain’s Ministry
of Labor (2020).































































































































Notes: These figures illustrate the evolution of the average number of UI and UA beneficiaries on a yearly
basis. The solid line corresponds to our dataset, where the numbers have been re-scaled using the official
proportions provided in Dirección General de Ordenación de la Seguridad Social (2020). The dashed line
has been obtained from the official statistics published by the Ministry of Labor. Moreover, our sample is
restricted to individuals who are 18 years of age or older.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data; and official statistics by Spain’s Ministry
of Labor (2020).
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B Appendix: Supplementary Tables
Table B.1: Personal Characteristics - Descriptives Sample
Self-employment Employment Total Sample
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Female 0.352 (0.478) 0.471 (0.499) 0.465 (0.499)
Age (years) 43.760 (12.016) 36.884 (12.261) 38.190 (12.719)
Lower education 0.632 (0.482) 0.599 (0.490) 0.623 (0.485)
Medium education 0.239 (0.427) 0.252 (0.434) 0.244 (0.429)
Higher education 0.129 (0.335) 0.149 (0.356) 0.133 (0.339)
Presence of children 0.393 (0.488) 0.458 (0.498) 0.459 (0.498)
Immigrant 0.153 (0.360) 0.256 (0.436) 0.240 (0.427)
Employment experience (months) 61.258 (80.541) 144.068 (146.124) 122.854 (135.461)
Self-employment experience indicator 0.115 (0.319) 0.223 (0.416)
Real monthly average earnings 1,266.161 (2,856.369) 1,731.593 (3,056.539) 1,660.452 (2,988.341)
ln(real monthly average earnings) 6.909 (0.396) 7.153 (0.739) 7.125 (0.690)
Low-skilled occupation 0.540 (0.498) 0.686 (0.464)
Medium-skilled occupation 0.296 (0.457) 0.205 (0.404)
High-skilled occupation 0.163 (0.370) 0.109 (0.312)
Permanent contract 0.399 (0.490) 0.234 (0.423)
Agriculture, extraction, primary manufacturing 0.132 (0.338) 0.078 (0.267) 0.059 (0.235)
Manufacturing and utilities 0.040 (0.197) 0.067 (0.250) 0.043 (0.203)
Construction 0.125 (0.330) 0.075 (0.264) 0.057 (0.231)
Trade 0.247 (0.431) 0.132 (0.338) 0.102 (0.302)
Transport and storage 0.058 (0.235) 0.035 (0.185) 0.027 (0.161)
Acommodation and food services 0.094 (0.292) 0.098 (0.297) 0.067 (0.250)
I&C, finance, insurance, real estate, and scientific services 0.104 (0.305) 0.090 (0.286) 0.063 (0.243)
Education, health, social, auxiliary and other services 0.156 (0.363) 0.357 (0.479) 0.225 (0.417)
PBD (months) 15.457 (7.041) 13.254 (7.330) 11.315 (9.657)
Local unemployment rate 11.402 (5.257) 12.194 (5.829) 12.157 (5.794)
Observations 133,746 790,152 1,347,976
Notes: This table presents mean values and standard deviations for personal characteristics. We distinguish between
self-employed individuals and employed individuals. The Total Sample column additionally includes cease-of-
activity/UI/UA benefit recipients, and unregistered/inactive individuals. Time-varying characteristics refer to the
last spell of each individual. The information refers to our sample for the years between 2005 and 2018, restricted
to individuals who are 18 years of age or older. Note that information on occupational codes is not provided for
individuals in the social security scheme of self-employed workers. Therefore, we do not have data on skill levels for
the self-employed (Dirección General de Ordenación de la Seguridad Social, 2020).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the 2005-2018 MCVL data.
47
Table B.2: Minimum and Maximum UI Benefit Amount (valid 2010-2016)
Dependent Children Minimum Maximum
0 80% IPREM + 1/6 · (monthly benefit) [497.01€] 175% IPREM [1,087.21€]
1 107% IPREM + 1/6 · (monthly benefit) [664.75€] 200% IPREM [1,242.52€]
≥ 2 107% IPREM + 1/6 · (monthly benefit) [664.75€] 225% IPREM [1,397.84€]
Notes: This table summarizes the computation of the legal maximum and minimum benefit amounts. These limits
depend on the family responsibilities (number of dependent children or descendants) and the value of the IPREM
index in a given year. In the period 2010-2016, the IPREM index remained unchanged at 532.51 euros per month.
Source: Authors’ own illustration based on the SEPE (2019).
Table B.3: Duration of Entitlement to UI Benefits
Contribution Period (in days) Potential Benefit Duration (in days)
< 360 0
360 - 539 120
540 - 719 180
720 - 899 240
900 - 1,079 300
1,080 - 1,259 360
1,260 - 1,439 420
1,440 - 1,619 480
1,620 - 1,799 540
1,800 - 1,979 600
1,980 - 2,159 660
≥ 2,160 720
Notes: This table summarizes the Spanish system of PBD. Eligibility requires a minimum contribution period of 360
days. PBD is a function of the individual’s contribution period and ranges from 120 to 720 days.
Source: Authors’ own illustration based on the SEPE (2019).
48
C Appendix: RDD Analysis




























-500 -250 0 250 500



























-500 -250 0 250 500
UI entry centered around the reform date


























-500 -250 0 250 500



























-500 -250 0 250 500

























-500 -250 0 250 500


























-500 -250 0 250 500



























-500 -250 0 250 500

























-500 -250 0 250 500


























-500 -250 0 250 500
UI entry centered around the reform date
Notes: These figures illustrate the reform effect on the probability of exiting unemployment into self-employment,
employment, or either one of them within the first 720 days of the UI spell from the raw data. We apply the
IMSE-optimal number of quantile-spaced bins using a linear (first row), quadratic (second row), and cubic (third row)
polynomial. Our sample includes individuals who are 25-52 years old, entitled to more than 180 days of UI benefits,
and who entered their UI benefit spell between January 1 2011 and December 31 2013, after having been laid-off
from a full-time employment spell in a private firm (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions).
Figure 3 shows the main effects using only a cubic polynomial.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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C.1 Summary Statistics
Table C.1: Personal Characteristics - RDD Sample
Self-employment Employment Total Sample
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Female 0.289 (0.453) 0.365 (0.482) 0.365 (0.481)
Age (years) 37.069 (6.893) 36.889 (7.193) 36.907 (7.160)
Lower education 0.523 (0.500) 0.588 (0.492) 0.580 (0.494)
Medium education 0.306 (0.461) 0.276 (0.447) 0.279 (0.449)
Higher education 0.171 (0.376) 0.136 (0.343) 0.141 (0.348)
Presence of children 0.551 (0.497) 0.522 (0.500) 0.527 (0.499)
Immigrant 0.165 (0.371) 0.192 (0.394) 0.200 (0.400)
Employment experience (months) 146.773 (78.642) 143.195 (83.588) 140.966 (82.361)
Self-employment experience indicator 0.224 (0.417) 0.145 (0.352) 0.155 (0.362)
Real monthly average earnings 1697.946 (685.418) 1633.885 (636.977) 1625.817 (640.979)
ln(real monthly average earnings) 7.368 (0.364) 7.341 (0.332) 7.335 (0.334)
Low-skill occupation 0.495 (0.500) 0.577 (0.494) 0.565 (0.496)
Medium-skill occupation 0.326 (0.469) 0.309 (0.462) 0.316 (0.465)
High-skill occupation 0.179 (0.383) 0.114 (0.317) 0.119 (0.324)
Permanent contract 0.792 (0.406) 0.683 (0.465) 0.694 (0.461)
Agriculture, extraction, primary manufacturing 0.054 (0.226) 0.063 (0.243) 0.061 (0.240)
Manufacturing and utilities 0.082 (0.274) 0.119 (0.323) 0.110 (0.313)
Construction 0.174 (0.380) 0.184 (0.388) 0.181 (0.385)
Trade 0.242 (0.428) 0.196 (0.397) 0.205 (0.404)
Transport and storage 0.059 (0.235) 0.057 (0.233) 0.056 (0.230)
Acommodation and food services 0.084 (0.277) 0.118 (0.322) 0.115 (0.318)
I&C, finance, insurance, real estate, and scientific services 0.140 (0.347) 0.098 (0.297) 0.104 (0.305)
Education, health, social, auxiliary and other services 0.165 (0.371) 0.165 (0.371) 0.168 (0.374)
PBD (months) 20.250 (5.375) 18.904 (6.105) 18.857 (6.103)
Local unemployment rate 23.635 (6.402) 23.613 (6.366) 23.641 (6.370)
Observations 4,132 27,630 34,581
Notes: This table presents mean values and standard deviations for pre-displacement personal characteristics of
individuals in our RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions). We
distinguish between individuals who transition from unemployment into self-employment or employment within
the first 720 days of their unemployment spell. The Total Sample column additionally includes those who stay
unemployed or whose actual exit states are censored.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table C.2: Summary Statistics - Extensive Margin Outcome Variables
Outcome Variable Mean Pre Mean Post Mean Difference
SE within 90 days 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.000
(0.229) (0.229) (0.229) (0.002)
SE within 180 days 0.078 0.077 0.079 0.002
(0.269) (0.267) (0.270) (0.003)
SE within 360 days 0.099 0.096 0.103 0.007**
(0.299) (0.295) (0.304) (0.003)
SE within 720 days 0.119 0.115 0.124 0.009**
(0.324) (0.320) (0.330) (0.003)
E within 90 days 0.279 0.294 0.263 -0.030***
(0.449) (0.455) (0.440) (0.005)
E within 180 days 0.443 0.458 0.426 -0.032***
(0.497) (0.498) (0.495) (0.005)
E within 360 days 0.629 0.628 0.629 0.001
(0.483) (0.483) (0.483) (0.005)
E within 720 days 0.799 0.795 0.804 0.009**
(0.401) (0.404) (0.397) (0.004)
SE or E within 90 days 0.335 0.349 0.319 -0.030***
(0.472) (0.477) (0.466) (0.005)
SE or E within 180 days 0.521 0.536 0.505 -0.030***
(0.500) (0.499) (0.500) (0.005)
SE or E within 360 days 0.728 0.724 0.732 0.008*
(0.445) (0.447) (0.443) (0.005)
SE or E within 720 days 0.918 0.910 0.928 0.018***
(0.274) (0.286) (0.259) (0.003)
N 34,581 18,324 16,257 34,581
Notes: This table shows the general sample mean, pre-reform period mean, post-reform period mean and the difference
between post- and pre-reform period mean of our extensive margin outcome variables using our RDD estimation
sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions). The outcome variables are binary and
indicate whether the person transitioned into a (self-)employment spell within the first 90, 180, 360 or 720 days of
unemployment, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table C.3: Summary Statistics - Covariates
Covariate Mean Pre Mean Post Mean Difference
Female 0.365 0.353 0.379 0.026***
(0.481) (0.478) (0.485) (0.005)
Age (years) 36.907 36.739 37.096 0.357***
(7.160) (7.158) (7.157) (0.077)
Lower education 0.580 0.596 0.562 -0.034***
(0.494) (0.491) (0.496) (0.005)
Medium education 0.279 0.278 0.280 0.002
(0.449) (0.448) (0.449) (0.005)
Higher education 0.141 0.126 0.158 0.033***
(0.348) (0.331) (0.365) (0.004)
Presence of children 0.527 0.532 0.521 -0.011**
(0.499) (0.499) (0.500) (0.005)
Immigrant 0.200 0.204 0.195 -0.010**
(0.400) (0.403) (0.396) (0.004)
Employment experience (months) 140.966 138.105 144.191 6.086***
(82.361) (82.869) (81.667) (0.887)
Self-employment experience indicator 0.155 0.158 0.152 -0.005
(0.362) (0.365) (0.360) (0.004)
ln(real monthly average earnings) 7.335 7.339 7.330 -0.009**
(0.334) (0.328) (0.341) (0.004)
Low skilled occupation 0.565 0.582 0.547 -0.034***
(0.496) (0.493) (0.498) (0.005)
Medium skilled occupation 0.316 0.306 0.327 0.021***
(0.465) (0.461) (0.469) (0.005)
High skilled occupation 0.119 0.113 0.126 0.013***
(0.324) (0.316) (0.332) (0.003)
Permanent contract 0.694 0.686 0.703 0.018***
(0.461) (0.464) (0.457) (0.005)
Agriculture, extraction, primary manufacturing 0.061 0.063 0.059 -0.004
(0.240) (0.243) (0.237) (0.003)
Manufacturing and utilities 0.110 0.115 0.105 -0.010***
(0.313) (0.319) (0.306) (0.003)
Construction 0.181 0.205 0.154 -0.051***
(0.385) (0.403) (0.361) (0.004)
Trade 0.205 0.199 0.213 0.014***
(0.404) (0.399) (0.409) (0.004)
Transport and storage 0.056 0.054 0.058 0.004
(0.230) (0.227) (0.234) (0.002)
Accommodation and food services 0.115 0.107 0.123 0.016***
(0.318) (0.309) (0.328) (0.003)
I&C 0.104 0.098 0.110 0.011***
(0.305) (0.298) (0.313) (0.003)
Education, health, social, and other services 0.168 0.159 0.178 0.019***
(0.374) (0.366) (0.382) (0.004)
PBD (months) 18.857 18.843 18.874 0.031
(6.103) (6.055) (6.157) (0.066)
Local unemployment rate 25.214 2.984***
(6.370) (6.017) (6.384) (0.068)
N 34,581 18,324 16,257 34,581
Notes: This table shows the total mean, pre-reform period mean, post-reform period mean and the difference between
post- and pre-reform period mean of our covariates using our RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description
of detailed sample restrictions).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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C.2 Continuity of the Running Variable
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UI entry centered around the reform date
Notes: This figure plots the number of UI entrants at each date (centered around the cutoff) using our RDD estimation
sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions). As there are many more entrants at the
beginning of each month, it shows that UI entry is systematic. Nonetheless, we cannot visually detect any evidence
of precise manipulation. The histogram is constructed using the rddensity routine in Stata (Cattaneo et al., 2018).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
C.3 Balancing Tests
Table C.4: Balancing Table (linear, including all covariates)
Outcome Variable RD Estimate Rel. Change s.e. p-value Bandwidth N Left N Right
Female 0.028 7.9% 0.021 0.221 156.474 5008 5296
Age (years) 0.142 0.4% 0.209 0.577 142.852 4556 4884
Lower education -0.006 -1.0% 0.023 0.556 136.971 4376 4564
Medium education 0.021 7.6% 0.024 0.219 121.588 3737 4084
Higher education -0.015 -11.9% 0.015 0.196 98.929 3026 3278
Presence of children 0.009 1.7% 0.022 0.547 162.667 5235 5529
Immigrant -0.032 -15.7% 0.015 0.016 143.763 4583 4909
Employment experience (months) -2.769 -2.0% 1.855 0.176 142.670 4556 4884
Self-employment experience indicator 0.002 1.3% 0.014 0.829 228.472 7705 7749
ln(real monthly average earnings) -0.002 -0.0% 0.025 0.960 213.113 7151 7358
Low skilled occupation 0.021 3.6% 0.019 0.172 143.468 4583 4909
Medium skilled occupation 0.004 1.3% 0.026 0.942 152.837 4882 5152
High skilled occupation -0.026 -23.0% 0.020 0.114 132.732 4112 4454
Permanent contract -0.003 -0.4% 0.024 0.883 122.226 3767 4107
Agriculture, extraction, primary manufacturing 0.001 1.6% 0.011 0.752 168.183 5577 5660
Manufacturing and utilities -0.011 -9.6% 0.015 0.405 232.575 7788 7975
Construction 0.011 5.4% 0.025 0.555 132.551 4112 4454
Trade -0.008 -4.0% 0.025 0.776 138.987 4424 4611
Transport and storage 0.012 22.2% 0.012 0.188 158.515 5073 5364
Accommodation and food services -0.013 -12.1% 0.019 0.527 107.935 3350 3484
I&C, finance, real estate, and scientific services 0.014 14.3% 0.014 0.195 135.240 4206 4542
Education, health, social, and other services 0.013 8.2% 0.018 0.394 135.015 4206 4542
PBD (months) -0.010 -0.1% 0.250 0.909 200.063 6816 6713
Local unemployment rate -0.035 -0.2% 0.558 0.865 130.696 4014 4398
Notes: The local polynomial estimation results are calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico
et al. (2014) and a triangular kernel. We show the effective number of observations used to the left (N Left) and to
the right (N Right) of the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the UI entry date level. We use a linear version
of the running variable and include all covariates. Relative changes are calculated based on the pre-reform average
values illustrated in Appendix Table C.3. We use our RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of
detailed sample restrictions).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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UI entry centered around the reform date
Notes: These figures illustrate that our covariates are balanced around the vicinity of the cutoff date. We use our
RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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UI entry centered around the reform date
Notes: These figures illustrate that our covariates are balanced around the vicinity of the cutoff date. We use our
RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table C.5: Balancing Table (quadratic, including all covariates)
Outcome Variable RD Estimate Rel. Change s.e. p-value Bandwidth N Left N Right
Female 0.022 6.2% 0.024 0.398 222.532 7357 7597
Age (years) 0.097 0.3% 0.219 0.774 239.356 7973 8172
Lower education -0.014 -2.3% 0.025 0.437 238.878 7927 8145
Medium education 0.030 10.8% 0.028 0.185 189.785 6229 6474
Higher education -0.019 -15.1% 0.018 0.204 141.928 4525 4854
Presence of children 0.019 3.6% 0.028 0.408 198.635 6765 6693
Immigrant -0.038 -18.6% 0.017 0.016 188.079 6217 6455
Employment experience (months) -2.647 -1.9% 2.004 0.205 211.974 7094 7287
Self-employment experience indicator -0.028 -17.7% 0.024 0.146 147.013 4708 5017
ln(real monthly average earnings) 0.013 0.2% 0.032 0.577 206.944 6973 7143
Low skilled occupation 0.039 6.7% 0.024 0.060 165.035 5540 5587
Medium skilled occupation -0.001 -0.3% 0.033 0.849 176.030 5798 6116
High skilled occupation -0.031 -27.4% 0.023 0.131 200.958 6816 6713
Permanent contract 0.003 0.4% 0.025 0.745 203.368 6860 6995
Agriculture, extraction, primary manufacturing 0.004 6.3% 0.013 0.652 215.952 7205 7395
Manufacturing and utilities -0.029 -25.2% 0.023 0.147 178.529 5863 6171
Construction 0.012 5.9% 0.029 0.691 195.773 6405 6636
Trade -0.009 -4.5% 0.026 0.738 238.400 7927 8145
Transport and storage 0.017 31.5% 0.015 0.222 223.279 7387 7623
Accommodation and food services -0.014 -13.0% 0.021 0.662 165.099 5540 5587
I&C, finance, real estate, and scientific services 0.019 19.4% 0.016 0.232 187.092 6180 6418
Education, health, social, and other services 0.016 10.1% 0.021 0.412 202.717 6845 6958
PBD (months) -0.012 -0.1% 0.325 0.959 221.552 7327 7583
Local unemployment rate 0.108 0.5% 0.552 0.736 245.730 8169 8349
Notes: The local polynomial estimation results are calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico
et al. (2014) and a triangular kernel. We show the effective number of observations used to the left (N Left) and to
the right (N Right) of the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the UI entry date level. We use a quadratic version
of the running variable and include all covariates. Relative changes are calculated based on the pre-reform average
values illustrated in Appendix Table C.3. We use our RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of
detailed sample restrictions).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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UI entry centered around the reform date
Notes: These figures illustrate that our covariates are balanced around the vicinity of the cutoff date. We use our
RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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UI entry centered around the reform date
Notes: These figures illustrate that our covariates are balanced around the vicinity of the cutoff date. We use our
RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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C.4 Results
Table C.6: Effect on the Probability of Exiting into Self-Employment
Outcome Variable RD Estimate Rel. Change s.e. p-value Polynomial Covs. Bandwidth N Left N Right
(A) SE within 90 days -0.019 -34.5% 0.012 0.113 linear 193.654 6512 6748
-0.019 -34.5% 0.011 0.082 linear X 197.335 6743 6670
-0.021 -38.2% 0.015 0.134 quadratic 218.016 7445 7682
-0.019 -34.5% 0.013 0.171 quadratic X 257.573 8675 8652
-0.022 -40.0% 0.016 0.120 cubic 264.809 9105 9125
-0.020 -36.4% 0.016 0.182 cubic X 249.984 8287 8454
(B) SE within 180 days -0.025 -32.5% 0.014 0.071 linear 192.417 6467 6716
-0.022 -28.6% 0.012 0.067 linear X 207.507 7003 7174
-0.028 -36.4% 0.018 0.088 quadratic 190.724 6400 6680
-0.027 -35.1% 0.016 0.085 quadratic X 202.732 6845 6958
-0.036 -46.8% 0.019 0.047 cubic 226.785 7686 7905
-0.032 -41.6% 0.019 0.062 cubic X 210.880 7054 7260
(C) SE within 360 days -0.029 -30.2% 0.017 0.085 linear 181.890 6118 6450
-0.025 -26.0% 0.016 0.107 linear X 186.304 6142 6392
-0.043 -44.8% 0.022 0.028 quadratic 166.751 5676 5758
-0.035 -36.5% 0.021 0.060 quadratic X 178.160 5863 6171
-0.048 -50.0% 0.023 0.018 cubic 264.475 9105 9125
-0.044 -45.8% 0.023 0.030 cubic X 239.670 7973 8172
(D) SE within 720 days -0.024 -20.9% 0.018 0.144 linear 156.627 5126 5436
-0.020 -17.4% 0.017 0.198 linear X 155.774 4978 5264
-0.049 -42.6% 0.023 0.018 quadratic 150.458 4926 5244
-0.036 -31.3% 0.023 0.069 quadratic X 160.135 5126 5483
-0.058 -50.4% 0.026 0.011 cubic 203.958 7033 7182
-0.047 -40.9% 0.026 0.036 cubic X 203.165 6860 6995
Notes: The outcome variables are binary and indicate whether the person transitioned into a self-employment spell
within the first 90, 180, 360 or 720 days of unemployment, respectively. The local polynomial estimation results are
calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014) and a triangular kernel. We show
the effective number of observations used to the left (N Left) and to the right (N Right) of the cutoff. Standard
errors are clustered at the UI entry date level. Relative changes are calculated based on the pre-reform average exit
probabilities illustrated in Appendix Table C.2. We use our RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description
of detailed sample restrictions). An overview of the results for comparison purposes is provided in Table 1.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table C.7: Effect on the Probability of Exiting into Employment
Outcome variable RD Estimate Rel. Change s.e. p-value Polynomial Covs. Bandwidth N Left N Right
(A) E within 90 days 0.040 13.6% 0.029 0.072 linear 154.605 5051 5373
0.047 16.0% 0.029 0.042 linear X 151.370 4843 5137
0.091 31.0% 0.042 0.013 quadratic 155.519 5096 5403
0.094 32.0% 0.041 0.009 quadratic X 156.595 5008 5296
0.096 32.7% 0.042 0.012 cubic 276.448 9463 9425
0.095 32.3% 0.041 0.012 cubic X 280.747 9298 9299
(B) E within 180 days 0.062 13.5% 0.035 0.035 linear 92.107 2897 3151
0.066 14.4% 0.035 0.025 linear X 91.028 2803 3038
0.076 16.6% 0.042 0.033 quadratic 150.063 4926 5244
0.080 17.5% 0.041 0.027 quadratic X 150.738 4813 5109
0.085 18.6% 0.044 0.025 cubic 235.693 8071 8292
0.086 18.8% 0.044 0.024 cubic X 234.536 7829 8057
(C) E within 360 days 0.043 6.8% 0.032 0.159 linear 132.275 4206 4569
0.044 7.0% 0.033 0.165 linear X 130.985 4010 4392
0.047 7.5% 0.040 0.186 quadratic 171.657 5810 6150
0.045 7.2% 0.040 0.223 quadratic X 176.446 5798 6116
0.055 8.8% 0.043 0.139 cubic 237.828 8127 8345
0.049 7.8% 0.045 0.239 cubic X 233.850 7807 7994
(D) E within 720 days 0.025 3.1% 0.020 0.190 linear 144.147 4724 5082
0.022 2.8% 0.020 0.250 linear X 138.955 4424 4611
0.040 5.0% 0.028 0.107 quadratic 153.514 5033 5343
0.037 4.7% 0.027 0.130 quadratic X 148.689 4748 5047
0.046 5.8% 0.033 0.149 cubic 203.087 7033 7182
0.042 5.3% 0.032 0.163 cubic X 194.632 6375 6591
Notes: The outcome variables are binary and indicate whether the person transitioned into an employment spell
within the first 90, 180, 360 or 720 days of unemployment, respectively. The local polynomial estimation results are
calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014) and a triangular kernel. We show
the effective number of observations used to the left (N Left) and to the right (N Right) of the cutoff. Standard
errors are clustered at the UI entry date level. Relative changes are calculated based on the pre-reform average exit
probabilities illustrated in Appendix Table C.2. We use our RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description
of detailed sample restrictions). An overview of the results for comparison purposes is provided in Table 1.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table C.8: Effect on the Probability of Exiting into Self-Employment or Employment
Outcome Variable RD Estimate Rel. Change s.e. p-value Polynomial Covs. Bandwidth N Left N Right
(A) SE or E within 90 days 0.030 8.6% 0.032 0.185 linear 141.196 4632 4980
0.034 9.7% 0.032 0.146 linear X 142.328 4556 4884
0.070 20.1% 0.043 0.056 quadratic 160.199 5252 5626
0.076 21.8% 0.042 0.039 quadratic X 156.880 5008 5296
0.070 20.1% 0.042 0.069 cubic 289.288 10045 9718
0.074 21.2% 0.042 0.057 cubic X 284.684 9427 9388
(B) SE or E within 180 days 0.028 5.2% 0.038 0.275 linear 100.351 3132 3406
0.036 6.7% 0.038 0.202 linear X 101.980 3097 3342
0.039 7.3% 0.044 0.242 quadratic 159.914 5229 5559
0.047 8.8% 0.044 0.187 quadratic X 159.225 5104 5416
0.028 5.2% 0.043 0.383 cubic 295.716 10190 9940
0.033 6.2% 0.043 0.350 cubic X 300.297 9983 9894
(C) SE or E within 360 days 0.011 1.5% 0.034 0.799 linear 140.648 4603 4949
0.016 2.2% 0.035 0.699 linear X 138.587 4424 4611
0.007 1.0% 0.037 0.838 quadratic 213.007 7337 7552
0.010 1.4% 0.037 0.849 quadratic X 231.391 7759 7946
0.006 0.8% 0.042 0.855 cubic 252.160 8591 8751
0.009 1.2% 0.043 0.830 cubic X 257.047 8675 8652
(D) SE or E within 720 days 0.001 0.1% 0.012 0.854 linear 167.029 5696 5792
0.002 0.2% 0.012 0.920 linear X 141.956 4525 4854
-0.001 -0.1% 0.015 0.930 quadratic 220.254 7495 7750
-0.001 -0.1% 0.014 0.956 quadratic X 188.296 6217 6455
-0.019 -2.1% 0.020 0.236 cubic 176.952 5939 6283
-0.013 -1.4% 0.018 0.352 cubic X 184.259 6066 6335
Notes: The outcome variables are binary and indicate whether the person transitioned into self-employment or
employment within the first 90, 180, 360 or 720 days of unemployment, respectively. The local polynomial estimation
results are calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014) and a triangular kernel.
We show the effective number of observations used to the left (N Left) and to the right (N Right) of the cutoff.
Standard errors are clustered at the UI entry date level. Relative changes are calculated based on the pre-reform
average exit probabilities illustrated in Appendix Table C.2. We use our RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1
for a description of detailed sample restrictions). An overview of the results for comparison purposes is provided in
Table 1.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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UI entry centered around the reform date
Notes: These figures illustrate the estimated linear reform effect on different UI exit states without covariates using
MSE-optimal bandwidths as suggested by Calonico et al. (2014). We use the rdrobust routine in Stata to select the
MSE-optimal bandwidth and the rdplot routine to generate the graphs. We use our RDD estimation sample (see
Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions). See Figure 6 for the main quadratic specification.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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UI entry centered around the reform date
Notes: These figures illustrate the estimated cubic reform effect on different UI exit states without covariates using
MSE-optimal bandwidths as suggested by Calonico et al. (2014). We use the rdrobust routine in Stata to select the
MSE-optimal bandwidth and the rdplot routine to generate the graphs. We use our RDD estimation sample (see
Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions). See Figure 6 for the main quadratic specification.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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C.5 Placebo Tests
Table C.9: Placebo Test - Individuals whose RR did not Drop after the Reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(A): SE within 360 days
RD Estimate -0.007 -0.040 -0.032 0.002 -0.034 -0.035
s.e. 0.051 0.067 0.068 0.049 0.067 0.070
p-value 0.784 0.405 0.504 0.945 0.467 0.477
Bandwidth 193 208.9 339 199.3 206.7 323.9
N left 568 654 1,207 614 638 1,131
N right 540 600 990 544 590 926
(B): SE within 720 days
RD Estimate -0.005 -0.019 -0.020 0.001 -0.012 -0.017
s.e. 0.064 0.080 0.082 0.062 0.076 0.081
p-value 0.901 0.689 0.691 0.953 0.768 0.754
Bandwidth 185.4 217.4 334.4 185.2 225 337.2
N left 534 684 1,188 526 699 1,174
N right 512 621 978 507 634 976
(C): E within 360 days
RD Estimate 0.006 -0.001 -0.015 0.018 0.012 -0.007
s.e. 0.071 0.076 0.089 0.073 0.078 0.090
p-value 0.904 0.831 0.776 0.926 0.964 0.830
Bandwidth 150.6 254.8 320.1 149.8 255.7 325.6
N left 412 842 1,142 401 833 1,133
N right 424 733 919 420 728 934
(D): E within 720 days
RD Estimate -0.041 -0.051 -0.048 -0.036 -0.042 -0.068
s.e. 0.063 0.074 0.105 0.067 0.087 0.113
p-value 0.443 0.460 0.634 0.533 0.636 0.486
Bandwidth 217.2 299.8 250.2 211.6 248.8 241.8
N left 684 1,050 823 649 795 768
N right 621 879 722 601 709 698
(E): SE or E within 360 days
RD Estimate -0.007 -0.032 -0.056 0.012 -0.008 -0.042
s.e. 0.081 0.096 0.108 0.082 0.097 0.111
p-value 0.726 0.549 0.462 0.940 0.730 0.545
Bandwidth 169.4 236.4 324.5 169.7 243.4 324.5
N left 482 764 1,153 475 783 1,132
N right 455 693 939 451 702 931
(F): SE or E within 720 days
RD Estimate -0.049 -0.081 -0.107 -0.034 -0.094 -0.122
s.e. 0.045 0.055 0.065 0.044 0.058 0.069
p-value 0.251 0.093 0.062 0.359 0.058 0.050
Bandwidth 178.8 187.9 211.5 195.3 162.5 196.6
N left 510 545 662 563 444 605
N right 495 519 608 538 444 540
Polynomial linear quadratic cubic linear quadratic cubic
Covariates X X X
Notes: We run this placebo test using workers unaffected by the RR drop because they either hit the ceiling or the
floor of UI benefits. We cannot conduct this test for exit state outcomes measured within the first 90 or 180 days
of the unemployment spell because we have too few observations for this specific group of people. The outcome
variables are binary and indicate whether the person transitioned into an (self-)employment spell within the first
360 or 720 days of unemployment, respectively. The local polynomial estimation results are calculated using the
MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014) and a triangular kernel. We show the effective number
of observations used to the left (N Left) and to the right (N Right) of the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the
UI entry date level.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table C.10: Placebo Test for Self-Employment - Fictive Reform Date (July 15 2013)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(A): SE within 90 days
RD Estimate 0.044 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.045 0.045
s.e. 0.025 0.031 0.035 0.024 0.028 0.031
p-value 0.059 0.168 0.226 0.065 0.084 0.123
Bandwidth 61.7 48.09 64.59 61.62 46.67 65.71
N left 1,608 1,317 1,659 1,577 1,247 1,734
N right 1,604 1,331 1,663 1,574 1,177 1,649
(B): SE within 180 days
RD Estimate 0.028 0.012 0.010 0.016 0.007 0.007
s.e. 0.031 0.054 0.063 0.031 0.047 0.053
p-value 0.381 0.852 0.890 0.673 0.896 0.895
Bandwidth 76.96 62.18 77.62 64.02 57.63 78.49
N left 2,089 1,627 2,106 1,628 1,487 2,089
N right 1,895 1,617 1,910 1,632 1,495 2,033
(C): SE within 360 days
RD Estimate 0.004 -0.013 -0.017 -0.006 -0.013 -0.018
s.e. 0.031 0.048 0.054 0.030 0.041 0.046
p-value 0.993 0.724 0.731 0.725 0.716 0.684
Bandwidth 60.73 56.28 70.4 54.71 53.25 69.65
N left 1,592 1,503 1,872 1,429 1,408 1,818
N right 1,582 1,494 1,779 1,447 1,415 1,735
(D): SE within 720 days
RD Estimate 0.016 -0.013 -0.024 0.006 -0.016 -0.025
s.e. 0.029 0.044 0.049 0.028 0.039 0.043
p-value 0.585 0.634 0.590 0.860 0.575 0.525
Bandwidth 59.96 51.52 65.76 56.83 49.3 64.09
N left 1,554 1,378 1,766 1,476 1,310 1,628
N right 1,563 1,381 1,681 1,469 1,325 1,632
Polynomial linear quadratic cubic linear quadratic cubic
Covariates X X X
Notes: This placebo test uses a fictive cutoff date (July 15 2013) to test whether the estimated reform effects are
driven by seasonality. We drop observations before the actual cutoff date (July 15 2012) to avoid bias from the true
reform effect. The outcome variables are binary and indicate whether the person transitioned into a self-employment
spell within the first 90, 180, 360 or 720 days of unemployment, respectively. The local polynomial estimation results
are calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014) and a triangular kernel. We
show the effective number of observations used to the left (N Left) and to the right (N Right) of the cutoff. Standard
errors are clustered at the UI entry date level.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table C.11: Placebo Test for Employment - Fictive Reform Date (July 15 2013)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(A): E within 90 days
RD Estimate 0.019 0.006 -0.016 0.027 0.014 -0.001
s.e. 0.040 0.050 0.070 0.042 0.055 0.072
p-value 0.803 0.996 0.786 0.619 0.865 0.948
Bandwidth 61.59 87.59 83.55 60.75 78.36 84.05
N left 1,608 2,342 2,232 1,561 2,089 2,223
N right 1,604 2,321 2,215 1,553 2,033 2,195
(B): E within 180 days
RD Estimate -0.045 -0.037 -0.053 -0.039 -0.033 -0.034
s.e. 0.059 0.058 0.086 0.059 0.065 0.086
p-value 0.327 0.371 0.607 0.401 0.531 0.792
Bandwidth 46.21 93.88 79.59 44.45 78.89 77.3
N left 1,265 2,485 2,148 1,228 2,089 2,070
N right 1,196 2,502 2,105 1,154 2,033 1,874
(C): E within 360 days
RD Estimate -0.022 -0.047 -0.058 -0.011 -0.023 -0.031
s.e. 0.036 0.054 0.069 0.038 0.045 0.058
p-value 0.461 0.298 0.444 0.675 0.516 0.656
Bandwidth 73.68 71.3 72.27 56.43 72.94 69.79
N left 1,941 1,889 1,915 1,476 1,880 1,818
N right 1,833 1,795 1,811 1,469 1,777 1,735
(D): E within 720 days
RD Estimate 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.011 0.009 0.007
s.e. 0.036 0.056 0.063 0.031 0.052 0.058
p-value 0.964 0.969 0.976 0.688 0.880 0.975
Bandwidth 69.51 54.58 69 79.37 54.28 66.41
N left 1,852 1,454 1,852 2,111 1,429 1,764
N right 1,767 1,469 1,767 2,064 1,447 1,668
Polynomial linear quadratic cubic linear quadratic cubic
Covariates X X X
Notes: This placebo test uses a fictive cutoff date (July 15 2013) to test whether the estimated reform effects are
driven by seasonality. We drop observations before the actual cutoff date (July 15 2012) to avoid bias from the true
reform effect. The outcome variables are binary and indicate whether the person transitioned into an employment
spell within the first 90, 180, 360 or 720 days of unemployment, respectively. The local polynomial estimation results
are calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014) and a triangular kernel. We
show the effective number of observations used to the left (N Left) and to the right (N Right) of the cutoff. Standard
errors are clustered at the UI entry date level.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table C.12: Placebo Test for Self-Employment or Employment - Fictive Reform Date (July 15 2013)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(A): SE or E within 90 days
RD Estimate 0.066 0.023 0.022 0.069 0.039 0.038
s.e. 0.046 0.066 0.079 0.048 0.068 0.078
p-value 0.194 0.823 0.738 0.171 0.620 0.600
Bandwidth 66.49 57.94 71.79 61.81 55.32 74.8
N left 1,796 1,514 1,889 1,577 1,456 1,928
N right 1,700 1,521 1,795 1,574 1,459 1,822
(B): SE or E within 180 days
RD Estimate -0.031 -0.042 -0.043 -0.030 -0.036 -0.034
s.e. 0.068 0.083 0.087 0.067 0.086 0.086
p-value 0.483 0.513 0.624 0.506 0.687 0.731
Bandwidth 43.44 67.79 101.9 42.82 60.07 99.54
N left 1,114 1,810 2,691 1,079 1,561 2,597
N right 1,157 1,721 2,683 1,127 1,553 2,586
(C): SE or E within 360 days
RD Estimate -0.041 -0.069 -0.076 -0.042 -0.048 -0.054
s.e. 0.029 0.035 0.036 0.031 0.035 0.036
p-value 0.078 0.024 0.029 0.092 0.114 0.125
Bandwidth 47.45 56.82 86 34.97 57.14 83.74
N left 1,298 1,503 2,314 902 1,487 2,193
N right 1,197 1,494 2,295 955 1,495 2,170
(D): SE or E within 720 days
RD Estimate 0.021 0.004 -0.016 0.011 0.006 -0.015
s.e. 0.019 0.023 0.025 0.021 0.023 0.026
p-value 0.322 0.968 0.400 0.780 0.963 0.428
Bandwidth 71.96 73.75 78.99 46.84 75.36 73.75
N left 1,889 1,941 2,126 1,247 2,038 1,906
N right 1,795 1,833 2,074 1,177 1,847 1,799
Polynomial linear quadratic cubic linear quadratic cubic
Covariates X X X
Notes: This placebo test uses a fictive cutoff date (July 15 2013) to test whether the estimated reform effects are
driven by seasonality. We drop observations before the actual cutoff date (July 15 2012) to avoid bias from the true
reform effect. The outcome variables are binary and indicate whether the person transitioned into self-employment or
employment within the first 90, 180, 360 or 720 days of unemployment, respectively. The local polynomial estimation
results are calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014) and a triangular kernel.
We show the effective number of observations used to the left (N Left) and to the right (N Right) of the cutoff.
Standard errors are clustered at the UI entry date level.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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C.6 Overestimation Bias if Self-Employment is Excluded
In Table C.13 we demonstrate the overestimation bias, which arises if self-employed workers are
excluded from the sample. For reasons of comparability, the results are based on a parametric
(global) estimation approach using different bandwidths between 150 and 170 days. Our findings
are very similar, however, if we use a non-parametric approach (Appendix Table C.14).
As can be seen from our illustration of extensive margin outcome variables in Figure 4, the exclusion
of individuals who transition from unemployment into self-employment causes columns (2) and (6)
to be equivalent, the same as columns (4) and (8).
When estimating the causal reform effect on the employment probability (E=1) in columns (1)-(4),
counterfactual outcomes are to become self-employed (SE=0) or to stay unemployed (UE=0).
Through the exclusion of self-employed workers from our sample, the counterfactual outcome is
restricted to individuals who stay unemployed. In other words, there are fewer individuals with
an outcome variable which is equal to zero. Based on this sample selection criterion, we find that
the reform effect on the probability of exiting from unemployment into employment within 90
days (column 2) is slightly overestimated. The estimated effects on the probability of exiting into
employment within 180 days (columns 3 and 4) are similar, regardless of the inclusion or exclusion
of self-employment.
When estimating the causal reform effect on the probability of exiting into self-employment or
employment (SE=1, E=1) in columns (5)-(8), the counterfactual outcome is unemployment (UE=0).
If self-employment is excluded, our sample contains fewer individuals with an outcome variable
Table C.13: Parametric Approach
Employment Self-Employment or Employment
E=1, (SE=0), UE=0 E=1, (SE=1), UE=0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Bandwidth
RD Estimate 0.094∗∗ 0.101∗ 0.065 0.065 0.078∗ 0.101∗ 0.043 0.065
(0.035) (0.040) (0.034) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038) 150
Rel. Change 32.0% 34.4% 14.2% 14.2% 22.3% 28.9% 8.0% 12.1%
N 9,922 8,607 9,922 8,607 9,922 8,607 9,922 8,607
RD Estimate 0.079∗ 0.086∗ 0.057 0.058 0.064 0.086∗ 0.038 0.058
(0.034) (0.038) (0.033) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 160
Rel. Change 26.9% 29.3% 12.4% 12.7% 18.3% 24.6% 7.1% 10.8%
N 10,609 9,218 10,609 9,218 10,609 9,218 10,609 9,218
RD Estimate 0.079∗ 0.084∗ 0.045 0.042 0.059 0.084∗ 0.024 0.042
(0.033) (0.037) (0.034) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 170
Rel. Change 26.9% 28.6% 9.8% 9.2% 16.9% 24.1% 4.5% 7.8%
N 11,600 10,073 11,600 10,073 11,600 10,073 11,600 10,073
Self-Employment included excluded included excluded included excluded included excluded
Exit within... 90 days 90 days 180 days 180 days 90 days 90 days 180 days 180 days
Notes: This table demonstrates the overestimation bias which arises if self-employed workers are excluded from the
sample. The outcome variable is binary and indicates whether the person transitioned into a (self-)employment spell
within the first 90 or 180 days of unemployment. We use a quadratic version of the running variable and include all
covariates. Relative changes are calculated based on the pre-reform average probabilities illustrated in Appendix
Table C.2. Standard errors are clustered at the UI entry date level (∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001). We use
our RDD estimation sample (detailed sample restrictions in Section 4.1).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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which is equal to one. Since the startup rate is negatively affected by the reform (compare
Section 5.1), estimating the joint effect on self-employment and employment yields much smaller
point estimates (columns 5 and 7) compared to the case when self-employment is excluded (columns
6 and 8). Consequently, under heterogeneous treatment effects the isolated look at the job-finding
rate does not accurately represent the reform’s general employment effects (on self-employment
and employment).
Table C.14: Non-Parametric Approach
Outcome variable RD Estimate Rel. Change s.e. p-value Polynomial Covs. Bandwidth N Left N Right
(A): E within 90 days
Self-Employment included 0.094 32.0% 0.041 0.009 quadratic X 156.595 5,008 5,296
Self-Employment excluded 0.096 32.7% 0.044 0.015 quadratic X 161.270 4,444 4,807
(B): E within 180 days
Self-Employment included 0.080 17.5% 0.041 0.027 quadratic X 150.738 4,813 5,109
Self-Employment excluded 0.069 15.1% 0.043 0.060 quadratic X 161.872 4,444 4,807
(C): SE or E within 90 days
Self-Employment included 0.076 21.8% 0.042 0.039 quadratic X 156.880 5,008 5,296
Self-Employment excluded 0.096 27.5% 0.044 0.015 quadratic X 161.270 4,444 4,807
(D): SE or E within 180 days
Self-Employment included 0.047 8.8% 0.044 0.187 quadratic X 159.225 5,104 5,416
Self-Employment excluded 0.069 12.9% 0.043 0.060 quadratic X 161.872 4,444 4,807
Notes: This table demonstrates the overestimation bias which arises if self-employed workers are excluded from the
sample. The outcome variables are binary and indicate whether the person transitioned into a (self-)employment
spell within the first 90 or 180 days of unemployment, respectively. The local polynomial estimation results are
calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014) and a triangular kernel. We show
the effective number of observations used to the left (N Left) and to the right (N Right) of the cutoff. Standard
errors are clustered at the UI entry date level. Relative changes are calculated based on the pre-reform average exit
probabilities illustrated in Appendix Table C.2. We use our RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description
of detailed sample restrictions).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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C.7 Subgroup Analysis of Extensive Margin Effects
Table C.15: Subgroup Analysis - Self-Employment within 360 days (including covariates)
Sub Sample RD Estimate s.e. p-value Polynomial Bandwidth N Left N Right
-0.036 0.019 0.057 linear 237.226 3858 3888
Age ≤ median(age) -0.051 0.031 0.064 quadratic 174.601 2768 2888
-0.062 0.033 0.047 cubic 241.635 3926 3928
-0.011 0.021 0.613 linear 186.612 3173 3332
Age > median(age) -0.019 0.027 0.403 quadratic 200.810 3506 3510
-0.022 0.029 0.373 cubic 281.018 4759 4882
-0.026 0.022 0.170 linear 192.638 2000 2460
Women -0.057 0.032 0.042 quadratic 161.119 1634 2039
-0.063 0.034 0.036 cubic 243.132 2633 3057
-0.025 0.023 0.240 linear 160.348 3498 3450
Men -0.029 0.026 0.224 quadratic 209.357 4792 4559
-0.031 0.027 0.227 cubic 295.563 6615 6116
-0.028 0.020 0.133 linear 183.442 4360 4420
Permanent contract -0.034 0.026 0.135 quadratic 192.851 4536 4578
-0.040 0.027 0.097 cubic 285.764 6664 6696
-0.015 0.022 0.525 linear 199.002 1937 2006
Temporary contract -0.027 0.030 0.266 quadratic 199.959 1937 2006
-0.051 0.036 0.092 cubic 213.809 2057 2174
-0.041 0.019 0.034 linear 181.942 3250 3345
Children -0.050 0.026 0.030 quadratic 190.843 3403 3469
-0.049 0.027 0.040 cubic 294.857 5379 5140
-0.008 0.027 0.620 linear 146.330 2110 2352
No Children -0.016 0.032 0.497 quadratic 190.212 2845 3035
-0.029 0.035 0.323 cubic 237.485 3596 3801
-0.008 0.032 0.913 linear 151.336 792 893
Immigrant -0.041 0.037 0.172 quadratic 154.735 805 910
-0.079 0.041 0.028 cubic 183.960 1003 1085
-0.026 0.016 0.087 linear 194.186 5298 5459
No immigrant -0.036 0.021 0.060 quadratic 182.951 4999 5210
-0.042 0.022 0.037 cubic 273.473 7511 7573
-0.018 0.021 0.398 linear 224.562 4263 4389
Lower education -0.023 0.029 0.384 quadratic 224.984 4263 4389
-0.022 0.032 0.447 cubic 275.410 5372 5283
-0.030 0.024 0.141 linear 197.777 1940 1818
Medium education -0.058 0.034 0.049 quadratic 186.739 1783 1735
-0.068 0.037 0.036 cubic 277.145 2615 2508
-0.021 0.029 0.528 linear 153.584 674 759
Higher education -0.078 0.032 0.007 quadratic 134.560 569 685
-0.101 0.035 0.001 cubic 175.520 773 910
-0.019 0.020 0.283 linear 169.291 2644 2854
ln(wage) ≤ median(ln(wage)) -0.021 0.025 0.398 quadratic 209.006 3342 3693
-0.025 0.027 0.359 cubic 307.673 4938 5073
-0.029 0.018 0.108 linear 212.703 3746 3602
ln(wage) > median(ln(wage)) -0.060 0.025 0.007 quadratic 152.603 2620 2517
-0.076 0.027 0.003 cubic 188.191 3290 3184
Notes: The outcome variable is binary and indicates whether the person transitioned into a self-employment spell
within the first 360 days of unemployment. We include all covariates. The local polynomial estimation results are
calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014) and a triangular kernel. We show
the effective number of observations used to the left (N left) and to the right (N right) of the cutoff. Standard errors
are clustered at the UI entry date level. We used the following median values: median(age)= 36 and the median
ln(real monthly average wage)= 7.3. Pre-reform average probability of becoming self-employed within the first 360
days of the unemployment spell: 9.6%. We use our RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of
detailed sample restrictions).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table C.16: Subgroup Analysis - Employment within 180 days (including covariates)
Sub Sample RD Estimate s.e. p-value Polynomial Bandwidth N Left N Right
0.073 0.044 0.050 linear 111.561 1645 1831
Age ≤ median(age) 0.101 0.054 0.028 quadratic 153.419 2371 2505
0.125 0.063 0.030 cubic 198.852 3282 3189
0.047 0.038 0.114 linear 95.036 1517 1639
Age > median(age) 0.059 0.045 0.129 quadratic 158.756 2618 2795
0.062 0.049 0.171 cubic 230.138 3978 4125
-0.003 0.049 0.878 linear 111.129 1097 1426
Women 0.019 0.059 0.581 quadratic 146.418 1498 1874
0.025 0.066 0.607 cubic 202.532 2195 2596
0.100 0.039 0.003 linear 93.878 1948 1936
Men 0.114 0.043 0.003 quadratic 163.706 3603 3494
0.116 0.045 0.005 cubic 272.936 6112 5750
0.042 0.039 0.177 linear 102.649 2234 2297
Permanent contract 0.048 0.044 0.185 quadratic 172.051 4116 4214
0.053 0.047 0.179 cubic 272.751 6416 6462
0.089 0.047 0.029 linear 126.469 1065 1324
Temporary contract 0.136 0.058 0.007 quadratic 155.867 1380 1595
0.155 0.070 0.018 cubic 193.903 1797 1964
0.069 0.045 0.074 linear 114.329 1930 2071
Children 0.073 0.052 0.100 quadratic 187.597 3364 3416
0.084 0.058 0.117 cubic 257.651 4731 4598
0.065 0.041 0.046 linear 91.817 1252 1417
No children 0.109 0.048 0.010 quadratic 131.111 1843 2081
0.109 0.050 0.013 cubic 215.132 3272 3464
-0.026 0.065 0.756 linear 144.734 753 867
Immigrant 0.024 0.081 0.572 quadratic 182.046 997 1084
0.106 0.113 0.268 cubic 190.694 1050 1112
0.069 0.037 0.029 linear 100.230 2553 2788
No immigrant 0.077 0.043 0.043 quadratic 163.960 4407 4583
0.076 0.043 0.053 cubic 291.908 8063 7977
0.052 0.041 0.116 linear 108.658 1943 1988
Lower education 0.059 0.049 0.148 quadratic 172.370 3273 3476
0.067 0.052 0.152 cubic 261.406 5118 5092
0.079 0.052 0.060 linear 103.913 906 941
Medium education 0.102 0.057 0.038 quadratic 158.903 1486 1459
0.121 0.063 0.036 cubic 199.206 1956 1828
0.052 0.068 0.316 linear 132.678 559 676
Higher education 0.096 0.080 0.145 quadratic 162.266 714 807
0.119 0.091 0.137 cubic 203.496 933 1056
0.023 0.036 0.375 linear 107.591 1555 1758
ln(wage) ≤ median(ln(wage)) 0.035 0.044 0.349 quadratic 143.728 2134 2512
0.033 0.051 0.548 cubic 178.490 2748 3127
0.083 0.049 0.044 linear 97.206 1623 1592
ln(wage) > median(ln(wage)) 0.093 0.054 0.045 quadratic 161.120 2757 2711
0.109 0.063 0.059 cubic 214.668 3769 3632
Notes: The outcome variable is binary and indicates whether the person transitioned into an employment spell within
the first 180 days of unemployment. We include all covariates. The local polynomial estimation results are calculated
using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014) and a triangular kernel. We show the effective
number of observations used to the left (N left) and to the right (N right) of the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered
at the UI entry date level. We used the following median values: median(age)= 36 and the median ln(real monthly
average wage)= 7.3. Pre-reform average probability of finding a job within the first 180 days of the unemployment
spell: 45.8%. We use our RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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C.8 Unemployment Duration Analysis
Table C.17: UI and UE Duration Means
Pre-Reform Post-Reform Total Period
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
(A) UI Duration
Self-Employment 5.850 6.189 2,329 6.004 5.985 2,189 5.924 6.091 4,518
Employment 6.884 6.137 15,958 7.086 6.022 14,035 6.979 6.084 29,993
Self-Employment or Employment 6.752 6.153 18,287 6.940 6.029 16,224 6.841 6.095 34,511
(B) UE Duration
Self-Employment 8.914 12.414 2,329 8.433 10.776 2,189 8.681 11.651 4,518
Employment 9.829 12.025 15,958 9.363 10.300 14,035 9.611 11.253 29,993
Self-Employment or Employment 9.712 12.079 18,287 9.237 10.370 16,224 9.489 11.310 34,511
Notes: This table presents the estimated UI (panel A) and UE (panel B) duration means, standard deviations, and
the number of observations for the pre- and post-reform period, respectively. The final column shows the respective
values for the whole period. Relative changes in Table C.19 are based on the pre-reform means from this table. We
use our RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
72
Table C.18: UI and UE Duration Elasticities (360 Days)
Outcome Variable Duration RD Est. % change in s.e. p-value Polyn. Covs. N left N right
Elast. (η) duration
(A) UI Duration
(A1) Self-Employment -0.510 0.257 8.5 0.474 0.649 linear 583 555
-0.545 0.275 9.1 0.477 0.620 linear X 506 475
-0.066 0.034 1.1 0.615 0.907 quadratic 633 589
-0.200 0.101 3.3 0.616 0.984 quadratic X 584 557
0.170 -0.086 -2.8 0.688 0.774 cubic 807 786
-0.029 0.014 0.5 0.644 0.922 cubic X 860 854
(A2) Employment 0.389 -0.254 -6.5 0.274 0.181 linear 2163 2503
0.621 -0.406 -10.4 0.268 0.054 linear X 1817 2074
0.752 -0.491 -12.5 0.334 0.071 quadratic 3451 3670
0.772 -0.504 -12.9 0.308 0.052 quadratic X 3384 3593
0.990 -0.647 -16.5 0.394 0.065 cubic 4695 4988
0.971 -0.634 -16.2 0.369 0.060 cubic X 4357 4647
(A3) Self-Employment 0.351 -0.222 -5.9 0.268 0.215 linear 2389 2551
or Employment 0.496 -0.314 -8.3 0.261 0.106 linear X 2128 2361
0.584 -0.370 -9.7 0.311 0.127 quadratic 4070 4230
0.641 -0.406 -10.7 0.296 0.094 quadratic X 3915 4065
0.814 -0.516 -13.6 0.360 0.095 cubic 5709 5923
0.861 -0.545 -14.4 0.343 0.074 cubic X 5104 5352
(B) UE Duration
(B1) Self-Employment -0.700 0.388 11.7 0.513 0.438 linear 589 560
-0.756 0.419 12.6 0.507 0.378 linear X 555 506
-0.278 0.154 4.6 0.673 0.975 quadratic 626 585
-0.475 0.264 7.9 0.665 0.817 quadratic X 595 567
0.292 -0.162 -4.9 0.784 0.680 cubic 751 718
-0.085 0.047 1.4 0.747 0.894 cubic X 769 725
(B2) Employment 0.623 -0.424 -10.4 0.314 0.075 linear 1733 1982
0.713 -0.486 -11.9 0.289 0.036 linear X 1622 1844
0.783 -0.534 -13.1 0.349 0.061 quadratic 3313 3641
0.821 -0.559 -13.7 0.317 0.038 quadratic X 3181 3511
1.027 -0.700 -17.1 0.408 0.053 cubic 4878 5039
1.010 -0.688 -16.8 0.376 0.045 cubic X 4394 4675
(B3) Self-Employment 0.478 -0.318 -8.0 0.301 0.139 linear 2021 2233
or Employment 0.548 -0.364 -9.1 0.275 0.082 linear X 1963 2158
0.615 -0.409 -10.2 0.329 0.111 quadratic 4018 4186
0.668 -0.444 -11.1 0.306 0.077 quadratic X 3642 3988
0.862 -0.573 -14.4 0.384 0.081 cubic 5697 5902
0.889 -0.591 -14.8 0.357 0.061 cubic X 5104 5352
Notes: This table presents our estimated UI (panel A) and UE (panel B) duration regression results. The local
polynomial estimation results are calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014)
and a triangular kernel. Standard errors are clustered at the UI entry date level. We use our RDD estimation
sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions) but restricted it to individuals who exit
into self-employment, employment or either one of them within the first 360 days of unemployment. The duration
elasticity, η, is computed from the percentage change in UI or UE duration (relative to the pre-reform average
duration, see Table C.17), divided by the percentage change in the RR due to the reform (approx. 16.67%), as
illustrated in equation 2. A summary of the results for exit within 360 and 720 days is provided in Table 2.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table C.19: UI and UE Duration Elasticities (720 Days)
Outcome Variable Duration RD Est. % change in s.e. p-value Polyn. Covs. N left N right
Elast. (η) duration
(A) UI Duration
(A1) Self-Employment -1.199 1.006 20.0 1.045 0.296 linear 743 718
-1.453 1.219 24.2 1.067 0.204 linear X 640 611
-1.249 1.047 20.8 1.174 0.375 quadratic 1080 1049
-1.480 1.241 24.7 1.168 0.288 quadratic X 1016 1008
-1.430 1.199 23.8 1.389 0.356 cubic 1088 1073
-1.725 1.447 28.7 1.401 0.303 cubic X 973 956
(A2) Employment 0.557 -0.581 -9.3 0.439 0.100 linear 3590 3988
0.729 -0.760 -12.2 0.501 0.061 linear X 2920 3292
0.830 -0.865 -13.8 0.543 0.063 quadratic 4881 5269
0.865 -0.901 -14.4 0.551 0.062 quadratic X 5593 5897
0.991 -1.032 -16.5 0.627 0.076 cubic 6234 6421
1.032 -1.075 -17.2 0.657 0.088 cubic X 6337 6626
(A3) Self-Employment 0.308 -0.313 -5.1 0.457 0.331 linear 4370 4726
or Employment 0.428 -0.435 -7.1 0.516 0.247 linear X 3733 4090
0.528 -0.536 -8.8 0.551 0.239 quadratic 5954 6252
0.532 -0.541 -8.9 0.559 0.248 quadratic X 6759 7064
0.663 -0.674 -11.1 0.619 0.225 cubic 7404 7685
0.703 -0.714 -11.7 0.655 0.245 cubic X 7519 7743
(B) UE Duration
(B1) Self-Employment -1.118 1.053 18.6 1.202 0.341 linear 679 650
-1.274 1.200 21.2 1.216 0.269 linear X 612 581
-1.182 1.113 19.7 1.408 0.451 quadratic 926 879
-1.352 1.274 22.5 1.370 0.350 quadratic X 915 877
-1.034 0.974 17.2 1.570 0.583 cubic 1032 1023
-1.321 1.244 22.0 1.553 0.466 cubic X 977 958
(B2) Employment 0.416 -0.473 -6.9 0.506 0.205 linear 3034 3429
0.536 -0.610 -8.9 0.540 0.142 linear X 2850 3251
0.566 -0.644 -9.4 0.565 0.169 quadratic 5474 5603
0.584 -0.665 -9.7 0.565 0.163 quadratic X 6073 6255
0.716 -0.814 -11.9 0.670 0.189 cubic 6345 6626
0.780 -0.888 -13.0 0.699 0.191 cubic X 6337 6626
(B3) Self-Employment 0.195 -0.217 -3.2 0.532 0.487 linear 3711 4133
or Employment 0.292 -0.325 -4.9 0.561 0.384 linear X 3569 3974
0.336 -0.373 -5.6 0.596 0.409 quadratic 6398 6590
0.358 -0.398 -6.0 0.596 0.397 quadratic X 6818 7114
0.469 -0.522 -7.8 0.679 0.374 cubic 7523 7787
0.529 -0.589 -8.8 0.705 0.360 cubic X 7461 7711
Notes: This table presents our estimated UI (panel A) and UE (panel B) duration regression results. The local
polynomial estimation results are calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014)
and a triangular kernel. Standard errors are clustered at the UI entry date level. We use our RDD estimation
sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions) but restricted it to individuals who exit
into self-employment, employment or either one of them within the first 720 days of unemployment. The duration
elasticity, η, is computed from the percentage change in UI or UE duration (relative to the pre-reform average
duration, see Table C.17), divided by the percentage change in the RR due to the reform (approx. 16.67%), as
illustrated in equation 2. A summary of the results for exit within 360 and 720 days is provided in Table 2.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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C.9 Reform Effect on the Self-Employment Quality
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(b) After the Labor Market Reform (2013-2018)
Notes: These figures illustrate the distribution of workers across the different employment states, including
unemployment, temporary employment, permanent employment and self-employment, with respect to their
age group, as a percentage of the Spanish labor force. The share of self-employed among older individuals
(50 and older) appears to decline in favor of unemployment and part-time employment, whereas for the
youth (below 30) self-employment becomes more relevant.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
Table C.20: Mean Comparison Test of Self-Employment Quality
Variable Pre Mean Post Mean Mean Diff. N Pre N Post
ln(real monthly average contribution basis) 7.359 6.816 -0.543 4,514 4,513
(0.005)
Agriculture, extraction, primary manufacturing 0.054 0.048 -0.005 4,518 4,518
(0.004)
Manufacturing and utilities 0.079 0.033 -0.045 4,518 4,518
(0.004)
Construction 0.174 0.133 -0.041 4,518 4,518
(0.005)
Trade 0.244 0.268 0.024 4,518 4,518
(0.007)
Transport and storage 0.058 0.053 -0.005 4,518 4,518
(0.003)
Accomodation and food services 0.085 0.127 0.042 4,518 4,518
(0.005)
I&C, finance, real estate, and scientific services 0.140 0.167 0.027 4,518 4,518
(0.006)
Education, health, social, and other services 0.167 0.170 0.003 4,518 4,518
(0.006)
Notes: This table presents the results of the mean-comparison tests of two measures of self-employment quality,
including earnings and sector of activity. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table C.21: Effect on (Self-)Employment Quality (Quadratic, 360 Days)
Outcome Variable RD Est. s.e. p-value Bandwidth N Left N Right Covs.
Duration (monthly)
Employment 0.153 1.271 0.878 189.308 3885 4230
0.174 1.346 0.941 183.778 3667 4003 X
Self-Employment -2.555 3.837 0.501 255.519 837 831
-2.488 3.788 0.531 255.300 821 819 X
ln(real monthly average contribution basis)
Employment 0.058 0.055 0.173 149.582 2938 3312
0.035 0.045 0.322 184.375 3654 4005 X
Self-Employment 0.017 0.031 0.536 289.762 955 933
0.035 0.035 0.278 236.841 780 768 X
Above median wage pre UI receipt
Employment -0.011 0.051 0.930 212.312 4460 4768
-0.015 0.039 0.666 238.501 4903 5138 X
Self-Employment -0.088 0.072 0.294 239.573 804 783
-0.081 0.073 0.190 162.239 527 500 X
Agriculture, extraction, primary manufacturing
Employment 0.034 0.019 0.091 185.251 3798 4159
0.027 0.015 0.062 258.377 5407 5453 X
Self-Employment -0.004 0.033 0.986 205.679 725 670
-0.008 0.031 0.824 198.800 694 605 X
Manufacturing and utilities
Employment -0.036 0.023 0.140 247.853 5271 5443
-0.024 0.017 0.150 255.389 5246 5398 X
Self-Employment -0.039 0.033 0.280 205.349 725 670
-0.035 0.032 0.368 207.013 712 668 X
Construction
Employment 0.055 0.039 0.086 163.220 3296 3634
0.034 0.022 0.063 141.143 2731 3072 X
Self-Employment 0.076 0.081 0.304 238.389 798 783
0.048 0.065 0.472 226.788 752 716 X
Trade
Employment -0.028 0.034 0.269 154.413 3071 3419
-0.023 0.027 0.243 154.691 2990 3321 X
Self-Employment 0.136 0.102 0.095 146.303 495 462
0.116 0.095 0.136 141.213 472 442 X
Transport and storage
Employment 0.009 0.014 0.436 234.767 4972 5226
-0.001 0.014 0.995 215.834 4394 4675 X
Self-Employment -0.026 0.051 0.473 184.042 626 585
-0.041 0.045 0.254 153.685 503 472 X
Accommodation and food services
Employment -0.062 0.030 0.031 188.693 3875 4218
-0.011 0.018 0.589 212.487 4344 4630 X
Self-Employment 0.003 0.055 0.975 187.165 638 595
-0.036 0.051 0.362 188.812 628 589 X
I&C, finance, real estate, and scientific services
Employment 0.012 0.022 0.617 223.071 4651 4950
0.007 0.018 0.636 177.926 3535 3892 X
Self-Employment 0.017 0.067 0.784 249.894 829 816
0.009 0.054 0.935 174.633 584 557 X
Education, health, social, and other services
Employment 0.018 0.033 0.505 275.273 5903 5919
-0.015 0.028 0.499 211.154 4323 4608 X
Self-Employment -0.088 0.060 0.088 164.003 541 513
-0.031 0.051 0.462 199.361 699 607 X
Permanent contract
Employment -0.039 0.047 0.549 166.596 3451 3670
-0.032 0.039 0.524 170.982 3417 3756 X
Notes: In this table we estimate the causal reform effect on (self-)employment quality. The local polynomial estimation
results are calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014), a quadratic specification
and a triangular kernel. We show the effective number of observations used to the left (N Left) and to the right (N
Right) of the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the UI entry date level. We restrict our RDD estimation sample
(see Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions) to individuals who exit into self-employment within
the first 360 days of unemployment. Results for individuals who exit within the first 720 days of unemployment are
provided in Table 3. Detailed results for the linear and cubic specifications are available upon request.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table C.22: Reform Effects on Monthly Earnings (Self-Employment within 360 Days)
Time Horizon RD Estimate s.e. p-value Polyn. Covs. Bandwidth N left N right
12 months after 0.069 0.055 0.114 linear 152.455 510 473
0.080 0.048 0.046 linear X 177.611 589 561
0.093 0.067 0.112 quadratic 238.643 796 779
0.103 0.064 0.076 quadratic X 234.423 776 763
0.066 0.102 0.537 cubic 222.493 756 715
0.085 0.096 0.387 cubic X 226.554 750 713
18 months after 0.051 0.054 0.222 linear 147.178 496 457
0.059 0.058 0.207 linear X 132.331 441 388
0.068 0.074 0.304 quadratic 199.310 712 611
0.076 0.074 0.268 quadratic X 189.292 626 587
0.063 0.097 0.583 cubic 230.444 786 756
0.081 0.089 0.379 cubic X 247.165 807 789
24 months after 0.080 0.048 0.049 linear 181.793 603 575
0.093 0.045 0.018 linear X 175.057 576 552
0.110 0.071 0.097 quadratic 199.315 702 608
0.127 0.065 0.035 quadratic X 181.345 591 567
0.115 0.091 0.212 cubic 223.534 749 711
0.149 0.082 0.055 cubic X 214.403 715 682
36 months after 0.023 0.066 0.724 linear 159.546 515 491
0.035 0.063 0.615 linear X 141.823 461 434
0.023 0.072 0.737 quadratic 258.245 844 824
0.026 0.075 0.852 quadratic X 201.639 685 627
-0.077 0.114 0.390 cubic 192.078 635 592
-0.017 0.100 0.773 cubic X 195.807 630 590
48 months after 0.040 0.067 0.425 linear 182.025 588 562
0.066 0.066 0.229 linear X 136.870 443 388
0.060 0.086 0.426 quadratic 228.101 755 709
0.085 0.085 0.271 quadratic X 170.966 549 526
0.046 0.119 0.743 cubic 217.165 718 685
0.093 0.104 0.370 cubic X 205.968 683 637
Notes: In this table, we estimate the causal reform effect on earnings, approximated by the contribution basis in the
case of self-employment for those who transition into (self-)employment within 360 days of entering unemployment.
The dependent variable corresponds to log monthly earnings after different time periods measured in months after
having entered UI. Note that the earnings or contribution basis in Table 3 and Table C.21 correspond to the exit
status, i.e. the first status which an individual has after unemployment, whereas the earnings considered here might
belong to a status which is different from the exit status, as we are able to trace the individuals’ complete labor market
trajectories until 2018. The local polynomial estimation results are calculated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth
suggested by Calonico et al. (2014), a linear/quadratic/cubic specification and a triangular kernel. We show the
effective number of observations used to the left (N Left) and to the right (N Right) of the cutoff. Standard errors
are clustered at the UI entry date level. We restrict our RDD estimation sample (see Section 4.1 for a description of
detailed sample restrictions) to individuals who exit into self-employment within the first 360 days of unemployment.
An overview of the results for comparison purposes is provided in Table 4.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table C.23: Reform Effects on Monthly Earnings (Employment within 360 Days)
Time Horizon RD Estimate s.e. p-value Polyn. Covs. Bandwidth N left N right
12 months after -0.001 0.040 0.766 linear 114.526 2152 2480
-0.005 0.027 0.924 linear X 142.833 2733 3064
0.031 0.048 0.335 quadratic 145.690 2861 3219
0.007 0.034 0.632 quadratic X 166.876 3338 3528
0.046 0.051 0.253 cubic 216.753 4499 4792
0.017 0.037 0.486 cubic X 242.795 4968 5162
18 months after -0.001 0.039 0.758 linear 117.698 2174 2523
0.006 0.022 0.714 linear X 150.830 2867 3199
0.027 0.045 0.369 quadratic 150.268 2942 3294
0.014 0.027 0.438 quadratic X 179.923 3520 3887
0.036 0.045 0.324 cubic 249.679 5221 5409
0.021 0.028 0.319 cubic X 266.258 5440 5535
24 months after -0.029 0.045 0.653 linear 144.996 2797 3184
-0.009 0.032 0.706 linear X 153.455 2912 3249
0.005 0.055 0.714 quadratic 175.068 3499 3908
-0.015 0.035 0.595 quadratic X 263.940 5358 5477
0.025 0.060 0.524 cubic 236.181 4890 5173
0.002 0.051 0.913 cubic X 225.331 4456 4768
36 months after -0.017 0.042 0.843 linear 140.262 2693 3049
-0.001 0.032 0.997 linear X 141.264 2641 2988
0.021 0.052 0.497 quadratic 169.375 3372 3606
-0.009 0.033 0.710 quadratic X 254.617 5037 5243
0.036 0.057 0.390 cubic 236.777 4833 5110
0.011 0.044 0.633 cubic X 252.757 5003 5219
48 months after 0.003 0.037 0.685 linear 102.545 1812 2078
-0.014 0.028 0.739 linear X 132.503 2352 2702
0.021 0.043 0.419 quadratic 150.893 2850 3193
-0.022 0.028 0.440 quadratic X 257.730 5159 5205
0.017 0.043 0.529 cubic 265.068 5439 5515
0.007 0.041 0.752 cubic X 222.913 4296 4579
Notes: In this table, we estimate the causal reform effect on earnings for those who transition into (self-)employment
within 360 days of entering unemployment. The dependent variable corresponds to log monthly earnings after different
time periods measured in months after having entered UI. Note that the earnings or contribution basis in Table 3 and
Table C.21 correspond to the exit status, i.e. the first status which an individual has after unemployment, whereas
the earnings considered here might belong to a status which is different from the exit status, as we are able to trace
the individuals’ complete labor market trajectories until 2018. The local polynomial estimation results are calculated
using the MSE-optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico et al. (2014), a linear/quadratic/cubic specification and a
triangular kernel. We show the effective number of observations used to the left (N Left) and to the right (N Right)
of the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the UI entry date level. We restrict our RDD estimation sample (see
Section 4.1 for a description of detailed sample restrictions) to individuals who exit into employment within the first
360 days of unemployment. An overview of the results for comparison purposes is provided in Table 4.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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D Appendix: RDD Robustness Check - Competing Risks Model
In this section, we briefly discuss the results of an alternative approach to the estimation of the
impact of unemployment benefit levels on the job-finding and startup rates. We consider that the
response of unemployed individuals to the cut in UI benefits can be expressed as failure events. In
this context, failure corresponds to the events of exiting from unemployment into self-employment
or employment. The counterfactual outcome would be to stay unemployed. We also look at the
failure of exiting into the union of self-employment and employment (general employment) vs.
remaining unemployed.
Fine and Gray (1999) propose a framework to analyze such models. They take different failure
events into account by modeling their respective cumulative incidence function (CIF) under a
proportional hazard rate assumption. The Fine-Gray subdistribution hazard model can be defined
as:
λk(t;X) = λk0(t)exp(XTβk) (D.1)
where λk(t;X) denotes the subdistribution hazard function, λk0(t) the baseline subdistribution
hazard function for the kth event type, and X a set of covariates (Austin, Latouche, & Fine, 2020).
The subdistribution hazard model allows us to estimate the effect of being treated on the CIF
for each failure event, while controlling for other time-invariant covariates measured at the time
of displacement. In our context X includes the same set of predetermined covariates as in our
RDD specification. Beyersmann and Schumacher (2008) introduce time-dependent categorical and
discrete covariates to the Fine-Gray model. We follow their approach to include variables which
indicate whether individuals leave unemployment in a given month after the start of the UI spell in
order to control for duration dependence.
Tables D.1 to D.3 summarize the results of the maximum-likelihood RDD hazard ratios and
estimates of the competing-risks regression models according to the Fine and Gray (1999) model.
Based on our estimated coefficients, we have computed the relative effects on the job-finding and
startup rates (fourth column). In line with the RDD results from our baseline specification in
Section 5.1, we observe consistently negative effects on the startup rate which are relatively stronger
than the positive effects on the job-finding rate, regardless of the considered time horizon. Our
estimates for self-employment, considered in more detail, seem to be robust to the inclusion of
predetermined covariates and duration dependence controls, especially in the cubic polynomials.
The effects’ sizes seem to be stable over different time horizons, i.e. heterogeneity over time vanishes
in the competing-risks framework. With respect to the probability of exiting into re-employment,
we observe similar patterns to our baseline RDD results as well. Effects seem to be larger and
more significant in the short term, while they decrease in the medium and long term, suggesting
that the heterogeneity over time is still relevant in the competing-risks framework when it comes
to employment. Lastly, the effects on the probability of exiting into the union of self-employment
and employment are rather insignificant, slightly positive in the short term, and closer to zero
(and sometimes even negative) in the medium and long term. Again, the negative effects on
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self-employment and the positive effects on employment cancel out each other if the union of
both (general employment) is considered. Our estimated CIFs are also graphically expressed in
Figure D.1 using the quadratic setting. Altogether, we find that the results pattern from our
baseline RDD specification is still observed in more complex competing-risks regression models.
Table D.1: Competing-Risks Regression Results for Self-Employment
Event of Interest Hazard Ratio Estimate Rate s.e. Polynomial Covs. Dur. Dep.
(A) SE within 90 days 0.905 -0.100 -9.5% 0.070 linear
0.912 -0.092 -8.8% 0.071 linear X
0.956 -0.045 -4.4% 0.069 linear X X
0.789∗∗ -0.236 -21.1% 0.108 quadratic
0.851 -0.162 -14.9% 0.108 quadratic X
0.866 -0.144 -13.4% 0.105 quadratic X X
0.763∗ -0.270 -23.7% 0.147 cubic
0.787 -0.240 -21.3% 0.148 cubic X
0.774∗ -0.256 -22.6% 0.144 cubic X X
(B) SE within 180 days 0.908 -0.097 -9.2% 0.064 linear
0.912 -0.092 -8.8% 0.064 linear X
0.933 -0.069 -6.7% 0.064 linear X X
0.803∗∗ -0.219 -19.7% 0.097 quadratic
0.863 -0.148 -13.7% 0.097 quadratic X
0.858 -0.153 -14.2% 0.097 quadratic X X
0.773∗ -0.257 -22.7% 0.133 cubic
0.793∗ -0.232 -20.7% 0.133 cubic X
0.775∗ -0.255 -22.5% 0.133 cubic X X
(C) SE within 360 days 0.892∗ -0.114 -10.8% 0.061 linear
0.894∗ -0.112 -10.6% 0.061 linear X
0.916 -0.088 -8.4% 0.061 linear X X
0.799∗∗ -0.224 -20.1% 0.092 quadratic
0.857∗ -0.154 -14.3% 0.092 quadratic X
0.865 -0.145 -13.5% 0.093 quadratic X X
0.776∗∗ -0.254 -22.4% 0.126 cubic
0.794∗ -0.230 -20.6% 0.126 cubic X
0.794∗ -0.231 -20.6% 0.127 cubic X X
(D) SE within 720 days 0.907* -0.097 -9.3% 0.059 linear
0.909 -0.095 -9.1% 0.059 linear X
0.927 -0.075 -7.3% 0.060 linear X X
0.818∗∗ -0.201 -18.2% 0.089 quadratic
0.873 -0.136 -12.7% 0.089 quadratic X
0.875 -0.134 -12.5% 0.090 quadratic X X
0.792∗ -0.233 -20.8% 0.122 cubic
0.807∗ -0.214 -19.3% 0.122 cubic X
0.797∗ -0.227 -20.3 0.123 cubic X X
Notes: This table presents the maximum-likelihood RDD estimates of the competing-risks regression models according
to the method of Fine and Gray (1999). The failure event of primary interest is exiting into self-employment within
90, 180, 360 or 720 days, and the competing failure event is exiting into re-employment in the same window. We
provide results for different specifications of the RDD polynomial, including and excluding control variables. The
last column indicates whether we control for duration dependence. The Rate column is computed from the value of
the estimate: Rate = (exp(β̂RDD) − 1) × 100. We use the stcrreg routine in Stata to estimate the competing-risks
regression models. N = 33,833 without controls, N = 32,900 with controls. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table D.2: Competing-Risks Regression Results for Employment
Event of Interest Hazard Ratio Estimate Rate s.e. Polynomial Covs. Dur. Dep.
(A) E within 90 days 0.975 -0.025 -2.5% 0.028 linear
0.981 -0.019 -1.9% 0.029 linear X
1.003 0.003 0.3% 0.025 linear X X
1.045 0.044 4.5% 0.044 quadratic
1.035 0.034 3.5% 0.045 quadratic X
1.032 0.031 3.2% 0.039 quadratic X X
1.066 0.064 6.6% 0.060 cubic
1.076 0.073 7.6% 0.061 cubic X
1.063 0.061 6.3% 0.054 cubic X X
(B) E within 180 days 1.017 0.017 1.7% 0.023 linear
1.028 0.027 2.8% 0.024 linear X
1.016 0.016 1.6% 0.025 linear X X
1.105∗∗∗ 0.099 10.5% 0.036 quadratic
1.088∗∗ 0.084 8.8% 0.036 quadratic X
1.046 0.045 4.6% 0.039 quadratic X X
1.101∗ 0.097 10.1% 0.049 cubic
1.098∗ 0.093 9.8% 0.050 cubic X
1.085 0.082 8.5% 0.053 cubic X X
(C) E within 360 days 1.026 0.025 2.6% 0.022 linear
1.033 0.032 3.3% 0.022 linear X
1.024 0.024 2.4% 0.025 linear X X
1.086∗∗ 0.082 8.6% 0.034 quadratic
1.067∗ 0.065 6.7% 0.034 quadratic X
1.050 0.049 5.0% 0.038 quadratic X X
1.069 0.067 6.9% 0.046 cubic
1.063 0.061 6.3% 0.047 cubic X
1.085 0.081 8.5% 0.052 cubic X X
(D) E within 720 days 1.024 0.024 2.4% 0.021 linear
1.030 0.030 3.0% 0.021 linear X
1.024 0.024 2.4% 0.024 linear X X
1.086∗∗ 0.083 8.6% 0.032 quadratic
1.069∗∗ 0.067 6.9% 0.033 quadratic X
1.048 0.047 4.8% 0.038 quadratic X X
1.075 0.073 7.5% 0.044 cubic
1.070 0.068 7.0% 0.045 cubic X
1.083 0.079 8.3% 0.051 cubic X X
Notes: This table presents the maximum-likelihood RDD estimates of the competing-risks regression models according
to the method of Fine and Gray (1999). The failure event of primary interest is exiting into re-employment within
90, 180, 360 or 720 days, and the competing failure event is exiting into self-employment in the same window. We
provide results for different specifications of the RDD polynomial, including and excluding control variables. The
last column indicates whether we control for duration dependence. The Rate column is computed from the value of
the estimate: Rate = (exp(β̂RDD) − 1) × 100. We use the stcrreg routine in Stata to estimate the competing-risks
regression models. N = 33,833 without controls, N = 32,900 with controls. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table D.3: Competing-Risks Regression Results for the Union of Self-Employment and Employment
Event of Interest Hazard Ratio Estimate Rate s.e. Polynomial Covs. Dur. Dep.
(A) SE or E within 90 days 0.951∗∗ -0.050 -4.9% 0.025 linear
0.959∗ -0.042 -4.1% 0.026 linear X
0.962 -0.039 -3.8% 0.018 linear X X
0.982 -0.018 -1.8% 0.039 quadratic
0.992 -0.008 -0.8% 0.040 quadratic X
0.960 -0.041 -4.0% 0.025 quadratic X X
0.988 -0.012 -1.2% 0.053 cubic
1.006 0.006 0.6% 0.054 cubic X
0.929 -0.073 -7.1% 0.034 cubic X X
(B) SE or E within 180 days 0.985 -0.015 -1.5% 0.021 linear
0.998 -0.002 -0.2% 0.021 linear X
0.939 -0.063 -6.1% 0.047 linear X X
1.034 0.034 3.4% 0.032 quadratic
1.040 0.039 4.0% 0.033 quadratic X
0.977 -0.023 -2.3% 0.054 quadratic X X
1.022 0.021 2.2% 0.044 cubic
1.031 0.031 3.1% 0.045 cubic X
1.011 0.011 1.1% 0.074 cubic X X
(C) SE or E within 360 days 0.990 -0.010 -1.0% 0.020 linear
1.002 0.002 0.2% 0.020 linear X
0.931 -0.071 -6.9% 0.057 linear X X
1.019 0.019 1.9% 0.030 quadratic
1.026 0.025 2.6% 0.031 quadratic X
0.984 -0.017 -1.6% 0.064 quadratic X X
0.991 -0.009 -0.9% 0.041 cubic
0.999 -0.001 -0.1% 0.042 cubic X
1.064 0.062 6.4% 0.090 cubic X X
(D) SE or E within 720 days 0.989 -0.011 -1.1% 0.019 linear
1.003 0.003 0.3% 0.019 linear X
0.928 -0.075 -7.2% 0.061 linear X X
1.023 0.023 2.3% 0.029 quadratic
1.035 0.035 3.5% 0.029 quadratic X
0.982 -0.019 -1.8% 0.069 quadratic X X
0.987 -0.014 -1.3% 0.040 cubic
0.999 -0.001 -0.1% 0.040 cubic X
1.084 0.081 8.4% 0.098 cubic X X
Notes: This table presents the maximum-likelihood RDD estimates of the competing-risks regression models according
to the method of Fine and Gray (1999). The failure event of primary interest is transition into the union of self-
employment and employment within 90, 180, 360 or 720 days, and the competing failure event is staying unemployed.
We provide results for different specifications of the RDD polynomial, including and excluding control variables. The
last column indicates whether we control for duration dependence. The Rate column is computed from the value of
the estimate: Rate = (exp(β̂RDD) − 1) × 100. We use the stcrreg routine in Stata to estimate the competing-risks
regression models. N = 33,833 without controls, N = 32,900 with controls. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Figure D.1: Cumulative Incidence Functions - Quadratic
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Notes: These figures illustrate the estimated cumulative incidence functions for self-employment, employment, and the
union of both exit states. In other words, the probability that individuals become self-employed, employed, or either
of them in each month of the respective 360- or 720-day window. The corresponding competing-risks models have
been estimated using the complete set of covariates, excluding duration dependence, and a quadratic specification of
the RDD polynomial. The stcurve routine in Stata has been used to generate the graphs.
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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E Appendix: Data and Variables
E.1 MCVL Dataset
Spain’s Continuous Working Life Sample - Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) - allows
us to extract employer-employee linked panel data. Starting from the year 2004, MCVL has been
released every year by Spain’s Dirección General de Ordenación de la Seguridad Social (DGOSS),
with 2018 as the latest edition. It contains social security data of a four percentage non-stratified
random sample of the population registered with the Spanish social security. Any individual who is
working, receiving unemployment benefits, or receiving a pension in Spain could be in this sample.45
The MCVL consists of two versions. The version Sin Datos Fiscales (SDF) includes social security
data without income tax records. Each edition provides data of contribution bases from which
the real labor earnings can be inferred for most individuals. However, these real earnings are top-
and bottom coded. In the version Con Datos Fiscales (CDF), income tax records data is added,
which provides information on each job and the uncensored real earnings separately. The data
files contained in each edition can be merged via the person ID which is maintained across MCVL
editions. Each MCVL edition comprises the complete labor market histories of each individual
in the sample from 1953 until the respective year of the MCVL wave. Earnings data is available
only since 1980. Combining the editions is useful to optimize the representativeness over time,
since it allows to detect all individuals who are added because they have been registered with the
Social Security, even though they may have been missing in one MCVL wave due to administrative
mistakes. Thus, linking the MCVL editions allows us to fill gaps in the affiliations with the Social
Security and update variables which are only updated when a new MCVL wave is produced (e.g.
residence).
The MCVL provides not only monthly data on labor income and (un-)employment spells but also
information on individual characteristics (gender, age, education, nationality, occupation, etc.),
working time, and employers’ characteristics (firm size, firm sector, etc.). Experience levels can be
easily computed. We created an overview document that lists all variables contained in each of the
MCVL waves (2005-2018): “Documentation of MCVL Variables and Labels”.
To be able to work with the MCVL data, one has to apply for data access.46 For more information
on the Spanish social security data and its availability, we refer to the Dirección General de
Ordenación de la Seguridad Social.
E.2 Data Construction
Due to space limitation, this part of the appendix provides a brief overview of our extensive data
work. As we believe that our data and variable documentation can prove to be useful for other
researchers who intend to work with the MCVL data, we refer to more detailed documentations
that allow replication of our work.
45Note that in this working paper, we do not consider pension data and only partially use taxable income data.
46http://www.seg-social.es/Estadisticas/EST211/1459
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E.2.1 From Raw to Master Data
Our master dataset aims to include as many variables and information as possible (e.g. it keeps
parallel and overlapping spells from side jobs), such that it can be used as starting point for other
research projects. We created an overview of all the variables which we obtain in our master
dataset: “MCVL-Variables.xlsx”. Our code partially builds upon the replication files and data
documentations provided by Lafuente (2020), Agrawal and Foremny (2019), and De La Roca
and Puga (2017). In the data documentations, we cite them for reference when we follow the
corresponding author’s approach, or we indicate in which way our concept differs. We refer to
the first part of our data documentation “Documentation I: From Original Data to Master
Data” for a detailed description of how to clean the original raw dataset from the Spanish social
security authorities and construct our master dataset.
E.2.2 From Master Data to Final Results
Our analysis dataset is restricted to the needs of this research project. We only keep an individual’s
main spells and eliminate parallel and overlapping spells from side jobs using the procedures by
Erhardt and Künster (2014). Again, we created an overview of all the variables which we obtain in
the process of transforming the master dataset into the analysis dataset: “MCVL_Variables_-
Analysis”. The second part of our data documentation “Documentation II: From Master to
Analysis Data” describes how we create our analysis dataset based on the master dataset.
E.3 Variables Overview
The following paragraphs give an overview of the variables that we use in our analysis. For
details on all the variables in the MCVL dataset and their transformation, we refer to our data
documentations, in particular to “MCVL-Variables.xlsx”.
E.3.1 Outcome Variables
• Extensive margin measures: This is a set of binary outcome variables which take the value
one if individual i becomes self-employed, employed, or either one of them within a certain
amount of days. The variable takes the value zero if the individual remains unemployed or
exits into an alternative state within this period. We choose intervals of 90, 180, 360, and
720 days.
• Unemployment duration: As we observe individuals’ spells until the end of 2018, those
who switch into an UI spell by the end of 2013 can be observed until a maximum of five years.
We guarantee that pre- and post-reform period spells potentially have the same duration
maximum by artificially right-censoring unemployment duration. We differentiate between
two duration measures:
– UI spell duration: Actual UI spell duration in months. It excludes UA spells and
spells without benefit receipt.
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– UE spell duration: Actual unemployment duration in months, including UI spells,
subsequent UA spells, and spells without benefit receipt (unregistered periods of unem-
ployment).
• (Self-)employment quality measures:
– Duration: Post-unemployment exit spell (either self-employment or employment)
duration in months.
– ln(real monthly average contribution basis): Natural logarithm of the individual’s
real monthly average contribution basis from Social Security records in 2015 euros. This
variable corresponds to real earnings but only with regards to employment spells. We
use it as the best available proxy for self-employment income.
– Above median wage pre-UI receipt dummy: Indicates whether the individual
received a real monthly average wage above the median before he or she became
unemployed. We use it as a proxy for high quality workers.
– Permanent contract dummy: Individual with a permanent contract (1), individual
with a temporary contract (0). Permanent contracts may be interpreted as a sign for
higher quality. Naturally, this information is not available for self-employment spells.
– Sector of activity indicators: Sector 1: Agriculture, extraction, primary manufac-
turing; Sector 2: manufacturing and utilities; Sector 3: construction; Sector 4: trade;
Sector 5: transport and storage; Sector 6: accommodation and food services; Sector
7: information and communication (I&C), finance, insurance, real estate, and scientific
services; Sector 8: education, health, social, auxiliary, and other services.
E.3.2 Predetermined Covariates
All control variables are measured at the individual’s UI spell entry.
• Socioeconomic characteristics
– Female dummy: Female (1), male (0).
– Age: Individual’s age in years.
– Age2: Age squared.
– Education level: Lower education, medium education, and higher education.47
– Presence of children dummy: Presence of children in the household (1), no presence
of children in the household (0).
47Lower education includes individuals without studies, with primary education, secondary school diploma (ESO),
and basic professional training. Medium education includes Bachillerato, intermediate professional training, and
other intermediate diplomas. Higher education includes university graduates, non-university higher studies diplomas,
doctorates, masters, and other post-graduate studies (Dirección General de Ordenación de la Seguridad Social, 2020).
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– Immigrant dummy: Immigrant (1), no immigrant (0). We define an immigrant as a
person with a different birth country than that of Spain. Alternatively we use a person’s
nationality.
• Pre-displacement job characteristics:
– Employment experience: Aggregated duration of an individual’s employment spells
in months.
– Self-employment experience dummy: Individual with self-employment experience
(1), individual without self-employment experience (0).
– ln(real monthly average earnings): Natural logarithm of the individual’s real
monthly average earnings from the Social Security records in 2015 euros. This variable
is equivalent to the ln(real monthly average contribution basis) from above, but in
this context we only consider previously employed workers. Workers who have been
self-employed before they switch into an unemployment spell are excluded from our
sample. Consequently, the contribution basis will always correspond to earnings with
respect to our predetermined covariates.
– Skill level: High skilled, medium skilled, and low skilled occupation.48
– Permanent contract dummy: As specified above.
– Sector of activity indicators: As specified above.
• Unemployment characteristics:
– Local unemployment rate: Quarterly unemployment rate on a province level.49
– Potential benefit duration (PBD): Individuals’ potential UI benefit duration in
months.
48This variable is based on the occupational codes described in Dirección General de Ordenación de la Seguridad
Social (2020). We follow the same classification as in Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020). High skilled
occupations include engineers, college graduates, senior managers, technical engineers, graduate assistants, as well as
administrative and technical managers. Medium skilled occupation includes non-graduate assistants, administrative
officers, administrative assistants, as well as subordinates and auxiliary workers. Low skilled occupation includes
first and second-class officers, third-class officers and technicians, laborers, as well as minors. Note that information
on occupational codes is not provided for individuals in the special social security scheme of self-employed workers
(Dirección General de Ordenación de la Seguridad Social, 2020).
49This variable is based on information extracted from official statistics published by INE (2018).
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F Appendix: Institutional Details
F.1 Social Security System in Spain
The Spanish social security system is organized in four different contribution schemes. Ordinary
employed individuals are registered within the general scheme, but there are also special schemes for
sea workers, coal mining workers, and self-employed individuals (autonomous scheme). The social
security system has increased in complexity over the years, and currently each of these schemes
consists of several sub-schemes (artists, domestic workers, seasonal workers, etc.).
The social security legislation established specific regulations of these schemes for some groups, such
as civil servants, armed forces, or education and health workers. Some reforms in the last decade
have aimed at simplifying this intricate system (Spanish Social Security, 2018). For instance, in
2008, self-employed individuals of the former special scheme for agriculture were integrated into the
autonomous scheme. Furthermore, the former special scheme for agriculture and the special scheme
for domestic employees were integrated into the general scheme as of January 2012. For detailed
information on unemployment and self-employment programs, we refer to our Online-Appendix
“Unemployment and Self-Employment: Institutional Background”.
F.2 Unemployment Insurance (UI)
The contribution period, which is used to calculate the PBD, excludes contributions which have
already been used for previous UI spells. However, one can still claim the remaining entitlements.
If an individual’s employment spell lasted for at least 360 days and, thus, he or she qualifies for
UI benefits, the individual is allowed to choose between the non-exhausted benefits from the last
UI spell, and the new entitlement collected from the most recent employment spell (option right).
Obviously, not only the PBD may differ but the amount of old and new benefits may differ as well
because they are calculated from different pre-unemployment salaries. The non-selected entitlement
will be lost. However, if the employment spell that followed the previous UI spell lasted for less
than 360 days, the newly gathered entitlement is not lost. Instead, the worker can claim it as soon
as the accumulated short-term employment spells reach the 360-days threshold (Alba-Ramirez,
Arranz, & Muñoz-Bullón, 2007).
It is important to note that individuals who claim benefits after July 14 2012 (when the new RR
was valid) could still receive UI benefits with the RR from the old system if they used the option
right. We drop every potential option right case to avoid biased estimates from these cases. We
also exclude individuals who exhaust the remaining entitlement from an old UI spell because they
were not able to gather new entitlement in the meantime, i.e. those who did not work for at least
360 days before being laid-off. These individuals would be different from individuals who become
less frequently unemployed and therefore have not exhausted any of their entitlements yet. The
latter is the group we are interested in, which is why we exclude the former.
In case of part-time employment, the eligibility of a worker can only be determined with respect to
the contribution periods of those jobs from which he or she has already been dismissed. As the UI
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benefit amount, which results from applying the RR to the regulatory base, must be weighted by
the corresponding part-time coefficient, a half-day job collects only 50% of the benefits a full-day
job would have generated. Additionally, part-time workers are not eligible for UI benefits if they
work no more than 48 hours per month (Kyyrä, Arranz, & García-Serrano, 2019). From July 2018
onward, the relevant contribution period for the part-time employed corresponds to the time when
the worker had an active affiliation, regardless of how many days in a given week one has worked
and regardless of the amount of hours worked. The regulatory base corresponds to the average of
the individual’s contribution bases in both the lost and ongoing part-time contracts (SEPE, 2019).
Both UI and UA recipients are subject to penalties in terms of (partial) benefit loss if they commit
an offense against provisions that regulate the unemployment protection. The level of a penalty
depends on an offense’s severity. There are minor, serious, and very serious offenses. The penalty
becomes more severe the more often an offense is committed. For very serious offenses, benefits are
canceled, and unduly collected benefits must be returned (SEPE, 2019).
F.3 Unemployment Assistance (UA)
UA eligibility requires one of the following circumstances: (1) UI benefits are exhausted and the
individual has family dependents; (2) the individual received UI benefits for at least 360 days and
is at least 45 years old; (3) the individual is ineligible for UI benefits because he or she contributed
less than 360 days; (4) the individual is a returned emigrant; (5) the individual was released from
prison; (6) the individual’s disability spell ended because he or she was declared to be able to
work; (7) the individual is at least 55 years old. The UA benefit amount is independent from the
pre-displacement salary.50 Instead, a flat benefit amount equal to 80% of the Public Income Index -
Indicador Público de Renta de Efectos Múltiples (IPREM) - is paid to UA recipients. The duration
of entitlement to UA benefits can reach a maximum of 30 months, depending on the individual’s
age and family responsibilities (SEPE, 2019).
F.4 Self-Employment and Social Security in Spain
The concept of self-employment (own-account work) is a broad category which includes different
types of workers: self-employed workers, self-employed professionals and freelancers, self-employed
entrepreneurs, economically-dependent self-employed workers (TRADE), agrarian self-employed
workers, and some special cases. Self-employed individuals pay their social security contributions to
the Special Regime of Self-Employed Workers (RETA). RETA includes self-employed workers older
than 18 years of age who are not bound by a work contract, but also cases such as unpaid family
members, book writers, TRADE workers, managers and CEOs (Spanish Social Security, 2018).
The contributions paid by the self-employed depend on the chosen level of social protection. The
self-employed worker determines the contribution rate as well as the desired contribution base
within existing legal bounds which are determined each year. For instance, if the worker decides to
be insured against the risk of “cease of activity” (analogous to UI benefits in the General Scheme),
50Our Excel file “UI_Benefits_Contributions_Calculator.xlsx” provides a useful tool to check the specific UI and
UA benefit limits applicable in each year.
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2.20% of his or her income is added to the minimum contribution base. To also be insured against
“professional contingencies” (protection in case of inability to work due to work-related reasons,
e.g. accidents), between 1.3% and 6.8% is added. The minimum and maximum base among which
the self-employed worker can choose depends on personal and occupational characteristics: age,
marital status, contribution history, gender, disability, etc. (Spanish Social Security, 2018).
As of 2019, the Spanish government uniformed the RETA scheme, obliging all self-employed to pay
all type of contingencies. De facto, the level of protection for the self-employed was equalized to
the one of employees. It is noteworthy that, before this reform, only 19.7% of the self-employed
had opted in to be covered for work accidents and occupational diseases (Eurofound, 2017).
In the MCVL data, we can observe all self-employed individuals, as they have to contribute at
least a minimum amount to the social security system. However, we can only approximately infer
the income of self-employed workers by assuming that those making more profits have chosen
to contribute more to the social security system. In the future, the reform of 2019 may allow
researchers to better approximate self-employment income.
F.5 Budgetary Adjustments and Public Firm Workers
Spain endured the economic and social consequences of the financial crisis of 2008 in a double
dip recession. During the early period of the crisis, the national government tried to stimulate
the economy through several programs, with the main goal of stabilizing employment. In 2009,
investments into infrastructure, unemployment training and services, along with hiring incentives
alleviated the first effects of the crisis. This first phase was followed by severe austerity policies
aimed at reducing public deficit to 3% by 2013 (Lusiani, 2014). From 2010 to 2012, the Spanish
government focused on keeping public spending minimal. These cutbacks had an impact on multiple
levels of the public administration, resulting in a loss of about 103,000 public workers from 2012 to
2013, which represented 4.1% of public sector employees (Registro Central de Personal, 2017).
In the health administration, these budgetary adjustments were translated into wage and hiring
freezes, which reportedly decreased the number of health professionals in public hospitals. The first
ones to be laid off were, of course, temporary workers and substitutes. In 2012 the public job offers
were frozen such that the replacement rate of workers was limited to only 10%, and the restrictions
were even harder for temporary contracts. Between 2010 and 2013, the number of health workers in
the public sector decreased by 21,011 individuals, i.e. 4.5% relative to 2010 (Bandrés & González,
2013). In the education sector, the same model of replacement and salary freezes was applied.
Similarly, the number of employed educators decreased for all education levels by almost 20,000
workers (2.6%) from 2012 to 2013 (Pérez García & Uriel Jiménez, 2016).
When we include public firm workers in our RDD sample, our McCrary and non-parametric density
test results indicate discontinuities in UI entries around the cutoff date. These discontinuities are
caused by the dismissal of suspiciously many public firm workers in the months right after the
reform was implemented. The discontinuities disappear when we exclude public firm workers, such
that our identification assumptions are fulfilled.
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F.6 Reforms
We present an overview of the main Spanish labor market reforms in recent years, along with the
strategies we implement to address each one of them throughout our empirical analysis.
F.6.1 Unemployment Insurance System Reforms
In general, our UI entry date accounts for these reforms.51 Some reforms affected the whole labor
force in the same way, and thus do not violate our identification assumption. In addition, we
restrict our analysis sample to full-time workers younger than 52 years of age, which avoids bias
from the remaining reforms.
• Introduction of the IPREM, July 2004. The IPREM substitutes the minimum wage
(SMI ) as a reference for unemployment benefits and other social aids.
• Active Insertion Income, November 2006. State subsidy for workers with special economic
needs and difficulties to find a job (e.g. individuals older than 45). Any person younger than
65 who fulfills the legal requirements may be eligible for this subsidy (SEPE, 2019).
• Labour Market Reform I, September 2010. New classification of fair dismissal conditions,
and in some cases reduction of severance payments from 45 to 20 days per year of employment.
• PREPARA, February 2011. New extraordinary subsidy as incentive to provide long-term
part-time contracts to unemployed individuals younger than 30, as long as they commit to
training programs.
• Labour Market Reform II, July 2012.
– RR reduction from 60% to 50% after 180 days of UI benefit receipt.
– UA benefits extension until retirement for workers older than 55.
• Budgetary Stability, December 2013. End of the public contributions to the severance
payments of dismissed workers in the case of objective reasons in solvent firms.
F.6.2 Self-Employment Reforms
Again, our UI entry date restrictions account for most of the following reforms. Potential inconsis-
tencies from reforms which mainly target younger individuals are considered in Appendix F.6.3
and can be ruled out.
• Self-employed Workers Statute, October 2007.
– Extension of social protection for temporary sick-leave to the self-employed.
– Definition of the role of economically dependent self-employed workers (TRADE).
51In our analysis sample, we only include individuals transitioning to UI from January 1 2011 to December 31 2013.
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• Cease-of-activity Benefits (CAB), August 2010. Introduction of CAB as a voluntary
contingency linked to work accidents and professional illness contingencies. CAB amounts
are based on the principle of contribution-benefits.
• Incentives to Entrepreneurship and Job Creation, March 2013.
– Capitalization of UI benefits for young employed workers: payment of 100% of the UI
benefits to men younger than 30 and women younger than 35 who would like to become
self-employed.
– Reactivation of outstanding UI benefit payments after being self-employed with better
conditions for workers under 30.
• Strategy of Entrepreneurship and Youth Employment, August 2013.
– Flat and reduced rate of social security contributions for young self-employed workers
(men under 30 and women under 35).
– Improvement of financing for young self-employed workers.
• Promotion of Self-Employment, October 2015. Generalization of many advantages of
young self-employed workers to all individuals.
• Further Reforms, December 2018.
– All voluntary contingencies become compulsory (CAB and professional contingencies).
– CAB duration is extended up to 24 months.
F.6.3 Ruling out Inconsistencies from the Self-Employment Reforms in 2013
In principle, it is possible that the reforms adopted in 2013, with the goal of promoting self-
employment among young workers, could affect our results. These reforms incentivize self-
employment by improving the financing of young self-employed workers, namely women younger
than 30 and men younger than 35. Details about the reforms may be inferred from Appendix F.6.2.
Since these reforms come with clear age criteria, we can infer individual eligibility from our data.
For the following analysis, we create a self-employment reform eligibility indicator (SE reform),
taking a value of one if the eligibility criteria are fulfilled (either female and younger than 35 or
male and younger than 30), and zero otherwise.
Even though the self-employment reforms may alter decisions of unemployed individuals who have
been previously looking for a job in regular employment, other authors did not address potential
bias from these reforms (Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas, 2020; Fernandez-Navia, 2020). Where
could these potential inconsistencies come from? Consider a very simplistic expression of the true
relationship between the outcome variable of interest Yi (self-employment or employment exit
indicators) and treatment indicators of the UI benefit cut (UI reform) and the self-employment
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reforms (SE reform) on the right hand side, as illustrated in equation F.1.
Yi =α+β ·1(ti ≥ 0)+γ ·1(agei < limit)+ εi = α+β ·UI reform+γ ·SE reform+ εi (F.1)
If this was the true relationship, omitting the SE reform dummy from the equation would lead to
omitted variable bias, which could lead to inconsistent point estimates, depending on the direction
and magnitude of the correlation between SE and UI reform indicators. This potential inconsistency
is illustrated in equation F.2. The estimated UI reform coefficient β̂ converges in probability towards
the true effect β if the covariance between UI reform and SE reform indicator is equal to zero.
plim β̂ = β+γ · Cov(UI reform,SE reform)
V ar(UI reform) (F.2)
Fortunately, we can compute this covariance directly from our data. We find a covariance which
is very close to zero but with a slightly negative tendency (-0.002544) in our RDD sample. Our
RDD sample includes individuals who switch into an UI benefit spell in the time between 2011 and
2013 if the bandwidth is not restricted any further (for more details please refer to Section 4.1). It
converges even closer to zero if we restrict the bandwidth, as illustrated in Table F.1. As soon as
the bandwidth hits 300 days, the covariance shows a positive tendency. Note that bandwidths of
300 days or lower are more plausible reference values, since they are closer to the MSE-optimal
bandwidths selected in our local polynomial regressions in Section 5.1. Since the covariance between
UI reform and SE reform seems to be very close to zero, we have reason to believe in a consistently
estimated UI reform effect.
Table F.1: Covariance between UI Reform and SE Reform Indicators
Bandwidth 530 500 400 300 200 180 150
Covariance -0.001647 -0.000945 -.000979 .000998 .003919 .003942 .00502
Notes: This table indicates the covariance between SE reform and UI reform indicators, computed from our RDD
sample with different bandwidths in days around the UI reform date (July 15 2012).
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
Nonetheless, we would like to consider, in more detail, any potential inconsistencies from the slightly
positive covariance when we use MSE-optimal bandwidths. First, we consider the possibility of
inconsistent point estimates in light of equation F.2 if we use the self-employment exit indicator as an
outcome variable. Given that the true UI reform effect is indeed negative (β < 0) and the SE reforms
have a positive effect on the self-employment probability (γ > 0), a slightly positive covariance
between UI reform and SE reform would lead to an estimated effect on the self-employment
probability (β̂) which is slightly less negative than it would be under absence of the self-employment
reform. Consequently, our estimated negative effect is slightly positively biased and may correspond
to a lower bound estimate in absolute terms, which is very close to the true effect. Even if the
SE reform effect would be huge, the inconsistency of the estimated UI reform effect would be
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very small.52 Thus, our estimated UI reform effects on self-employment can be considered very
conservative.
Second, we consider potential inconsistencies in the employment context. According to equation
F.2, if we believe that the UI reform affects the job finding probability positively (β > 0), the
SE reforms incentivize self-employment as opposed to employment (γ < 0), and we restrict the
bandwidth to 300 or less, then our estimated positive effect on the employment probability would
be slightly negatively biased. Consequently, we would estimate a more conservative lower bound
estimate of the true effect as well.
In addition, we empirically test whether the SE reforms affect our outcome variables of interest
in combination with the UI benefit reform by adding an interaction between UI reform and SE
reform to our estimation equation 1. Since the rdrobust routine in Stata, which we use to estimate
our local point estimates in Section 5, does not provide the estimated covariates’ coefficients, we
estimate a parametric regression instead. We test different bandwidths between 140 and 180
days, and use a linear, quadratic, and cubic spline. Our results regarding the medium-term
self-employment indicator as outcome variable can be inferred from Table F.2. All specifications
contain the covariates explained in Section 4.1, but we add the interaction term and the SE reform
indicator in columns 2, 4, and 6. Overall, point estimates stay very robust to the inclusion of
the additional variables. The coefficient of the interaction term is always very close to zero and
insignificant. We obtain similar evidence if we use the short-term employment indicator as our
outcome variable, as illustrated in Table F.3. We obtain a significant interaction effect only once,
for a bandwidth of 160 days. Overall, evidence speaks in favor of a consistently estimated UI reform
effect regardless of the outcome variable.
52Example: We can compute β, using our estimated medium-term UI reform effect of -3.5 p.p. in the quadratic
setting from Section 5.1, and the UI variance of 0.249114 which we computed from our data. We use a plausible
bandwidth setting of 200 days, for which the covariance between UI reform and SE reform corresponds to 0.003919.
If we assume that the SE reforms increase the self-employment probability by 50 p.p. (i.e. γ = 0.5) which would be a
tremendously huge effect, this would increase β by approximately 0.079 p.p. (= 0.5 · (0.003919/0.249114) = 0.007866).
Consequently, our estimated β̂ of -3.5 p.p. corresponds to a lower bound estimate of the true effect (β = −4.29 p.p.)
in this extreme setting with a huge SE reform effect.
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Table F.2: Reform Interaction Effect on Self-Employment within 360 days
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Bandwidth
UI reform -0.025 -0.024 -0.028 -0.027 -0.070∗∗ -0.069∗∗
(=RD Effect) (0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
SE reform 0.013 0.013 0.013 140
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
UI reform · SE reform -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
N 9322 9322 9322 9322 9322 9322
UI reform -0.024 -0.022 -0.028 -0.026 -0.062∗ -0.060∗
(=RD Effect) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025)
SE reform 0.013 0.013 0.013 150
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
UI reform · SE reform -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
N 9922 9922 9922 9922 9922 9922
UI reform -0.025 -0.023 -0.026 -0.024 -0.057∗ -0.055∗
(=RD Effect) (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024)
SE reform 0.014 0.014 0.014 160
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
UI reform · SE reform -0.007 -0.008 -0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
N 10609 10609 10609 10609 10609 10609
UI reform -0.023 -0.021 -0.029 -0.027 -0.045 -0.043
(=RD Effect) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024)
SE reform 0.010 0.010 0.010 170
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
UI reform · SE reform -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
N 11600 11600 11600 11600 11600 11600
UI reform -0.021 -0.019 -0.030 -0.029 -0.041 -0.039
(=RD Effect) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024)
SE reform 0.011 0.011 0.011 180
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
UI reform · SE reform -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
N 12175 12175 12175 12175 12175 12175
Polynomial linear linear quadratic quadratic cubic cubic
Covariates X X X X X X
Notes: The outcome variable is binary and indicates whether the person transitioned into a self-employment spell
within the first 360 days of unemployment. We use our RDD estimation sample (detailed sample restrictions in
Section 4.1). Standard errors are clustered at the UI entry date level. For reasons of comparability, the results are
based on a global estimation approach using different bandwidths between 140 and 180 days. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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Table F.3: Reform Interaction Effect on Employment within 180 days
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Bandwidth
UI reform 0.013 0.002 0.067 0.056 0.105∗ 0.094
(=RD Effect) (0.025) (0.026) (0.035) (0.035) (0.049) (0.049)
SE reform -0.046 -0.045 -0.045 140
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
UI reform · SE reform 0.040 0.041 0.041
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
N 9322 9322 9322 9322 9322 9322
UI reform 0.009 -0.001 0.065 0.055 0.099∗ 0.089
(=RD Effect) (0.025) (0.025) (0.034) (0.034) (0.048) (0.048)
SE reform -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 150
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
UI reform · SE reform 0.036 0.037 0.038
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
N 9922 9922 9922 9922 9922 9922
UI reform 0.007 -0.006 0.057 0.044 0.100∗ 0.087
(=RD Effect) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.033) (0.046) (0.046)
SE reform -0.046∗ -0.046∗ -0.046∗ 160
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
UI reform · SE reform 0.046∗ 0.048∗ 0.047∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
N 10609 10609 10609 10609 10609 10609
UI reform 0.009 -0.002 0.045 0.034 0.101∗ 0.090∗
(=RD Effect) (0.023) (0.024) (0.034) (0.034) (0.045) (0.045)
SE reform -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 170
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
UI reform · SE reform 0.038 0.039 0.039
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
N 11600 11600 11600 11600 11600 11600
UI reform -0.003 -0.013 0.055 0.046 0.082 0.071
(=RD Effect) (0.023) (0.024) (0.033) (0.033) (0.044) (0.043)
SE reform -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 180
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
UI reform · SE reform 0.036 0.036 0.037
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
N 12175 12175 12175 12175 12175 12175
Polynomial linear linear quadratic quadratic cubic cubic
Covariates X X X X X X
Notes: The outcome variable is binary and indicates whether the person transitioned into an employment spell within
the first 180 days of unemployment. Standard errors are clustered at the UI entry date level. We use our RDD
estimation sample (detailed sample restrictions in Section 4.1). For reasons of comparability, the results are based
on a global estimation approach using different bandwidths between 140 and 180 days. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on MCVL 2005-2018 data.
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